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THIRD PARTY INTERVENTIONS IN INTRASTATE DISPUTES IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

by

Mark Jerome Mullenbach

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Bradford S. Jones	Date 8/6/01
Gary Goertz	Date 8/6/01
	Date
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS - Continued

LIST OF FIGURES

LIST OF FIGURES - Continued

LIST OF TABLES

LIST OF TABLES - Continued

ABSTRACT

The phenomenon of third party intervention in domestic political disputes has posed a significant dilemma for international relations scholars and practitioners for several decades. Specifically, why do third parties decide to intervene in some intrastate disputes, but decide not to intervene in other intrastate disputes? The question of why potential third parties choose to intervene in some cases but not in other cases has been widely discussed among international relations scholars and practitioners for several decades, but very few systematic analyses of the question have been conducted by international relations scholars. In this study, I intend to deal with some of the deficiencies in the international relations literature on third party interventions in intrastate disputes.

After describing the phenomenon of third party interventions in intrastate disputes in the 20th century, I develop hypotheses regarding the occurrence of state interventions and intergovernmental organization (IGO) interventions in domestic political disputes. Hypotheses are tested using originally-collected data on some 3,102 cases of third party interventions (including 1,669 state/coalition of states interventions, 573 United Nations interventions, and 860 regional IGO interventions) in some 400 intrastate disputes during the 20th century. Using Logit regression analysis, I find that a combination of strategic (international) linkages and non-strategic (transnational) linkages had significant effects on the occurrence of state interventions during the 20th century. I also find that a combination of security, political, humanitarian, and normative considerations had significant effects on the occurrence of UN and regional IGO interventions during the post-World War II period.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

One of the most enduring political phenomenon of the past century has been the occurrence of disputes between groups within states in the international system. As the number of independent states increased sharply from some 50 countries in 1900 to some 190 countries in 2000, the opportunities for domestic political disputes also increased significantly during this period. At the end of the 20th century, nearly all of the violent conflicts in the international system were between groups within states. In fact, Wallensteen & Sollenberg (2000) reported that there were 110 armed conflicts throughout the world between 1989 and 1999, and that all but seven of these conflicts (94 percent) were intrastate disputes.[1] An equally enduring phenomenon of the past century has been the propensity of external (or third party) actors to involve themselves in disputes between groups within states. From the multilateral intervention by eight states during the Boxer Rebellion in China at the end of the 19th century to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) intervention against the Yugoslav government in the Kosovo dispute at the end of the 20th century, states, coalitions of states, and international organizations have frequently intervened in domestic political disputes in every region of the world.

The phenomenon of third party intervention in domestic political disputes has posed a significant dilemma for international relations scholars and practitioners for several decades. Specifically, why do third parties decide to intervene in some intrastate disputes,

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[1] The terms "intrastate dispute" and "domestic political dispute" are used interchangeably throughout the paper.

but decide not to intervene in other intrastate disputes? This question has led to numerous in-depth analyses of specific historical cases in which third party actors chose for one reason or another to intervene in domestic political disputes.[2] Since external interventions often require significant resources and military capabilities on the part of the third party actor, much of the scholarly attention has necessarily been focused on major international or regional powers, such as the United States, Russia/Soviet Union, Britain, France, and China. Some scholarly attention has also been focused on the role of international organizations in domestic political disputes, such as the United Nations (UN), Organization of African Unity (OAU), and the Organization of American States (OAS).

As one of the most prolific interveners, the US government frequently chose to intervene during crises and conflicts in many states throughout the world during the past century, but the US government also chose to remain on the sidelines during crises and conflicts in many other states during this period.[3] For example, the US government intervened in several domestic political disputes in Latin America prior to the Second World

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[2] For example, see Richter, Heinz. 1986. *British Intervention in Greece: From Varkiza to Civil War*. London: Merlin Press; Wittner, Lawrence S. 1982. *American Intervention in Greece, 1943-1949*. New York: Columbia University Press; and Bhasin, V. K. 1984. *Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan: Its Background and Implications*. New Delhi, India: S. Chand & Company, Ltd.

[3] Mi Yung Yoon (1997) suggested that the US chose to intervene in one way or another in 37 out of 82 "internal wars" in the third world between 1945 and 1989.

War, including the Dominican Republic,[4] Cuba,[5] and Panama.[6] However, the US government did not intervene in several domestic political disputes in other regions of the world during the same period, including Afghanistan, British Burma, United Kingdom/Ireland, Spain, Romania, Kingdom of Najd-Hijaz (Saudi Arabia), Iran, Turkey, and South Africa. In recent years, the US government decided to lead a multinational humanitarian intervention in Somalia on December 9, 1992,[7] but decided against leading a multinational humanitarian intervention under similar circumstances in Rwanda less than two years later.[8] Similarly, the French government chose to intervene in a number of crises

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[4] US troops were deployed in the Dominican Republic in March-April 1903, January-February 1904, September 1912, June-July 1914, and May 1916-September 1924. US diplomats mediated a ceasefire agreement between domestic political groups in August 1914, and US personnel supervised elections in the country in December 1913 and March 1924. US government officials temporarily administered the government of the country between November 1916 and October 1922.

[5] US troops were deployed in Cuba in September 1906-April 1909, June-August 1912, and February 1917-February 1922. US diplomats mediated negotiations between domestic political groups in September 1906, January 1921, and July 1933. US personnel supervised elections in the country in November 1908, November 1920, and March 1921.

[6] US troops were deployed in Panama in November 1903-February 1904, November 1904, May 1912-January 1914, and October 1925. US personnel supervised elections in the country in 1904, July 1908, and June 1912.

[7] The United Nations Security Council authorized the establishment of the Unified Task Force in Somalia (UNITAF) led by the United States on December 3, 1992. UNITAF, which consisted of 37,000 troops from 21 countries, began protecting the delivery of humanitarian assistance on December 9, 1992. Some 300,000 Somalis had died as a result of famine caused by civil conflict since November 1991, and some 700,000 Somalis had fled as refugees to neighboring countries. UNITAF was disbanded on May 4, 1993.

[8] Ethnic violence between Hutus and Tutsis broke out following the death of President Habyarimana in a plane crash on April 6, 1994. Some 500,000 individuals were killed during the first few weeks of the violence, and five million individuals were displaced as a result of the violence. The UN Security Council, which had established the United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR) on June 22, 1993, expanded UNOMUR to 5,200 peacekeeping troops and 90 civilian police on May 17, 1994. UNOMUR was unable to put an end to the genocide. The UN Security Council authorized the deployment of a French-led multinational

and conflicts within former colonies in Africa during the past several decades, but chose not to intervene in other crises and conflicts in former colonies. For example, French troops were deployed in Gabon after a military coup on February 17-18, 1964. French troops restored the deposed President Leon Mba to power, and withdrew from the country in April 1964. French troops also intervened to suppress a military rebellion against the government of President Jean Bedel Bokassa in Central African Republic in November 1967. On the other hand, the French government chose not to intervene following the overthrow of President Hubert Maga in a military coup led by Colonel Christophe Soglo in Benin on October 28, 1963. France also chose not to intervene following the overthrow of President Alphonse Massamba-Debat in a military coup in Congo-Brazzaville on August 3, 1968.

International organizations have also chosen to intervene in some domestic political disputes, while choosing not to intervene in other domestic political disputes. Since the end of the Second World War, the UN has been involved in relatively high-level interventions in intrastate disputes in several countries throughout the world. Prior to the end of the Cold War, the UN deployed peacekeeping missions in Congo-Kinshasa, Cyprus, Dutch East Indies, and Greece. During the same period, the UN did not get involved in intrastate disputes in several countries, including Argentina, Bangladesh, Bolivia, British Kenya, Burma, Chad, China, Colombia, French Madagascar, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Malayan Federation, Nepal, Nigeria, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, South Vietnam, Spain, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Venezuela. Following the Cold War, the UN decided to intervene in

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force (Operation Turquoise) on June 22, 1994, and Operation Turquoise protected a humanitarian zone in Rwanda from June 23 to August 21, 1994.

intrastate disputes in Angola, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Cambodia, Central African Republic, Congo-Kinshasa, Croatia, El Salvador, Georgia (Abkhazia), Guatemala, Haiti, Liberia, Macedonia, Morocco (Western Sahara), Mozambique, Nicaragua, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Tajikistan, and Yemen. On the other hand, the UN has decided not to intervene during the post-Cold War period in a number of other states experiencing domestic political disputes, including Algeria, Bangladesh, Belarus, Chad, Comoros, Egypt, Fiji, Gambia, Guyana, Lesotho, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Niger, Russia (Chechnya), Senegal, Solomon Islands, Togo, Turkey, Uzbekistan, and Zimbabwe.

The question of why potential third parties choose to intervene in some cases but not in other cases has been widely discussed among international relations scholars and practitioners for several decades, but very few systematic analyses of the question have been conducted by international relations scholars.[9] The relative lack of systematic analyses of third party interventions in intrastate disputes has not gone unnoticed in the scholarly community. More than thirty years ago, James Rosenau (1969) complained that in "an age when it is second nature to assume that the solution of problems requires comprehension of their sources, scholarly writings on the problem of intervention are singularly devoid of efforts to develop systematic knowledge on the conditions under which interventionary behavior is initiated, sustained, and abandoned" (149).[10] Rosenau acknowledged that the

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[9] In one of the few systematic analyses, Patrick Regan (1998) examined several factors hypothesized to influence the occurrence of state interventions in some 140 intrastate conflicts in the post-World War II period.

[10] Five years later, Rosenau suggested that much "still remains to be done, especially with respect to the generation of appropriate empirical data, but there is now a growing body of analytic insights that ought to serve as a basis for any inquiry into the subject (1974, 129).

literature was not lacking in empirical data, but he argued that "data and insights in themselves, however, do not necessarily lead to an ever-accumulating body of reliable knowledge about the conditions under which intervention does or does not occur. This requires a process in which interrelated propositions are constantly being formulated, tested, and revised, and such scientific procedures seem totally absent" (150). Rosenau concluded that the "factors that foster, precipitate, sustain, channel, constrain, and/or curb intervention simply have not been scientifically explored, with the result that the literature is barren of any established generalizations" (150). C. R. Mitchell (1970) suggested that what "seems to be called for is a radically different approach, which investigates, on an empirical and comparative basis, the structural, behavioral and attitudinal factors that underlie and lead" to the phenomenon of intervention (191), and Richard Little (1975) declared that "there has been little research carried out on international intervention in international relations" (3-4).

More recently, Gregory Raymond and Charles Kegley (1987) suggested that although "much has been written about intervention, the bulk of this literature consists of case histories rather than explanations of patterned regularities in interventionary behavior" (482). Karen Feste (1992) remarked that there are "no holistic explanations that cover whether, when, where, and how a country will intervene to influence the outcome of civil instability in foreign countries" (36). Finally, David Carment and Dane Rowlands (1998) noted that despite "the plea for increased doctrinal clarity, there remain few systematic and theoretical studies of third-party intervention in intrastate disputes" (574). In short, scholars have recognized for decades that research on the occurrence of third party interventions, while generating a great deal of descriptive knowledge about specific cases of third party

interventions, has not resulted in a great deal of explanatory knowledge.

One of the many ways that a researcher can make a contribution to theory and/or practice in an academic field is to design a systematic analysis of an important topic has been largely overlooked in the literature (King et al., 1994, 17). In this study, I intend to deal with some of the deficiencies in the international relations literature on third party interventions in intrastate disputes.[11] In the second chapter, I provide definitions for the main concepts dealt with in this research project, and I explain how cases of intrastate disputes and third party interventions are identified and categorized. I also explain the process in which information on these cases is systematically collected, and then I summarize the data compiled on cases of intrastate disputes and cases of third party interventions. Specifically, I provide frequencies of the occurrence of intrastate disputes (initiated and ongoing) during the 20th century, and discuss significant changes in the level of intrastate disputes during this period. I also provide frequencies of the occurrence of third party interventions during the 20th century, and discuss significant changes in the level of third party interventions during this period.

In the third chapter, I examine the occurrence of state interventions in intrastate disputes in the 20th century. I begin with the development of a theoretical framework, from

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[11] Scholars have recognized for some time the distinction between third party interventions in interstate disputes and third party interventions in intrastate disputes. For example, Percy Winfield (1932, 236-237) distinguished between "internal" and "external" interventions. Internal interventions are those involving "interference by one state between disputant sections of the community in another state," and external interventions are those involving "interference by one state in the relations...of other states without the consent of the latter." R. J. Vincent (1974, 5) argued that "this is a useful distinction in that it is sensitive to the difference between an 'external' act which addresses itself to a state's foreign relations, and an 'internal' act which seeks to penetrate and meddle in the domestic arrangements of a state."

which I derive a set of hypotheses concerning the occurrence of state interventions in domestic political disputes. The hypotheses are initially tested using data on all state interventions in intrastate disputes during the 20th century. The hypotheses are then tested using data on interventions by six selected states (US, Russia/USSR, China, France, Egypt, and Libya) during the 20th century. I summarize the results of the analyses, and discuss the implications of the results for the study of state interventions in domestic political disputes.

In the fourth chapter, I examine the occurrence of inter-governmental organization (IGO) interventions in intrastate disputes in the 20th century. Specifically, I examine the occurrence of both universal IGO and non-universal IGO interventions. Similar to the previous chapter, I develop a theoretical framework, from which I derive a set of hypotheses concerning the occurrence of UN and regional IGO interventions in domestic political disputes. Again, I summarize the results of the analyses, and discuss the implications of the results for the study of IGO interventions in domestic political disputes. In the final chapter, I will assess the results of the various analyses of third party interventions, and discuss the implications of the results for future research on third party interventions in intrastate disputes.

CHAPTER TWO

IDENTIFICATION AND CATEGORIZATION OF THIRD PARTY INTERVENTIONS IN INTRASTATE DISPUTES

One of the primary reasons for the absence of systematic analyses of third party interventions in intrastate disputes may be the lack of a comprehensive and reliable compilation of information regarding these events for a significant period of time. While there are some existing data sets that contain cases of mediation or cases of military interventions,[12] these types or categories of third party intervention comprise only a few of several different techniques that potential third parties may choose to use in an intrastate dispute. Other limitations of existing data sets are more related to the nature of the dispute, third party actor, and time period. For example, much of the existing data on third party intervention pertains largely to disputes between states, rather than disputes between groups within states. Much of the existing data on third party intervention focuses on states, and generally ignores the occurrence of interventions by the United Nations (UN), regional inter-governmental organizations (IGOs), and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Finally, much of the existing data on third party intervention comes from a rather limited period of time (e.g. post-World War II period), during which there may have been little variation in some of the important factors hypothesized to influence the occurrence of third party interventions.

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[12] For example, see Pearson, Frederic S. and Robert A. Bauman. 1988. International Military Interventions: Identification and Classification. *International Interactions* 14 (no.2): 173-180.

Given the significant limitations in existing data, an important step in the analysis of third party interventions in intrastate disputes must necessarily be the development of a comprehensive and reliable set of data on third party interventions. Ideally, the data set would include the wide range of intervention techniques from which potential third parties may choose, the wide range of third party actors, and a relatively long time period. In the following sections of this chapter, I explain the processes in which cases of intrastate disputes and third party interventions are identified and categorized. I then apply these processes to the historical record of the 20th century, and summarize data on cases of intrastate disputes and third party interventions that were observed to have occurred during that time period.

IDENTIFICATION AND CATEGORIZATION OF INTRASTATE DISPUTES

Intrastate dispute is defined as a *political disagreement between two groups within a state that has escalated on at least one occasion to a crisis, and one of the groups involved in the dispute is the recognized central government of the state.*[13] Intrastate disputes are divided into four mutually-exclusive categories: (1) national liberation/independence dispute - a political disagreement between a colonial government and one or more nationalist groups over control of a particular territory; (2) civil/political dispute - a political disagreement between two or more groups or coalitions of groups over control of the central government of a state; (3) military/political dispute - a political disagreement between a military

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[13] J. David Singer and Melvin Small (1972, 216) similarly classified intrastate disputes according to the following criteria: (1) dispute occurs within the borders of a state; (2) one of the disputants is the central government of a state; and (3) the opposition group is able to offer sustained resistance to the central government.

government and a civilian opposition group or coalition of groups over control of the central government of a state; and (4) secessionist/separatist dispute - a political disagreement between a central government and one or more secessionist/separatist groups over control of a particular territory within a state. Each of the four categories of intrastate disputes is discussed in more detail below.

National liberation/independence disputes generally begin when a nationalist group within a colonial territory establishes a political-military organization in opposition to the government of the colonial state with the intention of obtaining political independence for the territory. Nationalist organizations may decide to challenge the government of the colonial state through peaceful negotiations or through armed rebellion. National liberation/independence disputes generally end or are resolved in one of four different ways: (1) the government of the colonial state defeats or suppresses the opposition group, and the colonial territory does not achieve independence; (2) the government of the colonial state is defeated by the opposition group, and the colonial territory achieves independence; (3) the government of the colonial state and opposition group negotiate a settlement of the dispute, and the colonial territory achieves regional autonomy; and (4) the government of the colonial state and opposition group negotiate a settlement of the dispute, and the colonial territory achieves independence.

Civil/political disputes begin when an opposition group perceives that the political "playing field" within a country is unfairly tilted in favor of the group in control of the central government and makes the decision to challenge the authority of the central

government outside of the normal political channels.[14] The challenge may involve the establishment of a political-military organization in opposition to the central government, illegal demonstrations or strikes against the central government, or a rebellion against the central government. Civil/political disputes are generally rooted in ideological, ethnic/racial, and religious differences between the dominant groups within a country, and a civil/political dispute may generally involve one or more of these three dimensions. For example, the current civil war in Angola has both an ideological dimension and an ethnic dimension. Civil/political disputes generally end or are resolved in one of five different ways: (1) the central government is defeated and overthrown by an opposition group, and a civilian government is established following multi-party or multi-candidate elections; (2) the central government defeats or suppresses an opposition group; (3) the central government is deposed in a military coup, and a military junta assumes control of the government; (4) the central government and opposition group negotiate a settlement of the dispute; and (5) the central government holds multi-party or multi-candidate elections or a constitutional referendum following demonstrations, strikes, or riots organized by the political opposition.

Military/political disputes generally begin when a civilian government is deposed during a military coup, and a military government is established to rule the country. The military government may proceeds to dissolve the parliament, ban or suppress political opposition groups, suspend the constitution, or declare martial law. Opponents of the military government may decide to wage an armed rebellion against the military government

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[14] The "normal political channels" include participation in the government or parliament, participation in multi-party or multi-candidate elections, legal rallies and demonstrations, etc.

or may decide to organize domestic political opposition short of armed rebellion (e.g. demonstrations, strikes, riots) against the military government. Military/political disputes generally end or are resolved in one of four different ways: (1) the military government is defeated and overthrown by an opposition group, and a civilian government is established without multi-party or multi-candidate elections; (2) the military government is defeated and overthrown by an opposition group, and a civilian government is established following multi-party or multi-candidate elections; (3) the military government holds multi-party or multi-candidate elections after defeating or suppressing an opposition group, and a civilian government is established following the elections; and (4) the military government holds multi-party or multi-candidate elections without defeating or suppressing an opposition group, and a civilian government is established following the elections.

Secessionist/separatist disputes generally begin when a nationalist group establishes a secessionist/separatist movement or organization in opposition to the central government of a state, when a nationalist group proclaims a region's independence from the central government, or when a nationalist group begins an armed rebellion against the central government of a state. Secessionist/separatist disputes are usually caused by "deep cleavages" based on ethnic, racial, or religious differences between a dominant group in control of the central government and a minority group located in one specific region of the country (Spencer, 1998, 3-4). Secessionist/separatist disputes generally end or are resolved in one of five different ways: (1) the central government defeats or suppresses the secessionist/separatist movement, and the region does not achieve regional autonomy or independence; (2) the central government is defeated by the secessionist/separatist

movement, and the region achieves independence; (3) the central government and secessionist/separatist movement negotiate a settlement of the dispute, and the region achieves regional autonomy; (4) the central government and secessionist/separatist movement negotiate a settlement of the dispute, and the region achieves independence as a result of a referendum in the territory; and (5) the central government and secessionist/separatist movement negotiate a settlement of the dispute, and the region does not achieve independence as a result of a referendum in the territory.

IDENTIFICATION AND CATEGORIZATION OF THIRD PARTY INTERVENTIONS

Third party intervention is defined as *diplomatic/political, economic, or military involvement by a third party actor in a dispute for the purpose of assisting one of the parties to the dispute or for the purpose of assisting both of the parties to manage or resolve the dispute without taking sides.* This definition is broad enough to include a wide variety of both military and non-military interventions, but it is narrow enough to exclude many foreign policy actions that would not be classified as intervention.[15] In particular, the definition explicitly omits actions by an international actor that are not directly related to a political dispute between two or more parties within a state. Third party actors may be one of three different types: (1) representatives of states or coalition of states;[16] (2) representatives of

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[15] John W. Eley stated that the "necessity of dealing with the range of interventionary behavior is particularly clear in any effort to explain the factors underlying intervention" (1972, 255).

[16] Representatives of states/coalitions of states include heads-of-state or government (e.g. president or prime minister), government ministers (e.g. foreign minister or defense minister), and envoys or representatives of heads-of-state or government.

intergovernmental organizations (IGOs);[17] and (3) representatives of non-governmental organizations (NGOs). In the definition of third party intervention, diplomatic/political involvement refers to third party actions such as condemnations, diplomatic non-recognition, ceasefire appeals, fact-finding, and mediation. Economic involvement refers to third party actions such as economic assistance and economic sanctions. Military involvement refers to third party actions such as military assistance, military sanctions, peacekeeping, and use of military force (Vincent, 1974, 9-10).

Third party interventions are broadly categorized as either participatory (partisan) interventions or intermediary (non-partisan) interventions.[18] Participatory interventions are those interventions in which the third party actor gets involved on one particular side of the dispute. Third party actors may intervene in support of one of the parties to the dispute or in opposition to one of the parties to the dispute. Participatory interventions may be requested by the central government of a state, requested by the opposition to the central government, requested by another third party actor, or initiated by a third party actor without

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[17] IGOs are international organizations with states as members, and include universal organizations (such as the United Nations) and regional organizations (such as the Organization of American states and the European Union. Representatives of an IGO include the head of the secretariat (e.g. secretary-general), the council or president of the council, the assembly or president of the assembly; a summit meeting of the leaders of member-states, and a summit meeting of foreign ministers or defense ministers of member-states.

[18] Christopher R. Mitchell (1981, 274-275) suggested that a "distinction need to be drawn between third party activity that is essentially partisan, and that which is intermediary." Participatory interventions are "intended to help one of the parties win the dispute, or, at least, to achieve an improved outcome." Intermediary interventions are "undertaken by a third party with the primary intention of achieving some compromise settlement of the issues at stake between the parties, or at least ending disruptive conflict behavior indulged in by both sides." In addition, Kjell Skjelsbaek (1986, 141) suggested that "an intergovernmental organization may choose between two different ways of approaching a conflict: It may take a neutral stance, not favoring one or the other party, or it may take sides, supporting one party against the other."

a request by one party to the dispute or another third party actor. Participatory interventions are broadly categorized as follows: (1) verbal expressions - a third party actor makes an appeal, demand, or offer to one of the parties for the purpose of positively or negatively affecting one of the parties to a dispute; (2) assistance/sanctions - a third party actor provides assistance to or imposes sanctions against one of the parties to a dispute for the purpose of positively or negatively affecting one of the parties to a dispute; (3) threats of military force - a third party actor threatens to use military force against one of the parties to a dispute; (4) displays of military force - a third party actor mobilizes or displays military force in support of one of the parties to a dispute; and (5) uses of military force - a third party actor uses military force in support of or against one of the parties to a dispute.[19] Table 2-1 lists twenty-two different participatory intervention techniques.

[19] Richard Little (1975, 9-10) similarly categorized "intervention responses" in civil conflicts as: (1) verbal intervention response; (2) diplomatic recognition/non-recognition; (3) economic assistance; (4) military assistance; (5) providing sanctuary; (6) direct military assistance (threat to use military force); (7) direct military assistance (mobilization of military force); and (9) direct military assistance (use of military force).

Table 2-1. Third Party Participatory Intervention Techniques

Verbal Expressions
Expression of Support - the expression of support by a third party actor for one of the parties to a dispute.
Expression of Opposition - the expression of opposition (condemnation or denunciation) by a third party actor to one of the parties to a dispute.
Cease-fire Appeal/Demand - the appeal/demand for a cessation of military hostilities by a third party actor to one of the parties to a dispute.
Troop withdrawal Appeal/Demand - the appeal/demand for a withdrawal of troops by a third party actor to one of the parties to a dispute.
Offer of Economic Assistance - the offer of economic assistance by a third party actor to one of the parties to a dispute.
Offer of Military Assistance - the offer of military assistance by a third party actor to one of the parties to a dispute.
Assistance/Sanctions
Diplomatic Assistance (recognition) - the extension of diplomatic relations by a third party actor with one of the parties to a dispute; diplomatic recognition by a third party actor of one of the parties to a dispute.
Economic Assistance - the provision of economic assistance from a third party actor to one of the parties to a dispute.
Military Assistance - the provision of military weapons or equipment from a third party actor to one of the parties to a dispute; the acceleration of the delivery of weapons or military equipment sales rom a third party actor to one of the parties to a dispute; the deployment of military advisors by a third party actor in support of one of the parties to a dispute.
Diplomatic Sanctions (non-recognition) - the suspension of diplomatic relations by a third party actor with one of the parties to a dispute; non-recognition by a third party actor of one of the parties to a dispute.
Economic Sanctions - the suspension of economic assistance from a third party actor to one of the parties to a dispute; the boycott or embargo by a third party actor of commercial products to or from the territory of one of the parties to a dispute.
Military Sanctions - the suspension of military assistance from a third party actor to one of the parties to a dispute; the suspension of military weapons and equipment sales by a third party actor to one of the parties to a dispute.
Sanctions Monitoring/Enforcement - the monitoring/enforcement of economic or military sanctions by a third party actor against one of the parties to a dispute.

Table 2-1. Third Party Participatory Intervention Techniques - Continued

Threats of Force
Threat to Use Military Troops - threat by a third party actor to use military troops against the military forces or territory of one of the parties to a dispute.
Threat to Use Military Aircraft - threat by a third party actor to use military aircraft against the military forces or territory of one of the parties to a dispute.
Threat to Use Naval Ships - threat by a third party actor to use naval ships against the military forces or territory of one of the parties to a dispute.
Display of Force
Mobilization of Military Troops - mobilization of military troops by a third party actor against one of the parties to a dispute.
Mobilization of Military Aircraft - mobilization of military aircraft by a third party actor against one of the parties to a dispute.
Mobilization of Naval Ships - mobilization of naval ships by a third party actor against one of the parties to a dispute.
Use of Force
Use of Military Troops - use of military troops by a third party actor against the military forces or territory of one of the parties to a dispute.
Use of Military Aircraft - use of military aircraft by a third party actor against the military forces or territory of one of the parties to a dispute.
Use of Naval Ships - use of naval ships by a third party actor against the military forces or territory of one of the parties to a dispute.

Intermediary interventions are those interventions in which the third party actor does not take sides in the dispute, but rather acts as a neutral or impartial party in order to assist in the management or resolution of the dispute. Intermediary interventions may be requested by one party to the dispute, requested by both parties to the dispute, requested by another third party actor, or initiated by a third party actor without being requested by the parties to the dispute or by another third party actor. Intermediary interventions techniques are broadly categorized as follows: (1) verbal expressions - a third party actor makes an appeal, demand, or offer to both of the parties for the purpose of assisting with the de-escalation of the dispute; (2) diplomatic approaches - a third party actor uses diplomatic techniques, such as mediation[20] and conciliation,[21] to assist both of the parties achieve a de-escalation or resolution of the dispute; (3) legal/judicial processes - a third party actor uses legal or judicial techniques, such as arbitration[22] and judicial settlement,[23] to assist both of the parties achieve a de-escalation or resolution of the dispute; (4) administrative/civilian functions - a third party actor uses administrative/civilian techniques, such as temporary administration and

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[20] Saadia Touval and I. William Zartman (1985, 7) defined mediation as "a form of third party intervention in conflict for the purpose of abating or resolving that conflict through negotiation."

[21] Jean-Pierre Cot (1968, 9) defined conciliation as "intervention in the settlement of an international dispute by a body having no political authority of its own, but enjoying the confidence of the parties to the dispute and entrusted with the task of investigating every aspect of the dispute and of proposing a solution which is not binding on the parties."

[22] Richard B. Bilder (1997, 159) defined arbitration as "a form of adjudication that involves the referral of a dispute or disputes to an ad hoc tribunal...for binding decision." Bilder defined adjudication as "a method of international dispute settlement that involves the referral of the dispute to an impartial third party tribunal - normally either an arbitral tribunal or an international court - for binding decision, usually on the basis of international law" (155).

[23] Bilder (1997, 161) defined judicial settlement as "a form of adjudication that involves the referral of a dispute or disputes to a permanent judicial body for binding decision."

election observation/supervision, to assist both of the parties achieve a de-escalation or resolution of the dispute; and (5) military involvements - a third party actor uses military techniques, such as military observation and peacekeeping, to assist both of the parties achieve a de-escalation or resolution of the dispute. Table 2-2 lists twenty-five different intermediary intervention techniques.

DATA COLLECTION PROCESS

The primary objective of the date collection process was to identify and categorized cases of intrastate disputes and cases of third party interventions in intrastate disputes between January 1, 1900 and December 31, 2000. Cases of intrastate disputes that began prior to January 1, 1900, but occurred during ten or more years of the 20th century, were included in the data set. Likewise, cases of intrastate disputes that started prior to December 31, 2000, but had not yet ended, were also included in the data set.

The first step in the data collection process was to identify and categorize all cases of intrastate disputes in the 20th century. Using the operational definition of intrastate dispute, all potential intrastate dispute cases would necessarily be found within independent states in the international system during this period. A total of 191 independent states that existed at some point during the 20th century were identified (see Appendix A). The list of 191 states includes 181 states that existed at the end of the 20th century and ten states that ceased to exist at some point prior to the end of the 20th century,[24] and includes information on the dates of independence of the states, the former status of the states, and the type of government of the states. I examined the historical record for major conflictual events (i.e.

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[24] The list includes all independent states with populations of 100,000 or more individuals.

crises, conflicts, wars) between groups within each of the 191 states. In order to identify discrete cases of intrastate disputes, I aggregated the conflictual events for each state into historically relevant groupings with specific beginning dates and ending dates.

Table 2-2. Third Party Intermediary Intervention Techniques

Verbal Expressions
Cease-fire Appeal/Demand - the appeal or demand for a cease-fire by a third party actor to both parties to a dispute.
Negotiations Appeal/Demand - the appeal or demand for the peaceful resolution of a dispute through negotiations by a third party actor to both parties to a dispute.
Troop Withdrawal Appeal/Demand - the appeal or demand for the withdrawal of troops by a third party actor to both parties to a dispute.
Offer to Facilitate Negotiations - the offer by a third party actor to facilitate negotiations (i.e. provide good offices) between two parties to a dispute.
Offer to Mediate Negotiations - the offer by a third party actor to mediate negotiations between two parties to a dispute.
Diplomatic Approaches
Inquiry/Fact-Finding - the investigation by a third party actor of the facts pertaining to a dispute between two parties.
Good Offices - the facilitation by a third party actor of bilateral negotiations between two parties to a dispute for the purpose of ending military hostilities or a crisis, or for the purpose of resolving a dispute.
Mediation - the involvement of a third party actor in negotiations between parties to a dispute, during which the third party actor proposes specific, non-legally binding options or procedures for the purpose of ending hostilities or a crisis, or suggests options for resolving a dispute.
Conciliation - the involvement of a third party commission in negotiations between parties to a dispute, during which the third party commission investigates the facts pertaining to the dispute and proposes specific, non-legally binding options or procedures for the purpose of ending hostilities or a crisis, or suggests options for resolving a dispute.
Legal/Judicial Processes
Arbitration - the adjudication of a dispute between two parties by an ad hoc tribunal consisting of three or more jurists. Each of the parties to a dispute must agree to submit the dispute to the arbitration tribunal. The decision of the tribunal is legally binding on the parties to the dispute.
Judicial Settlement - the adjudication of a dispute between two parties by a permanent judicial body consisting of jurists from several countries. The judicial body or court must have prior authorization (jurisdiction) by the parties in order to adjudicate the dispute. The decision of the judicial body is legally binding on the parties to the dispute.
War Crimes Tribunal - the establishment of a war crimes tribunal by a third party actor to investigate and prosecute violations of international law by one or both parties to a dispute.
Truth Commission - the assisting by a third party actor in the establishment and conducting of a truth commission to investigate, but not prosecute, violations of international law by one or both parties to a dispute.

Table 2-2. Third Party Intermediary Intervention Techniques - Continued

Administrative/Civilian Functions
Temporary Administration - the temporary administration of a disputed territory by a third party actor for the purpose of providing an opportunity for the parties to peacefully negotiate a resolution of the dispute.
Humanitarian Assistance - the provision of humanitarian assistance by a third party actor to civilians displaced by military hostilities between two parties to a dispute.
Electoral Supervision/Monitoring - the supervision or monitoring of a plebiscite, national election, or referendum within a country or territory by a third party actor.
Civilian Police Training/Monitoring - the training or monitoring of civilian police within a country by a third party actor.
Human Rights Promotion/Monitoring - the promotion or monitoring of human rights conditions within a country by a third party actor.
Repatriation Assistance - the assisting of the repatriation of civilians or prisoners-of-war by a third party actor.
Military Involvements
Military Observation - the deployment of third party military personnel in a neutral zone for the purpose of monitoring compliance with a ceasefire agreement by the parties to a dispute.
Preventive Peacekeeping - the deployment of third party military personnel in an area for the purpose of preventing the escalation of a dispute between two parties to a crisis or military hostilities.
Humanitarian Protection - the deployment of third party military personnel in a conflict situation for the purpose of providing security for the delivery of humanitarian assistance or for the purpose of providing security for "safe havens" for refugees.
Interpositionary Peacekeeping - the deployment of third party military personnel in a neutral zone for the purpose of separating the military forces of the parties to a dispute following a cessation of military hostilities, or for the purpose of preventing the resumption of military hostilities between the parties.
Demobilization Monitoring/Verification - the deployment of third party military personnel for the purpose of monitoring or verifying compliance with a demobilization (troop withdrawal) agreement by the parties to a dispute.
Mine-Clearing/Sweeping - the deployment of military personnel by a third party for the purpose of clearing mines on land following a cessation of military hostilities and disengagement of military troops, or for the purpose of sweeping mines at sea, before, during, or after military hostilities.

As an illustrative example, information regarding more than forty major conflictual events that occurred within China during the late-19th century and the 20th century was located in the historical record (see Table 2-3). The conflictual events ranged from low-intensity crises to high-intensity wars, but each of the events represented a significant transformation of domestic political conditions within the country. The forty or so conflictual events were then aggregated into seven different intrastate disputes: (1) China (civil/political dispute), 1894-1912; (2) China/Mongolia (national liberation/independence dispute), 1911-1946; (3) China (civil/political dispute), 1912-1949; (4) China/Tibet (secessionist/separatist dispute), 1950-present; (5) China (civil/political dispute), 1966-1976; (6) China/Muslims in Xinjiang Province (secessionist/separatist dispute), 1980-present; and (7) China (civil/political dispute), 1986-1997.

Table 2-3. List of Conflictual Events in China

Conflictual Events	*Dates*
Sun Yat-sen established the *Xingzhong hui* ("League of the Renaissance") in opposition to the Manchu government.	November 24, 1894
Government troops suppressed an attempted rebellion by members of the Xingzhong Hui in Canton.	October 26, 1895
Opponents of Emperor Kuang Hsu led by Empress Dowager Tzu Hsi seized control of the Manchu government, and six supporters of Emperor Kuang Hsu were executed.	September 21-28, 1898
Government troops and members of the Boxer movement ("Society of the Righteous, Harmonious Fists") clashed in the P'ingyuan district in Shangtung province, resulting in the deaths of twenty-seven Boxers.	October 1899
The Boxer Movement rebelled against the Manchu government.	May 11-Aug. 28, 1900
Sun Yat-sen established the *T'ung Meng Hui* ("United League of China") in opposition to the Manchu Dynasty.	August 1905
Government troops suppressed an attempted rebellion by members of the T'ung Meng Hui in Kwangtung.	May 27, 1907
Government troops suppressed an attempted rebellion by members of the T'ung Meng Hui in Canton, resulting in the deaths of eighty-six rebels.	April 27-28, 1911.
Chinese nationalists rebelled against the Manchu government in Wuchang.	October 10, 1911
Emperor Kuang Hsu and Empress Dowager Tzu Hsi abdicated the throne.	February 12, 1912
Mongolia declared its independence from China.	November 18, 1911
Chinese troops invaded and occupied Mongolia.	Oct. 1919-Feb. 1920
Mongolian nationalists proclaimed the Mongolian People's Republic.	November 26, 1924
Mongolians voted for independence in a plebiscite, and the Chinese government formally recognized the independence of Mongolia.	Oct.20,1945-Jan.5,1946
Sun Yat-sen established the National People's Party (Kuomintang) in opposition to the government in Peking.	September 1912
The Kuomintang led an unsuccessful rebellion against the government in Kiangsi province.	July 10-Sept. 1, 1913
Sun Yat-sen formed a rival government in Canton, and he was elected president by a rival parliament in Canton.	Sept. 10, 1917
Chen Chiung-ming led a rebellion against the government of President Sun Yat-sen in Canton, and President Sun Yat-sen fled to Shanghai.	June 16-Aug. 14, 1922

Table 2-3. List of Conflictual Events in China - Continued

Conflictual Events	*Dates*
Chinese nationalist troops loyal to Sun Yat-sen recaptured Canton, and President Sun Yat-sen formed a government in Canton.	Jan. 15-Feb. 21, 1923
Chinese police and demonstrators clashed in Shanghai and other cities, resulting in the deaths of some 100 individuals.	May 30-June 23, 1925
Some 265,000 Kuomintang troops commanded by General Chiang Kai-shek launched a military offensive against the government in Peking, and Kuomintang troops captured Peking.	July15,1926-June8,1928
Kuomintang troops killed some 5,000 communists and trade union leaders in Shanghai.	April 11-12, 1927
Communists rebelled against the Kuomintang government in Nanchang.	August 1-2, 1927
Some 50,000 Kuomintang troops suppressed a communist rebellion in Canton.	December 11-15, 1927
Kuomintang troops launched several military offensives against communist rebels.	Oct. 1930-Dec. 1936
Kuomintang troops launched a military offensive against communist rebels in southwest Manchuria.	November 15, 1945
Kuomintang troops and communist rebels resumed military hostilities.	March 10, 1946
Communist rebels captured Canton, and the Kuomintang government fled to the island of Formosa.	Oct. 15-Dec. 7, 1949
The People's Republic of China (PRC) government claimed sovereignty over Tibet.	January 1, 1950
Chinese troops invaded and occupied Tibet.	Oct.7,1950-May23,1951
Tibetans rebelled against the Chinese government, and the Dalai Lama fled to India.	May 1956-Mar.31,1959
The Chinese government declared martial law in Lhasa after three days of clashes between Chinese police and Tibetan demonstrators; some 2,000 Chinese troops were deployed in Lhasa.	March 7, 1989
Chinese police shot and injured several Tibetans during protests near Lhasa.	May 7-14, 1996
Mao Zedong, chairman of the Communist Party of China (CPC), initiated the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.	April 18, 1966
Student supporters of Chairman Mao Zedong, known as Red Guards, held demonstrations in Beijing.	Aug. 18-Nov. 26, 1966
Chairman Mao Zedong and the ninth Congress of the CPC formally ended the Cultural Revolution.	April 24, 1969

Table 2-3. List of Conflictual Events in China - Continued

Conflictual Events	*Dates*
Marshall Lin Biao died in a plane crash following an attempted military rebellion.	Sept. 11-13, 1971
Chairman Mao Zedong died, and Prime Minister Hua Guofeng was designated as chairman of the CPC.	Sept.9,1976-Oct.7,1976
Muslim separatists (ethnic Uighurs) rebelled against the Chinese govt. in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR).	1980
Uighur rebels and Chinese police clashed in Baren township near Kashgar.	April 5-6, 1990
Chinese police suppressed a demonstration for independence in Gulja.	February 5-6, 1997
Chinese police killed six Uighurs near Gulja.	April 18, 1998
Student demonstrations in support of political reforms occurred in Shanghai, Beijing, and other cities.	December 16, 1986
Hu Yaobang, chairman of the CPC, was forced to resign as a result of his support for political reforms, and Prime Minister Zhao Ziyang was designated as general-secretary of the CPC.	Jan. 16-Nov. 24, 1987
Student demonstrations in support of political reform occurred in Beijing and Shanghai, and Chinese troops suppressed the demonstrations in Beijing.	April 16-June 5, 1989
Deng Xiaoping died, and he was replaced as paramount leader by President Jiang Zemin.	February 19, 1997

Using the information on conflictual events from all of the independent states in the international system during the 20th century, I developed a list of some 400 intrastate disputes that occurred during this period (see Appendix B). Each of the intrastate disputes represents a discrete case (i.e. a dispute that could be categorized as either civil/political, military/political, national liberation/independence, or secessionist/separatist) with a specific beginning date and ending date. Many of the disputes resulted in large numbers of fatalities, refugees, and internally-displaced persons, while other disputes resulted in few or no fatalities, refugees, and internally-displaced persons. As a consequence of the nature of the four categories of intrastate disputes, a state could experience more than one dispute at the same time (a state could experience only one civil/political or military political dispute at the same time, but could experience one or more national liberation/independence disputes or secessionist/separatist disputes at the same time). For example, four disputes were occurring simultaneously in Indonesia at the end of the 20th century, while six disputes were occurring simultaneously in India at the end of the 20th century.

The second step in the data collection process was to identify and categorize all cases of third party interventions in the intrastate disputes identified in the first step of the process. For each of the intrastate disputes identified, a thorough search for occurrences of third party interventions was conducted in the historical record using a wide range of general reference books, diplomatic histories, primary chronologies, and regional sources of information on international events (see Appendix C).[25] For each case of third party intervention, third party

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[25] Much of the information for this step of the data collection process was located and photocopied by three undergraduate research assistants at the University of Arizona library through a dissertation improvement grant awarded by the National Science Foundation (SES

actor, intervention technique, beginning date, ending date, number of third party personnel, number of third party fatalities, and intervention outcome were identified and categorized.

Using the example of China, information on 40 cases of third party interventions in six out of seven intrastate disputes that were identified for that country in the 20th century was located in the historical record (see Table 2-4). There were no identifiable third party interventions in the civil/political dispute that occurred in China between 1966 and 1976. In the six intrastate disputes in China that experienced third party interventions, thirty-five of the interventions were participatory (partisan) interventions and five of the interventions were intermediary (non-partisan) interventions. In addition, fifteen (38 percent) of the interventions were military interventions, including five cases of use of military force and four cases of military assistance. Twenty-five (62 percent) of the interventions were non-military interventions, including twelve cases of condemnations and six cases of diplomatic assistance. The third party actors represented each of the three possible types: twenty-eight (71 percent) interventions by states/coalitions of states; eight (20 percent) interventions by IGOs; and three (eight percent) interventions by NGOs. Of the twenty-five interventions by third party states, the US accounted for fourteen (56 percent) interventions.

9905857) in 1999-2000. The author was also supported by a dissertation fellowship awarded by the United States Institute of Peace in 1999-2000.

Table 2-4. Third Party Interventions in Intrastate Disputes in China

Third Party Interventions	*Dates*
Allied naval ships were deployed near Taku, and Allied naval ships attacked Chinese government forts near Tientsin.	June 4-June 17, 1900
Allied troops from Austria, Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, and the United States intervened against Boxer rebels, and captured Peking.	June 10-August 28, 1900
German troops commanded by Field Marshall Alfred von Waldersee carried out several punitive missions against the Chinese in Zhili and Shanxi provinces.	December 12, 1900
Russian troops commanded by Baron Roman von Ungern-Sternberg intervened in support of Mongolian nationalists, and forced Chinese troops out of the capital.	Oct.25, 1920-Feb.3, 1921
The United States provided diplomatic assistance (recognition) to the government in Peking.	May 2, 1913
The Soviet Union agreed to provide military assistance to the Kuomintang.	January 27, 1923
Britain, France, Italy, Japan, Portugal, and the US deployed naval ships near Canton.	December 23, 1923
Britain deployed naval ships near Shanghai.	May 31, 1925
The US provided diplomatic assistance (recognition) to the Kuomintang.	July 25, 1928
Germany provided diplomatic assistance (recognition) to the Kuomintang.	August 17, 1928
Britain provided diplomatic assistance (recognition) to the government of General Chiang Kai-shek.	December 20, 1928
France provided diplomatic assistance (recognition) to the government of General Chiang Kai-shek.	December 22, 1928
Soviet troops occupied Manchuria.	Aug. 1945-Mar. 1, 1946
General Albert Wedemeyer of the US commanded sealift and airlift operations in support of Chinese nationalist troops.	August-October 1945
Special Representative Patrick Hurley of the US mediated negotiations between Chinese nationalists and communists in Chungking.	Aug. 28-Sept. 22, 1945
Some 53,000 US troops were deployed in support of Chinese nationalists in northern China.	Sept.30, 1945-Jan.1947
President Harry Truman of the US appointed General George Marshall as special representative to China, and General Marshall mediated negotiations between the Chinese nationalists and communists.	December 14, 1945

Table 2-4. Third Party Interventions in Intrastate Disputes in China - Continued

Third Party Interventions	*Dates*
The US provided diplomatic assistance (recognition) to the Kuomintang government.	December 15, 1945
The US agreed to provide military assistance to the Kuomintang govt.	March 10, 1946
The US imposed military sanctions (arms embargo) against the Kuomintang government.	July 29, 1946
President Harry Truman sent Lt. General Albert Wedemeyer on a fact-finding mission to China.	July 22-Aug. 24, 1947
The US agreed to provide economic assistance to the Kuomintang government.	February 18, 1948
The United Nations General Assembly condemned the Chinese invasion of Tibet.	November 18, 1950
The UN General Assembly appealed for the end of Chinese repression of the Tibetans.	December 18, 1956
The US provided military assistance (weapons, ammunition, training) in support of the Tibetan rebels.	October 1958-1961
Malaysia condemned China's use of military force against the Tibetans.	March 30, 1959
The International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) established a seven-member commission of inquiry.	July 26, 1959
The UN General Assembly condemned China's disrespect for human rights in Tibet.	October 21, 1959
Amnesty International (AI) condemned the Chinese government for violent suppression of Tibetan protesters.	May 20, 1996
The European Union (EU) parliament condemned the Chinese government for the repression of Tibetans.	May 23, 1996
EU parliament condemned the Chinese government for human rights abuses against Tibetans.	March 13, 1997
EU parliament appealed for peaceful negotiations between the Chinese government and the Dalai Lama.	May 14, 1998
Amnesty International (AI) condemned the Chinese government for "gross and systematic human rights violations" in the XUAR.	April 20, 1999

Table 2-4. Third Party Interventions in Intrastate Disputes in China - Continued

Third Party Interventions	*Dates*
President George Bush of the US imposed military sanctions against the Chinese government.	June 5, 1989
The European Community (EC) condemned the Chinese government's use of military force against demonstrators in Beijing.	June 1989
The EC imposed military sanctions (arms sales ban) against the Chinese government.	June 27, 1989
The US condemned the Chinese government for the trial and imprisonment of Wei Jingsheng.	December 14, 1995
Britain condemned the Chinese government for the trial and imprisonment of Wei Jingsheng.	December 14, 1995
Germany condemned the Chinese government for the trial and imprisonment of Wei Jingsheng.	December 14, 1995
Amnesty International (AI) condemned the Chinese government for the trial and sentencing of Wang Dan.	October 30, 1996

SUMMARY OF THE CASES OF INTRASTATE DISPUTES

In this section of the chapter, I will summarize some 400 cases of intrastate disputes that were identified and categorized using the data collection processes described above. Specifically, I will provide information on the duration of intrastate disputes, frequency of intrastate disputes initiated, frequency of intrastate disputes ongoing, and comparison of the number of intrastate disputes initiated and resolved by region and dispute type. Of the more than 400 cases of intrastate disputes, 52 (12.9 percent) were national liberation/independence disputes, 224 (55.6 percent) were civil/political disputes, 71 (17.6 percent) were military/political disputes, and 56 (13.9 percent) were secessionist/separatist disputes. In addition, 76 (18.9 percent) occurred in the Asia/Pacific region, 80 (19.9 percent) occurred in the Europe/Russia/Former Soviet Union region, 63 (15.6 percent) occurred in the Middle East/North Africa/Persian Gulf region, 108 (26.8 percent) occurred in the Sub-Sahara Africa region, and 76 (18.9 percent) occurred in the Western Hemisphere region.

Duration

Table 2-5 provides figures on the average duration (years) of intrastate disputes in the five regions of the world. The average duration of all disputes is 20.8 years, ranging from 15.9 years for military/political disputes in the Sub-Saharan Africa region to 36.5 years for national liberation/independence disputes in the Western Hemisphere region. The average duration of disputes in the particular regions ranges from 17 years in the Sub-Saharan Africa region to 23.7 years in the Asia/Pacific and Western Hemisphere regions. The average duration of the different types of intrastate disputes ranges from 19.3 years for military/political disputes to 24 years for secessionist/separatist disputes.

Table 2-5. Average Duration (Years) of Intrastate Disputes

	A/P	E/R/FSU	ME/NA/PG	SSA	WH	All Regions
Nat.Lib./Ind.	27.2 (9)	22.8 (11)	24.3 (12)	16.6 (18)	36.5 (2)	22.3 (52)
Civ./Pol.	19.6 (37)	18.6 (54)	22.7 (29)	17.6 (51)	23.4 (52)	20.2 (224)
Mil./Pol.	22.7 (7)	23.5 (2)	19.0 (11)	15.9 (29)	22.7 (21)	19.3 (71)
Sec./Sep.	29.1 (23)	16.1 (13)	27.7 (9)	18.4 (10)	32.0 (1)	24.0 (56)
All Types	23.7 (76)	18.9 (80)	23.0 (61)	17.0 (108)	23.7 (76)	20.8 (403)

Note: Figures in parentheses are the total number of each type of intrastate dispute for each region.

Abbreviations: Nat.Lib./Ind. = National Liberation/Independence; Civ/Pol = Civil/Political; Mil/Pol = Military/Political; Sec/Sep = Secessionist/Separatist.
A/P - Asia/Pacific; E/R/FSU = Europe/Russia/Former Soviet Union; ME/NA/PG = Middle East/North Africa/Persian Gulf; SSA = Sub-Saharan Africa; WH - Western Hemisphere.

Frequency of Intrastate Disputes Initiated

Figure 2-1 provides frequencies of intrastate disputes initiated throughout the world during the 20th century. Figure 2-1 (f) indicates that the frequency of intrastate disputes initiated in all of the regions combined generally ranged from zero to seven disputes per year between 1900 and the mid-1940s. There was a temporary increase in the frequency of disputes initiated after the Second World War, but the frequency of disputes initiated generally ranged from zero to ten disputes per year in the 1950s. Throughout much of the 1960s and 1970s, the frequency of disputes initiated ranged in a higher level between approximately five and fifteen disputes per year. There was a significant decrease in the frequency of disputes initiated during the 1980s and 1990s (ranging from zero to five disputes per year), with the exception of a temporary increase in the frequency of disputes initiated at the end of the Cold War. Overall, figure 2-1(f) suggests that there were changes in the frequency of disputes initiated throughout the world as a result of significant events in international politics, including the end of the Second World War, the decolonization period in the 1960s, and the end of the Cold War.

Figure 2-1 (a) - (e) provides frequencies of intrastate disputes initiated in each of the five regions of the world during the 20th century. The frequency of disputes initiated in the Asia/Pacific region ranged from zero to five disputes per year throughout the century, with the exception of late-1940s when the frequency ranged from five to ten disputes per year. The frequency of disputes initiated in the Europe/Russia/Former Soviet Union region ranged from zero to five disputes per year, with the exceptions of the late-1910s and early-1990s.

Figure 2-1. Frequencies of Intrastate Disputes Initiated (Regions)



Abbreviations: A/P = Asia/Pacific; E/R/FSU = Europe/Russia/Former Soviet Union; ME/NA/PG = Middle East/North Africa/Persian Gulf; SSA = Sub-Saharan Africa; WH = Western Hemisphere.

In the Middle East/North Africa/Persian Gulf and Western Hemisphere regions, the frequency of disputes initiated ranged from zero to five disputes per year throughout the entire century. Finally, the frequency of disputes initiated in the Sub-Saharan Africa region ranged from zero to five dispute per year between 1900 and 1960, then generally ranged from zero to ten disputes per year between 1960 and 2000.

Figure 2-2 (a) - (d) provides frequencies of the different types of intrastate disputes initiated during the 20th century. Except for civil/political disputes, the frequencies of disputes initiated generally ranged from zero to five disputes per year throughout the century. The frequency of civil/political disputes initiated generally ranged from zero to ten disputes per year throughout the century, with the exception of the early-1990s. Figure 2-3 (a) - (d) provides frequencies of the different types of intrastate disputes initiated during the 20th century, accounting for the number of independent states in the international system. For the most part, these relative frequencies are similar to the set of frequencies in figure 2-2, but there are a couple of significant differences. First, the frequency of national liberation/independence disputes initiated is greater during the 1900-1920 period and the 1940-1960 period as shown in figure 2-3(a) compared to the frequency of national liberation/independence disputes initiated during the same periods as shown in figure 2-2(a). Second, the sharp increase in the frequency of civil/political disputes initiated in the early-1990s as shown in figure 2-3(b) is not significantly different from sharp increases in the frequency of civil/political disputes during other periods of the 20th century, including the early-1900s, late-1910s, late-1940s, and early-1960s.

Figure 2-2. Frequencies of Intrastate Disputes Initiated (Dispute Types)



Abbreviations: Nat. Lib. = National Liberation; Civ. Pol. = Civil/Political; Mil. Pol. = Military/Political; Sec. Sep. = Secessionist/Separatist.

Figure 2-3. Frequencies of Intrastate Disputes Initiated/Number of Independent States in the International System (Dispute Types)



Abbreviations: Nat. Lib. = National Liberation; Civ. Pol. = Civil/Political; Mil. Pol. = Military/Political; Sec. Sep. = Secessionist/Separatist.

Frequency of Intrastate Disputes Ongoing

Figure 2-4 provides frequencies of intrastate disputes ongoing during the 20th century. Figure 2-4 (f) indicates that the frequency of intrastate disputes ongoing in all of the regions combined increased at a decreasing rate between 1900 and the mid-1940s, and then increased at an increasing rate between the mid-1940s and the late-1970s. The frequency of disputes ongoing stabilized at approximately 140 disputes per year in the 1980s, and then increased sharply in the early 1990s. Since the early-1990s, the frequency of disputes ongoing has decreased at a steady rate.

Figure 2-4 (a) - (e) provides frequencies of intrastate disputes ongoing in each of the five regions of the world during the 20th century. There are a number of differences in the frequency of disputes ongoing among the regions. In the Asia/Pacific region, the frequency of disputes ongoing ranged from zero to ten disputes per year during the 1900-1945 period. The frequency of disputes ongoing in the region increased sharply in the mid-1940s, and then stabilized at approximately twenty disputes per year through the early-1960s. The frequency of disputes ongoing in the region increased at a steady rate between the early-1960s and the late-1980s, and then decreased at a steady rate after the early-1990s. The Europe/Russia/Former Soviet Union region experienced a sharp increase in the frequency of disputes ongoing in the first decade of the 20th century and, again, after the First World War. The frequency of disputes ongoing in the region stabilized at approximately twenty disputes per year between the early-1920s and the early-1940s, and then decreased at a steady rate between the mid-1940s and the mid-1960s. The frequency of disputes ongoing in the region stabilized at about ten disputes per year between the mid-1960s and late-1980s, before

sharply increasing after the end of the Cold War and the breakup of the Soviet Union in the early-1990s. Following the sharp increase in the early-1990s, the frequency of disputes ongoing in the region decreased through the end of the 20th century.

Unlike the previous two regions, the frequency of intrastate disputes ongoing in the Middle East/North Africa/Persian Gulf region generally increased at a decreasing rate from 1900 to 1980, and then decreased slightly after the end of the Cold War. There were few or no intrastate disputes ongoing in the Sub-Saharan Africa region between 1900 and 1940, but the frequency of disputes ongoing increased sharply between 1940 and 1980. The frequency of disputes ongoing in the region stabilized at about fifty disputes per year in the 1980s, then decreased at a steady rate during the 1990s. Finally, the frequency of intrastate disputes ongoing in the Western Hemisphere region increased at a decreasing rate between 1900 and 1980, then decreased at a steady rate between 1980 and 2000. Despite the differences among the various regions, there are a couple of similarities that are worth noting. First, each of the regions, with the exception of the Sub-Saharan Africa region, experienced considerable increases in the frequency of disputes ongoing during the first couple of decades of the century. Second, each of the regions experienced modest or significant decreases in the frequency of disputes ongoing after the end of the Cold War.

Figure 2-4. Frequencies of Intrastate Disputes Ongoing (Regions)



Abbreviations: A/P = Asia/Pacific; E/R/FSU = Europe/Russia/Former Soviet Union; ME/NA/PG = Middle East/North Africa/Persian Gulf; SSA = Sub-Saharan Africa; WH = Western Hemisphere.

Figure 2-5 (a) - (d) provides frequencies of the different types of intrastate disputes ongoing during the 20th century. The frequency of national liberation/independence disputes ongoing generally ranged from ten to fifteen disputes per year between 1900 and 1945, and generally ranged from fifteen to twenty disputes per year between 1945 and 1960. The frequency of national liberation/independence disputes ongoing decreased at a steady rate between 1960 and 2000. The frequency of civil/political disputes ongoing generally increased at a steady rate between 1900 and 1970, and then stabilized at approximately sixty disputes per year between 1970 and 1990. The frequency of civil/political disputes ongoing increased sharply in the early 1990s, but then decreased sharply during the remainder of the 1990s. The frequency of military/political disputes ongoing ranged from zero to ten disputes per year between 1900 and 1960, then increased sharply between 1960 and 1980. The frequency of military/political disputes ongoing decreased sharply between 1980 and 2000. Finally, the frequency of secessionist/separatist disputes ongoing increased at an increasing rate between 1900 and 1990, then decreased somewhat during the 1990s.

Figure 2-6 (a) - (d) provides frequencies of the different types of intrastate disputes ongoing during the 20th century, accounting for the number of independent states in the international system. This set of frequencies is similar to the previous set of frequencies, except for the case of civil/political disputes. Figure 2-6 (b) indicates that the frequency of civil/political disputes ongoing was higher during the first half of the century than during the second half of the century. There still appears to have been a small increase in the frequency of civil/political disputes ongoing in the early 1990s, but the increase had largely disappeared by the end of the century.

Figure 2-5. Frequencies of Intrastate Disputes Ongoing (Dispute Types)



Abbreviations: Nat. Lib. = National Liberation; Civ. Pol. = Civil/Political; Mil. Pol. = Military/Political; Sec. Sep. = Secessionist/Separatist.

Figure 2-6. Frequencies of Intrastate Disputes Ongoing/Number of Independent States in the International System (Dispute Types)



Abbreviations: Nat. Lib. = National Liberation; Civ. Pol. = Civil/Political; Mil. Pol. = Military/Political; Sec. Sep. = Secessionist/Separatist.

Comparison of the Number of Intrastate Disputes Initiated and Resolved

Figure 2-7 illustrates the differences in the number of initiated and resolved intrastate disputes in the five regions of the world. Throughout the world, the number of intrastate disputes initiated has generally been greater than the number of disputes resolved during each of the decades of the 20th century, with the exception of the 1990s. In the Asia/Pacific region, the number of disputes initiated was greater than the number of disputes resolved in each of the decades of the century, except the 1950s and 1990s. The number of disputes initiated was more than twice the number of disputes resolved in the region in the 1940s and 1960s. In the Europe/Russia/Former Soviet Union region, the number of disputes initiated was generally lower than (or equal to) the number of disputes resolved, except for the first two and last two decades of the century.

In the Middle East/North Africa/Persian Gulf region, the number of disputes initiated was generally higher than the number of disputes resolved during the 1900-1960eriod, but the number of disputes resolved was generally higher than the number of disputes initiated during the 19612000 period. In the Sub-Saharan Africa region, the number of disputes initiated was significantly greater than the number of disputes resolved between the 1940s and 1980s, but the number of disputes resolved was considerably greater than the number of disputes initiated in the 1990s. Finally, the number of disputes initiated was somewhat greater than the number of disputes resolved in the Western Hemisphere region during the 1900-1980 period, but the number of disputes resolved was greater than the number of disputes initiated during the 1980s and 1990s.

Figure 2-7. Comparison of the Number of Intrastate Disputes Initiated and Resolved by Region



Abbreviations: A/P = Asia/Pacific; E/R/FSU = Europe/Russia/Former Soviet Union; ME/NA/PG = Middle East/North Africa/Persian Gulf; SSA = Sub-Saharan Africa; WH = Western Hemisphere.

Figure 2-8 illustrates the differences in the number of initiated and resolved intrastate disputes among the different types of disputes. The number of national liberation/independence disputes initiated was generally higher than the number of such disputes resolved during the first half of the century, but the number of national liberation/independence disputes resolved was generally higher than the number of such disputes initiated during the second half of the century. The number of civil/political disputes initiated was consistently higher than the number of such disputes resolved during the 20th century, with the exception of the 1930s. The number of military/political disputes initiated was greater than the number of such disputes resolved during the 1920-1980 period, but the number of military/political disputes resolved was greater than the number of such disputes initiated during the last two decades of the century. Finally, the number of secessionist/separatist disputes initiated was consistently greater than the number of such disputes resolved during the 20th century, with the exception of the last decade of the century.

Figure 2-8. Comparison of the Number of Intrastate Disputes Initiated and Resolved by Dispute Type



Abbreviations: Nat. Lib. = National Liberation; Civ. Pol. = Civil/Political; Mil. Pol. = Military/Political; Sec. Sep. = Secessionist/Separatist.

SUMMARY OF THE CASES OF THIRD PARTY INTERVENTION

In this section of the chapter, I will summarize more than 3,500 cases of third party intervention that were identified and categorized using the data collection processes previously discussed. Table 2-6 provides the numbers of third party interventions that occurred in each of the five regions of the world during the 20th century. Third party interventions are divided into the two major categories (intermediary and participatory), as well as the ten major sub-categories. A little more than half (52.1%) of the third party interventions were participatory interventions, while a little less than half (47.9%) of the third party interventions were intermediary interventions. Some 50 percent of the intermediary interventions were administrative/civilian functions, while some 48 percent of the participatory interventions were assistance/sanctions.

Perhaps contrary to conventional wisdom, military interventions, including the sub-categories of military involvements, threats of force, displays of force, and uses of force, comprise only 430 (12.2%) of all third party interventions during the 20th century. The vast majority of third party interventions (87.8%) did not involve the threat, display, or use of military force by a third party actor either as an intermediary or participant. Table 2-6 also indicates that 487 (13.8%) of third party interventions occurred in the Asia/Pacific region, 801 (22.7%) occurred in the Europe/Russia/Former Soviet Union region, 557 (15.8%) occurred in the Middle East/North Africa/Persian Gulf region, 1,062 (30.1%) occurred in the Sub-Saharan Africa region, and 623 (17.6%) occurred in the Western Hemisphere region.

Table 2-6: Third Party Interventions and Geographic Regions

	A/P	E/R/FSU	ME/NA/PG	SSA	WH	Total (%)
Intermediary Interventions	215	511	196	515	253	1690 (47.9%)
Verbal Expressions	49	77	54	78	15	273 (7.7%)
Diplomatic Approaches	55	87	71	138	68	419 (11.9%)
Legal/Judicial Processes	1	2	2	2	1	8 (.22%)
Admin./Civilian Functions	88	301	53	251	155	848 (24.0%)
Military Involvements	22	44	16	46	14	142 (4.0%)
Participatory Interventions	272	290	361	547	370	1840 (52.1%)
Verbal Expressions	98	109	158	244	60	669 (18.9%)
Assistance/Sanctions	118	128	150	244	243	883 (25.0%)
Threats of Force	0	7	5	0	0	12 (.34%)
Displays of Force	12	6	7	2	18	45 (1.3%)
Uses of Force	44	40	41	57	49	231 (6.5%)
Total (percent)	487 (13.8%)	801 (22.7%)	557 (15.8%)	1062 (30.1%)	623 (17.6%)	3530 (100 %)

Abbreviations: A/P = Asia/Pacific; E/R/FSU = Europe/Russia/Former Soviet Union; ME/NA/PG = Middle East/North Africa/Persian Gulf; SSA = Sub-Saharan Africa; WH = Western Hemisphere.

Table 2-7 provides the numbers of third party interventions that occurred in each of the four types of intrastate disputes. Some 55 percent of all interventions have occurred in civil/political disputes (which accounted for 55.6% of all intrastate disputes), while only 8.8 percent of all interventions have occurred in national liberation/independence disputes (which accounted for 12.9 percent of all intrastate disputes). Some 19.2 percent of all interventions occurred in military/political disputes (which accounted for 17.6% of all intrastate disputes) and some 16.9 percent of all interventions occurred in secessionist/separatist disputes (which accounted for 13.9% of all intrastate disputes).

Table 2-7: Third Party Interventions and Dispute Types

	NL/I	C/P	M/P	S/S	Total (%)
Intermediary Interventions	93	1026	223	348	1690 (47.9%)
Verbal Expressions	27	125	32	89	273 (7.7%)
Diplomatic Approaches	27	234	72	86	419 (11.9%)
Legal/Judicial Processes	2	4	1	1	8 (.22%)
Admin./Civilian Functions	324	574	105	137	848 (24.0%)
Military Involvements	59	89	13	35	142 (4.0%)
Participatory Interventions	218	916	455	251	1840 (52.1%)
Verbal Expressions	108	302	144	115	669 (18.9%)
Assistance/Sanctions	93	406	264	120	883 (25.0%)
Threats of Force	0	8	0	4	12 (.34%)
Displays of Force	1	34	9	1	45 (1.3%)
Uses of Force	16	166	38	11	231 (6.5%)
Total (percent)	311 (8.8%)	1942 (55.0%)	678 (19.2%)	599 (16.9%)	3530 (100%)

Abbreviations: NL/I = National Liberation/Independence; C/P = Civil/Political; M/P = Military/Political; S/S = Secessionist/Separatist.

Frequency of Third Party Interventions and Regions

Figure 2-9 provides frequencies of the occurrence of third party interventions (intermediary and participatory) throughout the world during the 20th century. According to figure 2-9 (f), there were generally three phases of the occurrence of interventions in all of the regions combined during this period: (1) the frequency of interventions ranged from zero to 25 per year during the 1900-1960 period; (2) the frequency of interventions ranged from 25 to 100 per year during the 1960-1990 period; and (3) the frequency of interventions ranged from 100 to 300 per year during the 1990-2000 period. However, there are some important similarities and differences in the frequency of third party interventions among the five regions of the world. First, the frequency of interventions was generally in the low range (zero to 20 interventions per year) in each of the regions during the 1900-1960 period, although there tended to be a relatively higher level of intervention activity during this period in the Europe/Russia/Former Soviet Union and Western Hemisphere regions. Second, the frequency of interventions was generally in the low-to-moderate range (20 to 40 interventions per year) in the Asia/Pacific, Middle East/North Africa/Persian Gulf, and Sub-Saharan Africa regions during the 1960-1980 period. The frequency of interventions remained in the low range in the Europe/Russia/Former Soviet Union region and Western Hemisphere region during the 1960-1980 period. Finally, the frequency of interventions increased sharply in the Asia/Pacific, Europe/Russia/Former Soviet Union, and Sub-Saharan Africa regions after the end of the Cold War, but there were only small increases in the frequencies of interventions in the Middle East/North Africa/Persian Gulf and Western Hemisphere regions after the end of the Cold War.

Figure 2-9. Frequencies of the Occurrence of Third Party Interventions (Regions)



Abbreviations: A/P = Asia/Pacific; E/R/FSU = Europe/Russia/Former Soviet Union; ME/NA/PG = Middle East/North Africa/Persian Gulf; SSA = Sub-Saharan Africa; WH = Western Hemisphere.

Figure 2-10 provides frequencies of the occurrence of third party interventions throughout the world during the 20th century, accounting for the number of intrastate disputes ongoing. Figure 2-10(f) suggests that the level of interventions in all of the regions combined relative to the number of intrastate disputes ongoing did not change significantly between 1900 and 1990 (ranging between zero and one intervention per intrastate dispute ongoing), but did increase significantly after the end of the Cold War. The relative frequencies of interventions in each of the five regions are generally similar to the corresponding frequencies discussed in figure 2-9, except for a couple of noticeable differences. First, the relative frequency of interventions in the Europe/Russia/Former Soviet Union region during the 1960-1980 period is generally higher in figure 2-10(b) compared to the frequency shown in figure 2-9(b). Second, the relative frequency of interventions in the Western Hemisphere region during the 1990-2000 period is generally higher in figure 2-10(e) compared to the frequency shown in figure 2-9(e). Overall, the graphs in figure 2-10 suggest that there are significant variations in the level of third party interventions, even when accounting for the number of intrastate disputes ongoing, in the five different regions of the world and all of the regions combined.

Figure 2-10. Frequencies of the Occurrence of Third Party Interventions/Number of Intrastate Disputes Ongoing (Regions)



Abbreviations: A/P = Asia/Pacific; E/R/FSU = Europe/Russia/Former Soviet Union; ME/NA/PG = Middle East/North Africa/Persian Gulf; SSA = Sub-Saharan Africa; WH = Western Hemisphere.

Frequency of Third Party Intermediary/Participatory Interventions and Regions

Figure 2-11 provides frequencies of the occurrence of third party intermediary interventions throughout the world during the 20th century. Figure 2-11 (f) indicates that the frequency of intermediary interventions in all of the regions combined ranged from zero to 50 per year between 1900 and 1990, but increased sharply after the end of the Cold War. The same trend is generally evident in the Asia/Pacific, Europe/Russia/Former Soviet Union, and Sub-Saharan Africa regions; however, the frequency of intermediary interventions did not increase sharply in the Middle East/North Africa/Persian Gulf and Western Hemisphere regions after the end of the Cold War.

Figure 2-12 provides frequencies of the occurrence of third party participatory interventions throughout the world during the 20th century. Figure 2-12 (f) indicates that the frequency of participatory interventions in all of the regions combined generally ranged from zero to 25 per year between 1900 and 1960, and generally ranged from 25 to 75 per year between 1960 and 1990. The frequency of participatory interventions increased significantly (ranging from 50 to 100 per year) during the period after the end of the Cold War. Each of the five regions of the world (with the exception of the Europe/Russia/Former Soviet Union region) generally experienced higher levels of participatory intervention activity during the 1960-1980 period than during previous period, and each of the five regions generally experienced a decrease in participatory intervention activity during the 1980s. In addition, each of the five regions generally experienced a moderate-to-large increase in participatory intervention activity in the post-Cold War period.

Figure 2-11. Frequencies of the Occurrence of Third Party Intermediary Interventions (Regions)



Abbreviations: A/P = Asia/Pacific; E/R/FSU = Europe/Russia/Former Soviet Union; ME/NA/PG = Middle East/North Africa/Persian Gulf; SSA = Sub-Saharan Africa; WH = Western Hemisphere.

Figure 2-12. Frequencies of the Occurrence of Third Party Participatory Interventions (Regions)



Abbreviations: A/P = Asia/Pacific; E/R/FSU = Europe/Russia/Former Soviet Union; ME/NA/PG = Middle East/North Africa/Persian Gulf; SSA = Sub-Saharan Africa; WH = Western Hemisphere.

There are three important differences between the frequency of participatory interventions and the frequency of intermediary interventions during the 20th century. First, the level of participatory intervention activity was somewhat greater than the level of intermediary intervention activity during the 1900-1940 period. Second, the level of participatory intervention activity was considerably greater than the level of intermediary intervention activity during the 1960-1980 period. Finally, the increase in the level of participatory intervention activity in the post-Cold War period was less significant than the increase in the level of intermediary intervention activity in the post-Cold War period. In other words, the end of the Cold War resulted in significantly higher levels of third party intervention activity in nearly every region of the world, but the increase in the level of intermediary interventions was generally more significant than the increase in the level of participatory interventions.

Frequency of Third Party Interventions and Dispute Types

Figure 2-13 provides frequencies of the occurrence of third party (intermediary and participatory) interventions in the four types of intrastate disputes. The frequency of interventions in national liberation/independence disputes generally ranged from zero to 25 per year during the 1940-2000 period. The frequency of interventions in civil/political disputes generally ranged from zero to 25 per year during the 1900-1960 period, and ranged from 10 to 50 per year during the 1960-1990 period. The frequency of interventions in civil/political disputes increased sharply after the end of the Cold War. The frequency of interventions in military/political disputes generally ranged from zero to 50 per year between 1960 and 2000.

Figure 2-13. Frequencies of the Occurrence of Third Party Interventions (Dispute Types)



Abbrevations: Nat. Lib. = National Liberation; Civ. Pol. = Civil/Political; Mil. Pol. = Military/Political; Sec. Sep. = Secessionist/Separatist.

Finally, the frequency of interventions in secessionist/separatist disputes generally ranged from zero to 25 per year between 1960 and 1990, and increased significantly after the end of the Cold War. The major difference among the dispute types is that third party intervention activity in the post-Cold War period significantly increased in civil/political disputes and secessionist/separatist disputes, but did not significantly increase in national liberation/independence disputes and military/political disputes.

Frequency of Third Party Intermediary/Participatory Interventions and Dispute Types

Figure 2-14 provides frequencies of the occurrence of third party intermediary interventions in the four types of intrastate disputes in the 20th century. The level of intermediary intervention activity was extremely low during the 1900-1990 period in each of the four dispute types, but the level of intermediary intervention activity increased significantly in civil/political disputes and secessionist/separatist disputes in the post-Cold War period. There was a less than significant increase in the level of intermediary intervention activity in military/political disputes in the post-Cold War period, and there was no increase in the level of intermediary intervention activity in national liberation/independence disputes in the post-Cold War period.

Figure 2-14. Frequencies of the Occurrence of Third Party Intermediary Interventions (Dispute Types)



Abbrevations: Nat. Lib. = National Liberation; Civ. Pol. = Civil/Political; Mil. Pol. = Military/Political; Sec. Sep. = Secessionist/Separatist.

Figure 2-15 provides frequencies of the occurrence of participatory interventions in the four types of intrastate disputes. Except for civil/political disputes, the level of participatory interventions was generally quite low (zero to ten interventions per year) during the 1900-1960 period. The frequency of participatory interventions in civil/political disputes generally ranged from zero to 25 per year in the 1900-1990 period, and increased sharply in the post-Cold War period. The frequencies of participatory interventions in national liberation/independence disputes, military/political disputes, and secessionist/separatist disputes generally ranged from zero to 50 per year during the 1960-1980 period. There was a modest increase in the frequency of participatory interventions in secessionist/separatist disputes after the end of the Cold War, but there was little or no increase in the frequency of participatory interventions in national liberation/independence disputes and military/political disputes after the end of the Cold War.

Comparison of Third Party Intermediary and Participatory Interventions

Figure 2-16 provides a comparison of the occurrence of third party intermediary and participatory interventions across the five regions of the world during the 20th century. Figure 2-16(f) suggests that the worldwide number of participatory interventions was normally twice the number of worldwide intermediary interventions during each of the decades, except the 1990s. In contrast, the number of intermediary interventions was approximately twice the number of participatory interventions during the 1990s. The number of intermediary interventions, and to a lesser extent participatory interventions, was significantly greater during the 1990s than during all of the previous decades of the 20th century.

Figure 2-15. Frequencies of the Occurrence of Third Party Participatory Interventions (Dispute Types)



Abbrevations: Nat. Lib. = National Liberation; Civ. Pol. = Civil/Political; Mil. Pol. = Military/Political; Sec. Sep. = Secessionist/Separatist.

Figure 2-16. Comparison of the Occurrence of Third Party Intermediary and Participatory Interventions (Regions)



Abbreviations: A/P = Asia/Pacific; E/R/FSU = Europe/Russia/Former Soviet Union; ME/NA/PG = Middle East/North Africa/Persian Gulf; SSA = Sub-Saharan Africa; WH = Western Hemisphere.

The number of participatory interventions was generally greater than the number of intermediary interventions during each of the decades in each of the five regions of the world. However, the number of intermediary interventions was significantly greater than the number of participatory interventions in the 1990s in each of the regions, with the exception of the Middle East/North Africa/Persian Gulf region.

Figure 2-17 provides a comparison of the occurrence of third party intermediary and participatory interventions across the four types of intrastate disputes in the 20th century. Again, the number of participatory interventions was generally greater than the number of intermediary interventions during most of the century for each of the four dispute types. However, the number of intermediary interventions was greater than the number of participatory interventions during the decade of the 1990s for each of the four dispute types, except for national liberation/independence disputes. There was a significant increase in the number of both intermediary and participatory interventions in the 1990s in civil/political disputes and secessionist/separatist disputes, but there were not significant increases in the number of intermediary and participatory interventions in the 1990s in national liberation/independence disputes and military/political disputes.

Figure 2-17. Comparison of the Occurrence of Third Party Intermediary and Participatory Interventions (Dispute Types)



Abbrevations: Nat. Lib. = National Liberation; Civ. Pol. = Civil/Political; Mil. Pol. = Military/Political; Sec. Sep. = Secessionist/Separatist.

CHAPTER THREE

EXPLAINING THE OCCURRENCE OF STATE INTERVENTIONS IN INTRASTATE DISPUTES

> Intervention is an ancient and well-established an instrument of foreign policy as are diplomatic pressure, negotiations and war. From the time of the ancient Greeks to this day, some states have found it advantageous to intervene in the affairs of other states on behalf of their own interests and against the latters' will. Other states, in view of their interests, have opposed such interventions and have intervened on behalf of theirs.
>
> Hans Morgenthau, 1967

Why do sovereign states sometimes choose to intervene in domestic political disputes in other sovereign states? This question has received much scholarly attention for several decades, and therefore, there has been an accumulation of descriptive and explanatory knowledge concerning state interventions in intrastate disputes (Munro 1964; Bradley 1968; Millett 1968; Schwarz 1970; Tillema 1973; Ebinger 1976; Vanneman and James 1976; Hallett 1978; Valenta 1978; Gleijeses 1978; Bhasin 1984; Calder 1984; Schmid 1985; Zartman 1985; Richter 1986; MacQueen 1988; Schatzberg 1989; Miller 1990; Musicant 1990; Schoonmaker 1990; Sommerville 1990; Ispahani 1992; Tanca 1993; Alin 1994). However, much of the knowledge that has been acquired regarding state interventions in intrastate disputes is based largely on empirical analyses of interventions by one particular third party state in one particular domestic political dispute. Few scholarly studies of state interventions in domestic political disputes have systematically analyzed data on interventions by a variety of third party states in a variety of domestic political disputes.

In addition, much of the focus in the previous literature has been on interventions by the major powers in the international system, particularly the United States, Soviet Union,

and Britain (Van Wingen and Tillema 1980; Kaw 1989; Feste 1992; Yoon 1997). For example, Yoon examined the occurrence of US interventions in "Third World internal wars" during the 1945-1989 period, and found that the US was more likely to intervene when an ally of the Soviet Union had previously intervened in the war or when one of the parties to the internal war was identified as communist (1997, 592). On the other hand, Yoon found that neither strategic factors such as geographic proximity and prior military assistance nor economic factors such as trade and investments significantly influenced the occurrence of US interventions (1997, 594). Similarly, Van Wingen and Tillema found that Britain "did not systematically use force in favor of her greatest trade monopolies, nor her most profitable overseas investment," but tended to respond to requests for intervention in former colonies where she had continuing military commitments such as military bases (1980, 300). Meanwhile, Kaw examined the occurrence of interventions by the Soviet Union during the 1950-1987 period, and found that the Soviet Union was more likely to intervene in disputes involving bordering or allied states (1989, 425-426). Perhaps contrary to conventional wisdom, the results of these studies suggested that the factors influencing the occurrence of major power interventions during the Cold War were not necessarily the same from one major power to the next.

Some scholars have analyzed state interventions on an aggregate (cross-national) level for the Cold War period, but their findings have for the most part been less than conclusive. For example, Pearson examined the relationship between geographic proximity and the probability of military interventions during the 1948-1967 period, and found that most military interventions took place in targets with from two to six immediate neighbors,

and not in states with seven to fifteen neighbors (1974a, 454). However, Pearson also found that 62 percent of all "reported interventions codable for contiguity went to targets contiguous to the intervener," suggesting that geographic proximity might be a significant factor in explaining the occurrence of military interventions (1974a, 455). In his analysis of military interventions and domestic disputes between 1960 and 1967, Pearson found that there was "some evidence for the hypothesis that violent conflict is more likely than nonviolent conflict to attract intervention," but that the relationship may not have been statistically significant (1974b, 285-286). In a later study of military interventions and *realpolitik* during the 1946-1988 period, Pearson, Baumann, and Pickering concluded that "large powers initiate proportionately the most interventions," but that an increasing number of major power interventions were motivated by humanitarian concerns than strategic considerations (1994, 222-223).

In recent years, scholars have expanded the empirical analysis of state interventions to include non-military forms of intervention, as well as state interventions in ethnic conflicts, but the findings in these studies have also been rather inconclusive (Heraclides 1990; Cooper and Berdal 1993; Regan, 1996, 1998; Carment, James, Rowlands 1997; Carment and Rowlands 1998). For example, Regan examined factors hypothesized to influence the decisions of leaders in third party state to intervene militarily or economically in internal conflicts during the post-World War II period, and found that third party states were more likely to intervene during the Cold War than after the Cold War, and were less likely to intervene in higher-intensity conflicts than in lower-intensity conflicts (1998, 771-774). Regan also found statistically-insignificant evidence in support of the hypothesis that

third party states are more likely to intervene in conflicts involving refugee crises, and found that third party states were less likely (not more likely, as hypothesized) to intervene in conflicts in targets states involving higher numbers of bordering states than conflicts in targets state involving lower numbers of bordering states (1998, 771-774). On the other hand, Heraclides found that "neighboring states find it difficult to avoid becoming involved in nearby secessionist conflicts," and found that some states become involved in secessionist conflicts for "purely affective reasons" as opposed to strategic or instrumental reasons (1990, 376-377).

For the purposes of this study, third party intervention is broadly defined as *diplomatic/political, economic, or military involvement by a third party actor in a dispute for the purpose of assisting one of the parties to the dispute or for the purpose of assisting both of the parties to manage or resolve the dispute without taking sides.* Diplomatic/political involvement refers to third party actions such as condemnations, diplomatic non-recognition, ceasefire appeals, fact-finding, and mediation. Economic involvement refers to third party actions such as economic assistance and economic sanctions. Military involvement refers to third party actions such as military assistance, military sanctions, peacekeeping, and use of military force.

Third party interventions are broadly categorized according to two different dimensions. First, third party interventions may be categorized as either a participatory (partisan) intervention or an intermediary (non-partisan) intervention. Participatory interventions are those interventions in which the third party gets involved on one particular side of the dispute, and include verbal expressions, assistance/sanctions, threats of military

force, displays of military force, and uses of military force. Intermediary interventions are those interventions in which the third party does not take sides in the dispute, but rather acts as a neutral or impartial party in order to assist in the management or resolution of the dispute. Intermediary interventions include verbal expressions, diplomatic approaches, legal/judicial processes, administrative/civilian functions, and military involvements. Second, third party interventions may be categorized as either a military intervention or a non-military intervention. Military interventions are those interventions in which the third party employs a military technique (see "military involvements" above) in a partisan or non-partisan manner. Non-military interventions are those interventions in which the third party employs a "non-military" technique (see "diplomatic/political involvements" and "economic involvements" above) in a partisan or non-partisan manner.

In remaining sections of this chapter, I begin by developing a theoretical framework of state interventions based on the premise that there are connections at the international system level and transnational level between potential intervener states and target states that influence the occurrence of state interventions. From the theoretical framework, I derive a set of hypotheses concerning the occurrence of state interventions in intrastate disputes. The hypotheses are tested in two ways. First, the hypotheses are tested using aggregate data on all cases of state interventions in some 400 intrastate disputes that occurred during the 20th century. Second, the hypotheses are tested using all cases of state interventions by six selected countries (United States, Russia/Soviet Union, China, France, Egypt, Libya) in the 400 or so intrastate disputes.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES

I argue that political leaders of states choose to intervene in domestic political disputes in other states as a consequence of international influences and domestic pressures that largely originate from linkages already existing between third party states and states experiencing domestic political disputes or "target states" (Mitchell, 1970, 183-187). These linkages occur at both the international system level (strategic linkages) and the transnational level (non-strategic linkages). Strategic ("power") linkages refer to relationships among states (or governments of states) within the international system or a particular regional subsystem. On the other hand, non-strategic ("affective") linkages refer to relationships between domestic political/social groups within third party states and domestic political/social groups within target states. There are three general types of strategic linkages that exist at the international system level (geographic linkages, military linkages, and political linkages),[26] and there are four general types of non-strategic linkages that exist at the transnational level (ideological, ethnic/tribal, religious, and humanitarian).[27]

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[26] There is a possibility that economic linkages (e.g. trade or direct foreign investment between a third party state and a target state) might influence the occurrence of interventions. However, there are no known, reliable sources of trade or direct foreign investment data for the entire 20th century. Few studies that have tested economic linkages for the post-World War II period have found significant relationships. For example, John Odell (1974, 155) found "very little support" for the hypothesis that variations in US military interventions were related to bilateral trade or U.S. private investment in target states between 1950 and 1965. Similarly, Mi Yung Yoon (1997, 594) found that none of the economic variables in his analyses were important determinants of U.S. intervention in internal wars between 1945 and 1989. In any event, the possible effects of economic linkages might be accounted for in the models by variables for geographic linkages, political linkages, and military linkages.

[27] C. R. Mitchell (1970) suggested that transnational linkages can be divided into "those which involve transactions between the connected parties and those which merely involve congruent values, attitudes, ideologies, and self-images" (184). Specifically, he classified transnational linkages as "transactional" (educational, economic, military, political) and "affective"

Geographic Linkages

A third party state might choose to intervene in a domestic political dispute in a target state when the target state is geographically proximate to the third party state (Pearson, 1974a, 433; Luard, 1988, 121; Heraclides, 1990, 343; Feste, 1992, 17-18; Yoon, 1997, 582). There are three scenarios that could result in a decision by the leader of a third party state to intervene in a dispute in a bordering state. First, political violence or military hostilities between groups within the neighboring state could "spillover" the border into the third party state, resulting in damage of property or casualties in the third party state. Such an incident could influence the leader of the third party to decide to intervene in order to prevent another such incident from occurring. Second, a change in control of the government of a neighboring state as a result of a domestic political dispute could be perceived as a direct threat to the national security of the third party state, and therefore, the leader of the third party state could be influenced to intervene in the bordering state in order to prevent a change in control of the government or to reverse a change in control of the government. Third, the flow of refugees across the border from a target state could undermine the stability of the third party state, and again, the leader of the third party state could be influenced to intervene in the bordering state in order to prevent the flow of refugees from across the border. In each of these scenarios, the perceived threat to the third party state is a function of the common border with or geographic proximity to the target state. If the two states did not share a

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(ideological, religious, family/clan/tribal, ethnic/racial) (184-185). Similarly, Rajat Ganguly and Ray Taras (1998) suggested that external parties may intervene for both affective motives (reasons of justice; humanitarian considerations; ethnic, religious, racial, or ideological affinity with one of the disputants) and instrumental motives (international political considerations; short-term and long-term economic motives; and domestic motives) (75).

common border, these threats would not exist or would be minimal. Since major international/regional powers are more likely to have the economic and military capabilities required to intervene in another state, target states that share borders with these states might be more vulnerable to intervention than targets states that do not share borders with these states.

Hypothesis 1: There is a higher likelihood of a state intervention when the target state is geographically proximate to a major international/regional power.

Military Linkages

A third party state might choose to intervene in a domestic political dispute in a target state when the government of the third party state has a military alliance (i.e. mutual defense assistance agreement, mutual defense treaty, or treaty of mutual cooperation and security) with the government of the target state. A third party state that has negotiated a military alliance with a target state has a national interest in preventing the defeat or overthrow of the government of the target state (Kaw, 1989, 426). Similar to geographic proximity, target states that have military alliances with major international/regional powers might be more vulnerable to intervention than target states that do not have military alliances with major international/regional powers.

In addition to situations involving military alliances between the governments of a third party state and a target state, there are two other scenarios that might also influence a third party state to intervene in a target state. First, the leader of a third party state might choose to intervene in an intrastate dispute after an allied state has intervened in the dispute (Kim, 1991, 676). In this scenario, the third party state might want to assist the allied state

in achieving its goals during an intervention. The failure of the allied state in achieving its goals during an intervention could undermine the stability of the government of the allied state, and therefore, could undermine the military alliance between the two states. Second, the leader of a third party state might choose to intervene in support of one party to a dispute after an adversarial state has intervened in support of the other side of a dispute (Luard, 1972, 15-16; Heraclides, 1990, 343; Yoon, 1997, 582; Vertzberger, 1998, 167). The success of the adversarial state in achieving its goals during an intervention could result in an increase in the prestige of the adversarial state in the region of the target state, and consequently, could result in a decrease in the prestige of the third party state.

Hypothesis 2a: There is a higher likelihood of a state intervention when the government of the target state has a military alliance with the government of a major international/regional power.

Hypothesis 2b: There is a higher likelihood of a state intervention when a state that has a military alliance with a major international/regional power has intervened in the dispute.

Hypothesis 2c: There is a higher likelihood of a state intervention when a state that is an adversary of a major international/regional power has intervened in the dispute.

Political Linkages

A third party state might choose to intervene in another state experiencing a domestic political dispute if the third party state possesses a preponderance of relative economic and military capabilities in the international system (international hegemon) or in a regional subsystem (regional hegemon). In both of these situations, the third party state has a national interest in ensuring that a domestic political dispute does not result in a serious threat to international or regional peace and security. International and regional hegemons also have

a national interest in ensuring that particular domestic political disputes do not lead to challenges to their dominant status in the international system or regional subsystem. As a consequence of their preponderance of relative economic and military capabilities, hegemons are generally less constrained than non-hegemons in intervening in intrastate disputes in the international system or regional subsystems (Young, 1968, 180; Macfarlane, 1985, 17; Pearson et al., 1994, 208; Carment et al., 1997, 110). In other words, there are generally no states or coalitions of states that could prevent a hegemon from intervening in a dispute, while there are states and coalitions of states that could prevent a non-hegemon from intervening in a dispute. The combination of national interests in maintaining the status quo and the relative lack of constraints results in a strong influence on international and regional hegemons to frequently intervene in domestic political disputes in their respective spheres of influence.

Similarly, third party states, particularly major international/regional powers, might be compelled to intervene in another state experiencing a domestic political dispute when the target state is a former colony or protectorate of the third party state (Hoffman, 1984, 15). In these situations, the government of the former colony or protectorate often retains strong political and cultural ties to the government of the former colonial power. When the government of the former colony or protectorate is seriously threatened by domestic political opposition, it will often appeal to the government of the former colonial power for economic or military assistance. Governments of former colonial powers have felt obligated to assist governments of a former colonies when appeals for assistance are made during period of domestic instability, particularly during the decade or two immediately following

independence (Van Wingen, 1980, 293-295).

Hypothesis 3a: There is a higher likelihood of a state intervention when there is a hegemon in the international system.

Hypothesis 3b: There is a higher likelihood of a state intervention when there is a hegemon in the regional subsystem.

Hypothesis 3c: There is a higher likelihood of a state intervention when the target state is a former colony/protectorate of a major international/regional power.

Ideological Linkages

A third party state might choose to intervene in a domestic political dispute in another state when a group within the third party state (typically the group that has control of the central government of the third party state) has a salient ideological linkage with either the group in control of the central government in the target state or an opposition group in the target state (Morgenthau, 1967, 428-429; Young, 1968, 183-184; Mitchell, 1970, 185; Macfarlane, 1985, 11-12; Feste, 1992, 18-19; Yoon, 1997, 582; Ganguly and Taras, 1998, 76-77). Ideological linkages between groups within third party states and groups within target states are found in domestic political disputes that have discernible ideological dimensions. A particular intrastate dispute has an ideological dimension when either the group in control of the government or an opposition group is largely motivated by or identified with a particular ideology. For example, there was an ideological dimension to the civil conflict fought between the government of El Salvador and opposition groups from 1972 to 1992, since most of the opposition groups were strongly identified with the Marxist-Leninist ideology. During the conflict, the US provided military assistance to the Salvadoran government, and Cuba provided military assistance to some of the opposition groups.

There are two scenarios in which an ideological linkage between a group within a particular third party state and a group within a target state could lead to an intervention in a domestic political dispute. First, the government of the third party state decides to intervene in support of the government in a target state that is being opposed by an ideologically motivated opposition group. The government of the third party state intervenes because it opposes the ideology of the opposition group, and does not want to see the opposition group gain control of the government of the target state. Second, the government of the third party state intervenes in support of an opposition group in a target state that is governed by an ideologically motivated political group. The government of the third party state intervenes because it opposes the ideology of the group currently in control of the government of the target state, and would like to see the opposition group gain control of the government of the target state. In both scenarios, ideological linkages are salient when the political group in control of the government or the leader of the political group in control of the government in the third party state is ideologically motivated.

Hypothesis 4: There is a higher likelihood of a state intervention when there is an ideological dimension to the dispute.

Ethnic/Tribal Linkages

A third party state might choose to intervene in a domestic political dispute in another state when a group within the third party state has a salient ethnic/tribal linkage with a group in the target state (Mitchell, 1970, 185; Heraclides, 1990, 373; Cooper and Berdal, 1993, 134; Ganguly and Taras, 1998, 76). Ethnic/tribal linkages are salient when an ethnic/tribal group has a high level of influence over foreign policy in the third party state compared to

other groups in the state, and when a domestic political dispute in a target state involves members of the same ethnic/tribal group. In these situations, ethnic/tribal groups that are parties to domestic political disputes will often seek external assistance from members of the same ethnic/tribal group in third party states. If a particular ethnic/tribal group has control over the government of the third party state or has significant influence over the foreign policy of the government of the third party state, the chances are good that the government of the third party state will choose to intervene in order to assist the ethnic/tribal group in the target state or to assist both of the parties in the target state to manage or resolve the dispute (Vertzberger, 1998, 154). Ethnic/tribal linkages between groups within third party states and groups within target states are found in domestic political disputes that have discernible ethnic/tribal dimensions. For example, the secessionist/separatist conflict in Sri Lanka involves an ethnic/tribal group (ethnic-Tamils) in opposition to the ethnic Sinhalese-controlled government. Ethnic-Tamils in southern India have a strong affinity with ethnic-Tamils in northern Sri Lanka, and consequently, the Indian government has intervened in support of the ethnic-Tamils in Sri Lanka (O'Ballance, 1989, 14-15).

Hypothesis 5: There is a higher likelihood of a state intervention when there is an ethnic/tribal dimension to the dispute.

Religious Linkages

A third party state might choose to intervene in another state experiencing a domestic political dispute when a group within the third party state has a salient religious linkage with a group within the target state (Mitchell, 1970, 185; Heraclides, 1990, 373). Religious linkages are salient when a religious group has a high level of influence over the foreign

policy in the third party state compared to other groups in the state, and when a domestic political dispute in a target state involves members of the same religious group. Similar to ethnic/tribal linkages, religious groups that are parties to domestic political disputes will often seek external assistance from members of the same religious group in third party states. If a particular religious group has control over the government of a third party state, there is a good chance that the government of the third party state will choose to intervene in order to assist the religious group in the target state or to assist both of the parties in the target state to manage or resolve the dispute. Religious linkages between groups within third party states and groups within target states are found in domestic political disputes that have a discernible religious dimension. For example, the secessionist/separatist dispute on the islands of Sulu, Palawan, and Mindanao in southern Philippines from 1968 to 1996 involved a Muslim group (Moro National Liberation Front - MNLF) in opposition to the government. The Muslim governments of Malaysia and Libya had strong affinities with the Muslims in the Philippines, and consequently, the countries provided military assistance to the MNLF from 1968 to 1976 (Suhrke and Noble, 1977, 179-195; Man, 1990, 138-148).

Hypothesis 6: There is a higher likelihood of a state intervention when there is a religious dimension to the dispute.

Humanitarian Linkages

A third party state might choose to intervene in an intrastate dispute as a result of a serious humanitarian crisis in a target state (Heraclides, 1990, 372; Cooper and Berdal, 1993, 134; Dowty and Loescher, 1996, 69-71; Regan, 1998, 767; Ganguly and Taras, 1998, 76). Civilian/military fatalities and refugees/internally-displaced persons (IDPs) are two

indicators of a serious humanitarian crisis in a state experiencing a domestic political dispute. The government of a third party state might be pressured by concerned citizens, elected representatives, representatives of the media, or representatives of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to intervene in an intrastate dispute in order to alleviate a humanitarian crisis in a target state. For example, the UN authorized member-states to "use all necessary means" to secure the delivery of humanitarian assistance to the people of Somalia on December 3, 1992 (a conflict among rival clans in Somalia had caused some 2.8 million refugees/IDPs and some 350,000 fatalities beginning in November 1991) (Thakur, 1994, 387-410).

Hypothesis 7a: There is a higher likelihood of a state intervention when there is a high level of refugees/internally-displaced persons resulting from the dispute in the target state.

Hypothesis 7b: There is a higher likelihood of a state intervention when there is a high level of fatalities resulting from the dispute in the target state.

RESEARCH DESIGN

To conduct a rigorous, empirical test of the hypotheses regarding state interventions in intrastate disputes, original data was collected on some 400 intrastate disputes that occurred between January 1, 1900 and December 31, 2000 (see Appendix B). The unit of analysis is the *dispute phase*. All of the intrastate disputes were disaggregated into their respective phases: pre-crisis phases, crisis phases, conflict phases, post-conflict phases, and post-crisis phases.[28] Following an approach used by Meernik (1994) in his analysis of the

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[28] Frank L. Sherman (1994) developed a similar set of dispute phases, including a) dispute phase; b) conflict phase; c) hostilities phase; d) post-hostilities conflict phase; e) post-hostilities dispute phase; and f) settlement phase. Sherman's conceptual framework was based on research originally done by Lincoln P. Bloomfield and Amelia C. Leiss (1969).

use of military force by US presidents, each dispute phase represents an *opportunity to intervene*.[29] Potential intervener states have a unique opportunity to intervene in a domestic political dispute after every major shift, whether escalatory or de-escalatory, in the intensity level of the dispute. For example, an intrastate dispute that has escalated to military hostilities (conflict phase) provides potential intervener states with an opportunity to assist one of the parties defeat the other party (or avoid being defeated by the other party), assist both of the parties to negotiate an end to military hostilities, or not get involved in the dispute. Furthermore, an intrastate dispute that has de-escalated to a cessation of military hostilities (post-conflict phase) provides third party states with the opportunity to assist one of the parties rebuild its military forces, assist both of the parties to negotiate a demobilization agreement or assist both of the parties by deploying peacekeeping troops, or not get involved in the dispute. Altogether, the 400 or so intrastate disputes consisted of 1,194 dispute phases, or an average of approximately three phases per dispute.

The historical record was examined for information on the occurrence of diplomatic/political, economic, and military interventions by states and coalitions of states in the 1,194 dispute phases during the 20th century (see Appendix C for a list of standard sources of information), and a total of 1,669 interventions by states or coalitions of states were identified. Of the 1,669 state interventions, 256 interventions (15.3%) occurred in the Asia/Pacific region, 259 interventions (15.5%) occurred in the Europe/Russia/Former Soviet

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[29] William J. Dixon (1993) similarly used disaggregated conflicts or "conflict phases" as the unit of analysis in his study of democracy and conflict management of interstate conflicts (47-49). He argued that it is "only through the disaggregation of disputes that it is possible to capture even so basic an attribute as the presence or absence of conflict management activity" (49).

Union region, 348 interventions (20.9%) occurred in the Middle East/North Africa/Persian Gulf region, 437 interventions (26.2%) occurred in the Sub-Saharan Africa region, and 369 interventions (22.1%) occurred in the Western Hemisphere region.

Figure 3-1 (a) - (e) provides frequencies of the occurrence of state interventions in the five regions of the world. The frequencies of the occurrence of state interventions differed significantly from one region to the next. The number of state interventions in the Asia/Pacific region ranged from zero to five per year between 1900 and 1944, and ranged from zero to fifteen per year between 1945 and 1963. The number of state interventions in the Asia/Pacific region ranged from zero to twenty-five per year between 1964 and 1980, and ranged from zero to ten per year between 1981 and 2000. The number of state interventions in the Europe/Russia/Former Soviet Union region ranged from zero to fifteen per year between 1910 and 1944, and ranged from zero to ten per year between 1945 and 1991. The number of state interventions in the region ranged from zero to twenty-five per year between 1992 and 2000. The number of state interventions in the Middle East/North Africa/Persian Gulf region ranged from zero to ten per year between 1900 and 1957, and ranged from zero to thirty per year between 1958 and 1974. The number of state interventions in the Middle East/North Africa/Persian Gulf region generally ranged from zero to fifteen per year between 1975 and 2000. There were few state interventions in the Sub-Saharan Africa region between 1900 and 1959, but the number of interventions ranged from zero to thirty per year between 1960 and 2000. Finally, the number of state interventions in the Western Hemisphere region ranged from zero to twenty per year throughout the 20th century.

Figure 3-1: Frequencies of the Occurrence of State Interventions (Regions)



Abbreviations: A/P = Asia/Pacific; E/R/FSU = Europe/Russia/Former Soviet Union; ME/NA/PG = Middle East/North Africa/Persian Gulf; SSA = Sub-Saharan Africa; WH = Western Hemisphere.

Figure 3-1 (f) provides the frequency of the occurrence of state interventions in all of the regions combined during the 20th century. There were four observable phases of interventions during the period: (1) Early 20th Century (1900-1930) - the frequency of interventions ranged from zero to twenty per year; (2) Pre-World War II/World War II (1931-1945) - the frequency of interventions ranged from zero to thirty per year; (3) Cold War (1946-1989) - the frequency of interventions ranged from five to sixty per year; and (4) Post-Cold War (1990-2000) - the frequency of interventions ranged from ten to seventy-five per year.

Dependent Variable

In order to account for the different dimensions of state interventions, I have operationalized the dependent variable in the following four ways: (1) there was a state intermediary or participatory intervention during the dispute phase = 1; there was not a state intermediary or participatory intervention during the dispute phase = 0; (2) there was a state intermediary intervention during the dispute phase = 1; there was not a state intermediary intervention during the dispute phase = 0; (3) there was a state participatory intervention during the dispute phase = 1; there was not a state participatory intervention during the dispute phase = 0; (4) there was a state military intervention during the dispute phase = 1; there was not a state military intervention during the dispute phase = 0. Since each variant of the dependent variable is dichotomous, separate logistic regression models for each will be estimated.

Independent Variables

The specification of the model suggests that the likelihood of the occurrence of a state intervention is a function of the seven types of strategic and non-strategic linkages. One or more indicators of each of the seven types of linkages are operationalized as follows:

* Geographic Proximity {the target state shares a common land border with or is located within 150 miles of water of a major international/regional power = 1; otherwise = 0}. See Appendix G for a list of major international/regional powers.

* Military Alliance {government of the target state has a military alliance (mutual defense assistance agreement, mutual defense treaty, or treaty of mutual cooperation and security) with the government of a major international/regional power = 1; otherwise = 0}. See Appendix D for a list of military alliances.

* Prior Allied Intervention {there was a prior intervention during the current or previous dispute phase by a military ally of a major international/regional power = 1; otherwise = 0}.

* Prior Adversary Intervention {there was a prior intervention during the current or previous dispute phase by an adversary of a major international/regional power = 1; otherwise = 0}. Two states are considered adversaries if they experienced three or more "militarized interstate disputes" during any ten-year period, or experienced one "militarized interstate dispute" for one or more consecutive years. Data on "militarized interstate disputes" was obtained from the Correlates of War (COW) Project's Military Interstate Dispute (MID) data set. See Appendix E for a list of adversaries.

* International Hegemon {there is a hegemon in the international system = 1; otherwise = 0}. A state is considered an international hegemon when it possesses a preponderance of military and economic capabilities in the international system. Specifically, a state is considered a hegemon: a) when it possesses a higher percentage of relative major power economic/military capabilities than any other state; b) when it possesses 30 percent or more of the relative major power economic/military capabilities; and c) when its percentage margin over the major power with the second highest level of relative economic/military capabilities is 10 percent or more. The data on relative major power economic/military capabilities was obtained from the Correlates of War (COW) Project's National Capabilities data set (Singer 1988). Using this coding rule, the data indicates that there was a hegemon in the international system during the years 1918-1929, 1942-1957, and 1989-2000.

* Regional Hegemon {there is a hegemon in the regional subsystem = 1; otherwise = 0}. A state is considered a regional hegemon when it possesses a preponderance of relative military and economic capabilities within a particular region, or "states which possess power sufficient to dominate a subordinate state system" (Myers, 1991, 5). Since there is no comparable "national capabilities" data set for the various regions of the world, several scholarly books written on the topic of regional hegemony were used to develop a list of regional hegemons in the 20th century. See Appendix F for a list of regional hegemons.

* Former Colony {the target state is a former colony or protectorate of a major international/regional power = 1; otherwise = 0}. See Appendix A for information on the former status of states in the international system.

* Ideological Linkage {there is an ideological dimension to the dispute = 1; otherwise = 0}. Data on ideological linkages was obtained from standard sources of information (see Appendix C).

* Ethnic/Tribal Linkage {there is an ethnic/tribal dimension to the dispute = 1; otherwise = 0}. Data on ethnic/tribal linkages was obtained from standard sources of information (see Appendix C).

* Religious Linkage {there is a religious dimension to the dispute = 1; otherwise = 0}. Data on religious linkages was obtained from standard sources of information (see Appendix C).

* Refugees {there are 25,000 or more refugees/ internally displaced persons resulting from the dispute = 1; otherwise = 0}. Data on refugee levels was obtained from the *United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees* (UNHCR), the *United States Committee for Refugees* (USCR), and standard sources of information (see Appendix C).

* Fatalities: this variable is operationalized as a dichotomous variable {there are 100 or more annual civilian/military fatalities resulting from the dispute = 1; otherwise = 0}. Data on fatalities was obtained from standard sources of information (see Appendix C).

DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS

Table 3-1 provides the results of the Logistic regression analyses of the effects of strategic and non-strategic linkages on the occurrence of state interventions in intrastate disputes during the 20th century. The hypotheses predicted that the coefficients for each of the independent variables in each of the models would be positive. In the first column, the dependent variable in the model is the occurrence of a state intermediary or participatory intervention during a dispute phase. There is some evidence in support of several of the

strategic linkage hypotheses. The coefficient for prior allied intervention is positive and statistically significant. Consistent with hypothesis 2b, there is a higher likelihood of a state intervention when a state that is an ally of a major international/regional power has intervened during the current or previous dispute phase. Likewise, the coefficient for prior adversary intervention is positive and statistically significant. Consistent with hypothesis 2c, there is a higher likelihood of a state intervention when a state that is an adversary of a major international/regional power has intervened during the current or previous dispute phase. Finally, the coefficient for regional hegemon is positive and statistically significant. Consistent with hypothesis 3b, there is a higher likelihood of a state intervention when there is a hegemon in the regional subsystem.

There is also some evidence in support of two of the non-strategic linkage hypotheses in the first column. The coefficients for refugees and fatalities are statistically significant in the hypothesized directions. Consistent with hypotheses 7a and 7b, there is a higher likelihood of a state intervention when there are high levels of refugees/internally-displaced persons and fatalities resulting from the dispute in the target state.

Table 3-1: Estimates of Logit Models of the Occurrence of State Interventions

Independent Variables	All Interventions	Intermediary Interventions	Participatory Interventions	Military Interventions
Strategic Linkages				
Geographic Proximity	-.05 (.17)	.10 (.24)	-.14 (.16)	-.13 (.18)
Military Alliance	-.62 (.18)	-.24 (.26)	-.64 (.17)	-.17 (.19)
Prior Allied Intervention	1.85 (.18)**	1.46 (.29)**	1.45 (.19)**	1.32 (.21)**
Prior Adversary Intervention	1.17 (.19)**	-.18 (.32)	1.58 (.20)**	1.22 (.24)**
International Hegemon	-.01 (.15)	.10 (.22)	-.36 (.15)	-.33 (.18)
Regional Hegemon	.86 (.20)**	1.27 (.25)**	.43 (.19)**	.40 (.22)
Former Colony	-.19 (.17)	.27 (.25)	-.19 (.16)	.02 (.19)
Non-Strategic Linkages				
Ideological Linkage	-.30 (.19)	-.46 (.29)	-.21 (.18)	-.29 (.20)
Ethnic/Tribal Linkage	-.33 (.19)	.25 (.25)	-.65 (.19)	-.22 (.21)
Religious Linkage	-.07 (.19)	.32 (.23)	-.11 (.20)	-.39 (.23)
Refugees	.79 (.23)**	.96 (.28)**	.46 (.24)*	.77 (.27)**
Fatalities	1.24 (.19)**	.85 (.26)**	1.18 (.19)**	1.47 (.22)**
Constant	-1.60 (.24)**	-3.54 (.38)**	-1.47 (.24)**	-2.45 (.29)**
Number of Cases	1,194	1,194	1,194	1,194
Log Likelihood (LL)	-560.64	-396.74	-536.34	-469.06
Chi-Square Statistic	406.35	140.71	385.44	293.89
Probability > Chi-Square	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00

Note: Estimates are Logit regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. Robust standard errors are adjusted for clustering on the dispute (i.e. the assumption of the independence of observations is relaxed within each dispute).

* $p \leq .05$, one-tailed test.

** $p \leq .01$, one-tailed test.

In the second column in table 3-1, the dependent variable is the occurrence of a state intermediary intervention during a dispute phase. Again, there is some evidence in support of both strategic and non-strategic linkage hypotheses. The coefficients for prior allied intervention and regional hegemon are positive and statistically significant. Consistent with hypotheses 2b and 3b, there is a higher likelihood of a state intermediary intervention when a state that is an ally of a major international/regional power has intervened during the current or previous dispute phase and when there is a hegemon in the regional subsystem. In addition, the coefficients for refugees and fatalities are positive and statistically significant. Consistent with hypotheses 7a and 7b, there is a higher likelihood of a state intermediary interventions when there are high levels of refugees and fatalities resulting from the dispute.

In the third column in table 3-1, the dependent variable is the occurrence of a state participatory intervention during a dispute phase. The coefficients for prior allied intervention, prior adversary intervention, regional hegemon, refugees, and fatalities are statistically significant in the hypothesized directions. Consistent with hypotheses 2b, 2c, 3b, 7a, and 7b, there is a higher likelihood of a state participatory intervention when a state that is an ally of a major international/regional power has intervened during the current or previous dispute phase, when a state that is an adversary of a major international/regional power has intervened during the current or previous dispute phase, when there is a hegemon in the regional subsystem, when there is a high level of refugees resulting from the dispute, and when there is a high level of fatalities resulting from the dispute.

Finally, the dependent variable in the fourth column of table 4-1 is the occurrence of a state military intervention during a dispute phase. The coefficients for prior allied intervention, prior adversary intervention, refugees, and fatalities are statistically significant in the hypothesized directions. Consistent with hypotheses 2b, 2c, 7a, and 7b, there is a higher likelihood of a state military intervention when a state that is an ally of a major international/regional power has intervened during the current or previous dispute phase, when a state that is an adversary of a major international/regional power has intervened during the current or previous dispute phase, when there is a high level of refugees resulting from the dispute, and when there is a high level of fatalities resulting from the dispute.

Overall, there are five main findings regarding the occurrence of state interventions and strategic linkages. First, there is no evidence that target states sharing borders with major international/regional powers are more susceptible to external state interventions than target states not sharing borders with major international/regional powers. In fact, the negative signs of the coefficients for the independent variable in three of the four models indicate that target states sharing borders with major international/regional powers may be less susceptible to external state interventions. At the very least, we can say that target states geographically proximate to a major international/regional power are no more or less likely to experience interventions by other states. This finding contradicts realist expectations concerning the behavior of major powers toward their neighbors. Second, there is some evidence that military alliance has the opposite effect than what was hypothesized under the realist theory. Target states that had military alliances with major international/regional powers were less likely, not more likely, to experience state interventions. Third, there is

compelling evidence that prior interventions by states that had military alliances with major international/regional powers or by states that were adversaries of major international/regional powers does increase the likelihood of subsequent state interventions. Fourth, there is no evidence of a higher likelihood of state interventions in domestic political disputes when there is a hegemon in the international system, but there is strong evidence of a higher likelihood of state interventions in domestic political disputes when there is a hegemon in the regional subsystem of the target state. Hegemony matters when it comes to the occurrence of state interventions in intrastate disputes, but possibly only at the regional level. Finally, there is no evidence of a higher likelihood of state interventions in target states that are former colonies/protectorates of major international/regional powers.

There are also a couple of main findings regarding the occurrence of state interventions and non-strategic linkages. First, there was no evidence that domestic political disputes with ideological, ethnic/tribal, or religious dimensions were more susceptible to state interventions than disputes without these types of dimensions. I argued that disputes with ideological, ethnic/tribal, or religious dimensions would be more likely to result in ideological, ethnic/tribal, or religious linkages between groups in target states and groups in third party states, and therefore, these disputes would be more likely to experience state interventions. However, it is possible that the effects of ideological, ethnic/tribal, and religious linkages are not properly accounted for through this particular operationalization of the variables. Second, there is strong evidence that domestic political disputes with serious humanitarian problems are more susceptible to state interventions than disputes without serious humanitarian problems. Nearly all of the coefficients for the humanitarian

linkage variables were highly statistically significant in the hypothesized directions in the four models of state interventions.

ANALYSIS OF STATE INTERVENTIONS: SIX SELECTED COUNTRIES

In the previous section, hypotheses regarding state interventions in intrastate disputes were tested using aggregate data on all state interventions in intrastate disputes that occurred during the 20th century. While some generalizations can be made regarding the results of those analyses, there are some significant limitations to the aggregate approach. For example, we can test with aggregate data whether or not there is a higher likelihood of a state intervention when the target state is geographically-proximate to a major international/regional power (hypothesis 1), but we can not use these results to make a generalization about the likelihood of an intervention by third party states that are geographically-proximate to states experiencing domestic political disputes. Likewise, we can test with aggregate data whether or not there is a higher likelihood of a state intervention when there is an ideological dimension to an intrastate dispute (hypothesis 4), but we can not use these results to make generalizations about the likelihood of interventions by third party states within which there are groups that have ideological linkages to groups in target states.

In this section of the chapter, I test a similar set of hypotheses regarding state interventions in intrastate disputes using data on six selected countries (United States, Russia/Soviet Union, China, France, Egypt, Libya). The six selected countries represent three categories of states: major international powers (superpowers), major international powers (non-superpowers), and non-major international powers (major regional powers). The six selected countries include cases of state interventions that occurred in all five regions

of the world (Asia/Pacific, Europe/Russia/Former Soviet Union, Middle East/North Africa/Persian Gulf, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Western Hemisphere). Finally, the six selected countries represent both colonial (imperial) powers and non-colonial (non-imperial) powers, and represent both democracies and non-democracies during the period of the 20th century.

The hypotheses derived from the theoretical framework discussed in the previous section are slightly modified for the analyses in this section:

Hypothesis 1: There is a higher likelihood of an intervention by a third party state when the target is geographically proximate to the third party state.

Hypothesis 2a: There is a higher likelihood of an intervention by a third party state when the government of the target state has a military alliance with the government of the third party state.

Hypothesis 2b: There is a higher likelihood of an intervention by a third party state when another state that has a military alliance with the third party state has intervened in the dispute.

Hypothesis 2c: There is a higher likelihood of an intervention by a third party state when another state that is an adversary of the third party state has intervened in the dispute.

Hypothesis 3a: There is a higher likelihood of an intervention by a third party state when the third party state is a hegemon in the international system.

Hypothesis 3b: There is a higher likelihood of an intervention by a third party state when the third party state is a hegemon in the regional subsystem of the target state.

Hypothesis 3c: There is a higher likelihood of an intervention by a third party state when the target state is a former colony/protectorate of the third party state.

Hypothesis 4: There is a higher likelihood of an intervention by a third party state when a group in the third party state has an ideological linkage with a group in the target state.

Hypothesis 5: There is a higher likelihood of an intervention by a third party state when a group in the third party state has an ethnic/tribal linkage with a group in the target state.

Hypothesis 6: There is a higher likelihood of an intervention by a third party state when a group in the third party state has a religious linkage with a group in the target state.

Hypothesis 7a: There is a higher likelihood of an intervention by a third party state when there is a high level of refugees/internally-displaced persons resulting from the dispute in the target state.

Hypothesis 7b: There is a higher likelihood of an intervention by a third party state when there is a high level of fatalities resulting from the dispute in the target state.

The historical record was examined for information on occurrences of diplomatic, economic, and military interventions by the six selected countries in the 1,194 dispute phases. Table 3-2 summarizes the data collected on some 859 interventions in the dispute phases by the six countries. The US was involved in the largest number of state interventions among the six countries, including 238 out of 485 interventions (49.1%) in the Western Hemisphere region. China was involved in the least number of state interventions among the six countries, including 21 out of 40 interventions (52.5%) in the Asia/Pacific region. Russia/Soviet Union intervened in intrastate disputes primarily in the Europe/Russia/Former Soviet Union region (37.5%) and the Middle East/North Africa/Persian Gulf region (22.5%), while France intervened primarily in the Sub-Saharan Africa (38.9%) and Europe/Russia/Former Soviet Union regions (27.1%). Egypt and Libya intervened in intrastate disputes primarily in the Middle East/North Africa/Persian Gulf and Sub-Saharan Africa regions. When the countries intervened in intrastate disputes, they tended to become involved more often as participants rather than as intermediaries. In addition, the countries

tended to become involved more often non-militarily rather than militarily. The proportions of total interventions that were participatory interventions ranged between 65 percent and 85 percent for each of the six countries. With the exception of Egypt, the proportion of total interventions that were non-military interventions was between 50 percent and 60 percent for each of the countries.

Table 3-2. Summary of the Occurrence of State Interventions (Six Selected Countries)

	United States	Russia/USSR	China	France	Egypt	Libya
Intermediary Interventions	96 (19.8%)	40 (33.7%)	6 (15.0%)	40 (33.9%)	11 (23.9%)	11 (22.0%)
Participatory Interventions	389 (80.2%)	80 (66.7%)	34 (85.0%)	78 (66.1%)	35 (76.1%)	39 (78.0%)
Military Interventions	199 (41.0%)	60 (50.0%)	18 (45.0%)	54 (45.8%)	13 (28.3%)	23 (46.0%)
Non-Military Interventions	286 (59.0%)	60 (50.0%)	22 (55.0%)	64 (54.2%)	33 (71.7%)	27 (54.0%)
Interventions - Asia/Pacific	79 (16.3%)	21 (17.5%)	21 (52.5%)	12 (10.2%)	3 (6.5%)	3 (6.0%)
Interventions - Europe/Russia/ Former Sov. Union	60 (12.4%)	45 (37.5%)	2 (5.0%)	32 (27.1%)	1 (2.2%)	1 (2.0%)
Interventions - Middle East/North Africa/Persian Gulf	54 (11.1%)	27 (22.5%)	8 (20.0%)	22 (18.6%)	34 (73.9%)	27 (54.0%)
Interventions - Sub-Saharan Africa	54 (11.1%)	20 (16.7%)	9 (22.5%)	46 (38.9%)	8 (17.4%)	17 (34.0%)
Interventions - W. Hemisphere	238 (49.1%)	7 (5.8%)	0 (0.0%)	6 (5.1%)	0 (0.0%)	2 (4.0%)
Total Interventions	485	120	40	118	46	50

Figure 3-2 (a) - (f) illustrates the frequencies of interventions in intrastate disputes by the six countries. Figure 3-2 (a) suggests that there have generally been three waves of intervention activity by the US in intrastate disputes during the 20th century: the 1910-1935 period; the 1945-1975 period; and the 1980-present period. The first wave essentially corresponds to the period of "gunboat diplomacy" in Latin America during the early decades of the 20th century. The second wave corresponds to the US rivalry with the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Finally, the third wave corresponds to the resurgence of intervention activity by the US that started during the Reagan Administration and continuing through the post-Cold War period. Figure 3-2 (b) shows that Russia/Soviet Union also engaged, albeit on a smaller scale than the US, in three waves of intervention activity: the 1910-1930 period; the 1950-1980 period; and the 1990-2000 period. The first wave essentially corresponds to the last decade of the Russian Empire and the revolutionary/counter-revolutionary period of the late-1910 and 1920s. The second wave corresponds to the Soviet Union and the Cold War period, and the third wave corresponds to re-emergence of Russia and the post-Cold War period. Figure 3-2 (c) indicates that China engaged in low-to-moderate intervention activity (approximately zero to five interventions per year) during the 1960-1980 period, and may be having a small resurgence of intervention activity in the post-Cold War period. Figure 3-2 (d) suggests that France had low-to-moderate intervention activity throughout the 1910-1990 period, but its intervention activity increased significantly after the end of the Cold War. Figure 3-2 (e) shows that Egypt engaged in low-to-moderate intervention activity during the 1960-1980 period, and figure 3-2 (f) indicates that Libya engaged in low-to-moderate intervention activity during the 1970-1985 period.

Figure 3-2. Frequencies of the Occurrence of State Interventions (six selected countries)



Tables 3-3 through 3-6 provide the results of the Logistic regression analyses of the effects of strategic and non-strategic linkages on the occurrence of interventions by the six selected states. The hypotheses predicted that the coefficients for each of the independent variables in the models would be positive. For each of the models presented in table 3-3, the dependent variable is the occurrence of an intermediary or participatory intervention by the six selected states. The dependent variable is coded "1" if an intermediary or participatory intervention occurred during a dispute phase, and is coded "0" if an intermediary or participatory intervention did not occur during a dispute phase. These results provide evidence in support of several of the strategic linkage hypotheses. The coefficients for geographic proximity are positive and statistically significant in the models for Russia/USSR, China, France, Egypt, and Libya; the coefficient for geographic proximity is not statistically significant only in the model for the US. Consistent with hypothesis 1, five of the six selected states were more likely to intervene when they were geographically proximate to the target state. The coefficients for regional hegemon are positive and statistically significant in the models for the US and Russia/USSR (the only two states among the six states that were regional hegemons during any part of the 20th century). Consistent with hypothesis 3b, the US and Russia/USSR were more likely to intervene when they were hegemons in the regional subsystem of the target state. The coefficients for former colony are positive and statistically significant in the models for France and Egypt. Consistent with hypothesis 3c, France and Egypt were more likely to intervene when the target state was a former colony or protectorate.

Table 3-3: Estimate of Logit Models of the Occurrence of State Interventions by Six Selected Countries (Intermediary and Participatory)

Independent Variables	United States	Russia/USSR	China
Strategic Linkages			
Geographic Proximity	.21 (.33)	1.33 (.34)**	1.74 (.43)**
Military Alliance	.13 (.22)	-3.12 (1.20)	--- ---
Prior Allied Intervention	-.04 (.14)	.15 (.65)	--- ---
Prior Adversary Intervention	.37 (.21)*	.46 (.34)	.12 (.45)
International Hegemon	.22 (.16)	--- ---	--- ---
Regional Hegemon	1.58 (.29)**	2.80 (.86)**	--- ---
Former Colony	-.34 (.52)	-1.56 (.90)	--- ---
Non-Strategic Linkages			
Ideological Linkage	1.10 (.36)**	1.53 (.33)**	2.70 (.40)**
Ethnic/Tribal Linkage	1.55 (.41)**	.24 (1.04)	--- ---
Religious Linkage	--- ---	.91 (.39)**	--- ---
Refugees	.48 (.24)*	1.32 (.37)**	.39 (.56)
Fatalities	.81 (.20)**	.88 (.38)*	.72 (.59)
Constant	-2.16 (.14)**	-4.11 (.27)**	-4.87 (.37)**
Number of Cases	1,182	1,156	1,150
Log Likelihood (LL)	-554.75	-239.41	-108.69
Chi-Square Statistic	138.12	113.95	67.85
Probability > Chi-Square	0.00	0.00	0.00

Note: Estimates are Logit regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. Robust standard errors are adjusted for clustering on the dispute (i.e. the assumption of the independence of observations is relaxed within each dispute). Some of the independent variables and control variables are omitted from some of the models when they are not relevant to a particular state or when the variables perfectly predicted failure.

* $p \leq .05$, one-tailed test.

** $p \leq .01$, one-tailed test.

Table 3-3: Estimates of Logit Models of the Occurrence of State Interventions by Six Selected Countries (Intermediary and Participatory) - Continued

Independent Variables	France	Egypt	Libya
Strategic Linkages			
Geographic Proximity	2.10 (.53)**	1.95 (.65)**	1.48 (.64)*
Military Alliance	.30 (.38)	-.85 (1.95)	--- ---
Prior Allied Intervention	-.15 (.30)	.38 (.82)	.21 (.79)
Prior Adversary Intervention	.41 (.40)	-.04 (1.06)	.01 (.55)
International Hegemon	--- ---	--- ---	--- ---
Regional Hegemon	--- ---	--- ---	--- ---
Former Colony	1.73 (.29)**	2.69 (.99)**	--- ---
Non-Strategic Linkages			
Ideological Linkage	--- ---	3.26 (.67)**	3.22 (.54)**
Ethnic/Tribal Linkage	--- ---	3.27 (1.07)**	1.60 (.90)*
Religious Linkage	--- ---	1.83 (.72)**	.69 (.67)
Refugees	.59 (.38)	.40 (.64)	.19 (.53)
Fatalities	1.02 (.34)**	1.01 (.60)*	2.02 (.53)**
Constant	-3.74 (.22)**	-4.44 (.35)**	-4.96 (.42)**
Number of Cases	1,158	993	734
Log Likelihood (LL)	-244.92	-113.16	-94.68
Chi-Square Statistic	86.69	94.29	128.35
Probability > Chi-Square	0.00	0.00	0.00

Note: Estimates are Logit regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. Robust standard errors are adjusted for clustering on the dispute (i.e. the assumption of the independence of observations is relaxed within each dispute). Some of the independent variables and control variables are omitted from some of the models when they are not relevant to a particular state or when the variables perfectly predicted failure.

* $p \leq .05$, one-tailed test.

** $p \leq .01$, one-tailed test.

All but one of the coefficients for the three indicators of military linkage (military alliance, prior allied intervention, prior adversary intervention) are not statistically significant in the hypothesized directions in the models. The only exception was the coefficient for prior adversary intervention in the model for the US. Consistent with hypothesis 2c, there was a higher likelihood of an intervention by the US when an adversary of the US had intervened in the dispute.

The results in table 3-3 also provide evidence in support of the non-strategic linkage hypotheses. The coefficients for ideological linkage are positive and statistically significant in the models for the US, Russia/USSR, China, Egypt, and Libya. Consistent with hypothesis 4, five of the six selected states were more likely to intervene in a dispute when there was a salient ideological linkage between a group in the third party state and a group in the target state. In addition, the coefficients for ethnic/tribal linkage are positive and statistically significant in the models for the US, Egypt, and Libya, and the coefficients for religious linkage are statistically significant in the models for Russia/USSR and Egypt. Consistent with hypotheses 5 and 6, the US, Russia/USSR, Egypt, and Libya were more likely to intervene when there was a salient ethnic/tribal linkage or religious linkage between a group in the third party state and a group in the target state. Finally, the coefficients for refugees are positive and statistically significant in the models for the US and Russia/USSR, and the coefficients for fatalities are statistically significant in the models for US, Russia/USSR, France, Egypt, and Libya. Consistent with hypotheses 7a and 7b, the US, Russia/USSR, France, Egypt, and Libya were more likely to intervene in domestic political disputes when there were high levels of refugees/internally-displaced persons or fatalities.

For each of the models presented in table 3-4, the dependent variable is the occurrence of an intermediary intervention by the six selected states. The dependent variable is coded "1" if an intermediary intervention occurred during a dispute phase, and is coded "0" if an intermediary intervention did not occur during a dispute phase. These models provide evidence in support of some of the strategic hypotheses. Somewhat different from the previous set of models, the coefficients for geographic proximity are positive and statistically significant in only two of the models (France and Egypt). With just one exception, all of the coefficients for the three indicators of military linkage (military alliance, prior allied intervention, prior adversary intervention) are not statistically significant in the hypothesized directions. As in the previous set of models, there was a higher likelihood of an intermediary intervention by the US when an adversary of the US had intervened in the dispute. All three of the coefficients for international hegemon and regional hegemon are positive and statistically significant. Consistent with hypotheses 3a and 3b, the US and Russia/USSR were more likely to intervene as an intermediary when they were hegemons in the international system and regional subsystem of the target state. Lastly, the coefficients for former colony are positive and statistically significant in the models for Russia/USSR and France. Consistent with hypothesis 3c, Russia/USSR and France were more likely to intervene as an intermediary when the target state was a former colony/protectorate.

Table 3-4: Estimates of Logit Models of the Occurrence of State Interventions by Six Selected Countries (Intermediary)

Independent Variables	United States	Russia/USSR	China
Strategic Linkages			
Geographic Proximity	.50 (.56)	-.10 (.67)	--- ---
Military Alliance	-.96 (.53)	--- ---	--- ---
Prior Allied Intervention	-.13 (.38)	.69 (1.03)	--- ---
Prior Adversary Intervention	.81 (.34)**	.79 (.62)	--- ---
International Hegemon	.61 (.29)*	--- ---	--- ---
Regional Hegemon	2.00 (.50)**	1.96 (.79)**	--- ---
Former Colony	1.14 (1.20)	1.54 (.90)*	--- ---
Non-Strategic Linkages			
Ideological Linkage	.31 (.61)	.68 (.82)	1.74 (1.09)
Ethnic/Tribal Linkage	2.04 (1.06)*	-.47 (.96)	--- ---
Religious Linkage	--- ---	1.96 (.65)**	--- ---
Refugees	.76 (.43)*	2.08 (.77)**	2.10 (.73)**
Fatalities	.65 (.36)*	.16 (.76)	.08 (.79)
Constant	-4.80 (.96)**	-5.60 (.59)**	-6.79 (1.16)**
Number of Cases	1,182	1,133	908
Log Likelihood (LL)	-224.49	-87.12	-17.29
Chi-Square Statistic	60.67	46.88	60.78
Probability > Chi-Square	0.00	0.00	0.00

Note: Estimates are Logit regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. Robust standard errors are adjusted for clustering on the dispute (i.e. the assumption of the independence of observations is relaxed within each dispute). Some of the independent variables and control variables are omitted from some of the models when they are not relevant to a particular state or when the variables perfectly predicted failure.

* $p \leq .05$, one-tailed test.

** $p \leq .01$, one-tailed test.

Table 3-4: Estimates of Logit Models of the Occurrence of State Interventions by Six Selected Countries (Intermediary) - Continued

Independent Variables	France	Egypt	Libya
Strategic Linkages			
Geographic Proximity	2.46 (.49)**	2.49 (.91)**	.69 (1.04)
Military Alliance	-.73 (.71)	1.07 (1.01)	--- ---
Prior Allied Intervention	-.09 (.46)	.03 (1.73)	.62 (.81)
Prior Adversary Intervention	.22 (.70)	-.35 (1.71)	.89 (1.22)
International Hegemon	--- ---	--- ---	--- ---
Regional Hegemon	--- ---	--- ---	--- ---
Former Colony	1.82 (.52)**	.86 (2.14)	--- ---
Non-Strategic Linkages			
Ideological Linkage	--- ---	--- ---	--- ---
Ethnic/Tribal Linkage	--- ---	--- ---	3.85 (1.05)**
Religious Linkage	--- ---	3.17 (1.06)**	--- ---
Refugees	2.27 (.77)**	-.61 (1.05)	-1.58 (1.22)
Fatalities	-.17 (.72)	2.33 (.97)**	2.33 (1.26)*
Constant	-5.00 (.37)**	-6.47 (.64)**	-6.83 (1.15)**
Number of Cases	1,158	979	697
Log Likelihood (LL)	-103.29	-35.15	-21.15
Chi-Square Statistic	60.01	156.37	65.58
Probability > Chi-Square	0.00	0.00	0.00

Note: Estimates are Logit regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. Robust standard errors are adjusted for clustering on the dispute (i.e. the assumption of the independence of observations is relaxed within each dispute). Some of the independent variables and control variables are omitted from some of the models when they are not relevant to a particular state or when the variables perfectly predicted failure.

* $p \leq .05$, one-tailed test.

** $p \leq .01$, one-tailed test.

The models in table 3-4 also provide evidence in support of some of the non-strategic hypotheses. The coefficients for ethnic/tribal linkage are positive and statistically significant in the models for the US and Libya, and the coefficients for religious linkage are positive and statistically significant in the models for Russia/USSR and Egypt. Finally, the coefficients for refugees are positive and statistically significant in the models for the US, Russia/USSR, China, and France, and the coefficients for fatalities are positive and statistically significantly in the models for the US, Egypt, and Libya.

For each of the models presented in table 3-5, the dependent variable is the occurrence of a participatory intervention by the six selected states. The dependent variable is coded "1" if a participatory intervention occurred during a dispute phase, and is coded "0" if a participatory intervention did not occur during a dispute phase. The coefficients for geographic proximity are positive and statistically significant in the models for Russia/USSR, China, France, Egypt, and Libya. The coefficient for military alliance is positive and statistically significant in the model for France. Consistent with hypothesis 2a, France was more likely to intervene as a partisan (i.e. on the side of the government in the domestic political dispute) when the government of the target state had a military alliance with the government of France.

Table 3-5: Estimates of Logit Models of the Occurrence of State Interventions by Six Selected Countries (Participatory)

Independent Variables	United States	Russia/USSR	China
Strategic Linkages			
Geographic Proximity	.15 (.28)	1.67 (.33)**	1.90 (.44)**
Military Alliance	.28 (.21)	-4.11 (1.34)	--- ---
Prior Allied Intervention	-.03 (.14)	.28 (.65)	--- ---
Prior Adversary Intervention	.19 (.21)	.44 (.36)	.26 (.47)
International Hegemon	.04 (.17)	--- ---	--- ---
Regional Hegemon	1.44 (.25)**	3.58 (1.07)**	--- ---
Former Colony	-.37 (.47)	-4.29 (1.15)	--- ---
Non-Strategic Linkages			
Ideological Linkage	1.38 (.34)**	1.64 (.35)**	2.74 (.43)**
Ethnic/Tribal Linkage	1.17 (.71)*	--- ---	--- ---
Religious Linkage	--- ---	--- ---	--- ---
Refugees	.28 (.26)	1.22 (.39)**	.17 (.65)
Fatalities	.84 (.21)**	.95 (.41)*	.79 (.63)
Constant	-2.26 (.15)**	-4.37 (.30)**	-5.06 (.39)**
Number of Cases	1,182	1,127	1,150
Log Likelihood (LL)	-510.42	-199.31	-98.59
Chi-Square Statistic	123.26	102.10	68.26
Probability > Chi-Square	0.00	0.00	0.00

Note: Estimates are Logit regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. Robust standard errors are adjusted for clustering on the dispute (i.e. the assumption of the independence of observations is relaxed within each dispute). Some of the independent variables and control variables are omitted from some of the models when they are not relevant to a particular state or when the variables perfectly predicted failure.

* $p \leq .05$, one-tailed test.

** $p \leq .01$, one-tailed test.

Table 3-5: Estimates of Logit Models of the Occurrence of State Interventions by Six Selected Countries (Participatory) - Continued

Independent Variables	France	Egypt	Libya
Strategic Linkages			
Geographic Proximity	1.99 (.66)**	1.27 (.67)*	1.68 (.67)**
Military Alliance	.72 (.38)*	--- ---	--- ---
Prior Allied Intervention	-.17 (.33)	.57 (.81)	.37 (.80)
Prior Adversary Intervention	.64 (.40)	.22 (.87)	-.27 (.62)
International Hegemon	--- ---	--- ---	--- ---
Regional Hegemon	--- ---	--- ---	--- ---
Former Colony	1.37 (.33)**	3.37 (.91)**	--- ---
Non-Strategic Linkages			
Ideological Linkage	--- ---	3.89 (.60)**	3.38 (.56)**
Ethnic/Tribal Linkage	--- ---	3.48 (1.08)**	1.51 (.93)
Religious Linkage	--- ---	.93 (1.07)	.42 (.78)
Refugees	.02 (.41)	1.00 (.71)	.80 (.70)
Fatalities	1.34 (.36)**	.29 (.70)	1.98 (.55)**
Constant	-4.07 (.27)**	-4.61 (.39)**	-5.19 (.45)**
Number of Cases	1,158	974	734
Log Likelihood (LL)	-195.83	-90.65	-86.41
Chi-Square Statistic	70.48	93.85	142.55
Probability > Chi-Square	0.00	0.00	0.00

Note: Estimates are Logit regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. Robust standard errors are adjusted for clustering on the dispute (i.e. the assumption of the independence of observations is relaxed within each dispute). Some of the independent variables and control variables are omitted from some of the models when they are not relevant to a particular state or when the variables perfectly predicted failure.

* $p \leq .05$, one-tailed test.

** $p \leq .01$, one-tailed test.

The coefficients for regional hegemon are statistically significant in the models for the US and Russia/USSR. Consistent with hypothesis 3b, the US and Russia/USSR were more likely to intervene as a partisan when they were hegemons in the regional subsystem of the target state. Lastly, the coefficients for former colony are positive and statistically significant in the models for France and Egypt. Consistent with hypothesis 3c, France and Egypt were more likely to intervene as partisans when the target state were former colonies/protectorates.

Likewise, the results in table 3-5 provide additional evidence in support of the non-strategic linkage hypotheses. The coefficients for ideological linkage are positive and statistically significant in the models for the US, Russia/USSR, China, Egypt, and Libya. Consistent with hypothesis 4, there was a higher likelihood of participatory interventions by the US, Russia/USSR, China, Egypt, and Libya when groups in those states had ideological linkages with groups in target states. The coefficients for ethnic/tribal linkage are positive and statistically significant in the models for the US and Egypt. Consistent with hypothesis 5, there was a higher likelihood of a participatory intervention by the US and Egypt when groups in those states had ethnic/tribal linkages with groups in target states. Finally, the coefficient for refugees is positive and statistically significant in the model for Russia/USSR, and the coefficients for fatalities are statistically significant in the models for the US, Russia/USSR, France, and Libya. These results are consistent with hypotheses 7a and 7b.

Table 3-6: Estimates of Logit Models of the Occurrence of State Interventions by Six Selected Countries (Military)

Independent Variables	United States	Russia/USSR	China
Strategic Linkages			
Geographic Proximity	.41 (.30)	1.85 (.41)**	1.82 (.61)**
Military Alliance	.58 (.27)*	-4.90 (1.15)	--- ---
Prior Allied Intervention	.02 (.18)	.99 (.76)	--- ---
Prior Adversary Intervention	.27 (.27)	-.01 (.44)	.18 (.62)
International Hegemon	-.20 (.22)	--- ---	--- ---
Regional Hegemon	1.81 (.33)**	4.06 (.94)**	--- ---
Former Colony	-.26 (.51)	-2.31 (.96)	--- ---
Non-Strategic Linkages			
Ideological Linkage	1.90 (.46)**	1.91 (.44)**	2.89 (.53)**
Ethnic/Tribal Linkage	.77 (1.12)	.58 (1.01)	--- ---
Religious Linkage	--- ---	.23 (.81)	--- ---
Refugees	.69 (.31)*	1.80 (.46)**	.87 (.73)
Fatalities	1.21 (.26)**	1.39 (.51)**	.80 (.80)
Constant	-3.45 (.24)**	5.53 (.46)**	-6.06 (.64)**
Number of Cases	1,182	1,156	1,150
Log Likelihood (LL)	-321.31	-145.86	-58.83
Chi-Square Statistic	139.44	90.34	56.44
Probability > Chi-Square	0.00	0.00	0.00

Note: Estimates are Logit regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. Robust standard errors are adjusted for clustering on the dispute (i.e. the assumption of the independence of observations is relaxed within each dispute). Some of the independent variables and control variables are omitted from some of the models when they are not relevant to a particular state or when the variables perfectly predicted failure.

* $p \leq .05$, one-tailed test.

** $p \leq .01$, one-tailed test.

Table 3-6: Estimates of Logit Models of the Occurrence of State Interventions by Six Selected Countries (Military) - Continued

Independent Variables	France	Egypt	Libya
Strategic Linkages			
Geographic Proximity	1.81 (.57)**	3.44 (1.02)***	1.28 (1.04)
Military Alliance	.82 (.45)*	--- ---	--- ---
Prior Allied Intervention	-.55 (.43)	--- ---	1.05 (.97)
Prior Adversary Intervention	.52 (.48)	1.02 (.83)	-.83 (.86)
International Hegemon	--- ---	--- ---	--- ---
Regional Hegemon	--- ---	--- ---	--- ---
Former Colony	2.09 (.37)**	--- ---	--- ---
Non-Strategic Linkages			
Ideological Linkage	--- ---	3.28 (89)***	2.33 (.79)**
Ethnic/Tribal Linkage	--- ---	--- ---	1.43 (.99)
Religious Linkage	--- ---	1.41 (1.32)	1.67 (.69)**
Refugees	.56 (.48)	.97 (.92)	1.19 (.68)*
Fatalities	1.67 (.47)**	1.53 (1.16)	2.35 (.83)**
Constant	-5.04 (.90)**	-6.16 (.77)***	-6.49 (.62)**
Number of Cases	1,158	925	734
Log Likelihood (LL)	-135.09	-49.45	-55.74
Chi-Square Statistic	87.38	45.00	151.43
Probability > Chi-Square	0.00	0.00	0.00

Note: Estimates are Logit regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. Robust standard errors are adjusted for clustering on the dispute (i.e. the assumption of the independence of observations is relaxed within each dispute). Some of the independent variables and control variables are omitted from some of the models when they are not relevant to a particular state or when the variables perfectly predicted failure.

* $p \leq .05$, one-tailed test.

** $p \leq .01$, one-tailed test.

Finally, the dependent variable is the occurrence of a military intervention by the six selected states for each of the models presented in table 3-6. The dependent variable is coded "1" if a military intervention occurred during a dispute phase, and is coded "0" if a military intervention did not occur during a dispute phase. Once again, the models provide evidence in support of some of the strategic hypotheses. The coefficients for geographic proximity are positive and statistically significant in the models for Russia/USSR, China, France, and Egypt, and the coefficients for military alliance are positive and statistically significant in the models for the US and France. Also, the coefficients for regional hegemony are positive and statistically significant in the models for the US and Russia/USSR, and the coefficient for former colony is positive and statistically significant in the model for France.

Likewise, the results in table 3-6 provide evidence in support of some of the non-strategic hypotheses. The coefficients for ideological linkage are positive and statistically significant in the models for the US, Russia/USSR, China, Egypt, and Libya, and the coefficient for religious linkage is positive and statistically significant in the model for Libya. Also, the coefficients for refugees are positive and statistically significant in the models for the US, Russia/USSR, and Libya, and the coefficients for fatalities are positive and statistically significant in the models for the US, Russia/USSR, France, and Libya.

DISCUSSION

Table 3-7 summarizes the results of the statistical analyses presented in the previous section. The results indicate that a combination of strategic and non-strategic linkages have influenced the occurrence of interventions in intrastate disputes by each of the six selected countries during the 20th century, but the impact of these linkages has varied from one country to the next. Only two of the strategic linkages (prior adversary intervention and regional hegemon) had significant effects on the occurrence of US interventions in domestic political disputes during this period. The first of these results essentially confirms Yoon's (1997) finding that the US was more likely to intervene when an ally of the Soviet had previously intervened in a dispute. On the other hand, all of the non-strategic linkages, with the exception of religious linkage, had significant effects on the occurrence of US interventions. The result concerning ideological linkage generally confirms Yoon's (1997) finding that the US was more likely to intervene when one of the parties was identified as communist.

Table 3-7: Summary of Strategic/Non-Strategic Linkages and the Occurrence of State Interventions by Six Selected Countries (Intermediary and Participatory)

	United States	Russia/USSR	China	France	Egypt	Libya
Strategic Linkages						
Geographic Linkage	No	**Yes**	**Yes**	**Yes**	**Yes**	Yes
Military Linkage (1)	No	No	n.a.	No	No	n.a.
Military Linkage (2)	No	No	n.a.	No	No	No
Military Linkage (3)	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
Political Linkage (1)	No	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Political Linkage (2)	**Yes**	**Yes**	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Political Linkage (3)	No	No	n.a.	**Yes**	**Yes**	n.a.
Non-Strategic Linkages						
Ideological Linkage	**Yes**	**Yes**	**Yes**	n.a.	**Yes**	**Yes**
Ethnic/Tribal Linkage	**Yes**	No	n.a.	n.a.	**Yes**	Yes
Religious Linkage	n.a.	**Yes**	n.a.	n.a.	**Yes**	No
Human. Linkage (1)	**Yes**	**Yes**	No	No	No	No
Human. Linkage (2)	**Yes**	Yes	No	**Yes**	Yes	**Yes**

Linkages: The military linkages are numbered in the following order: military alliance, prior allied intervention, and prior adversary intervention. The political linkages are numbered in the following order: international hegemon, regional hegemon, and former colony. The humanitarian linkages are numbered in the following order: refugees and fatalities.

Note: The statistical significance of the coefficients of the independent variables is assessed at or below the .05 level. The entries in **bold** indicate statistical significance at or below the .01 level.

Overall, the US was more likely to intervene when an adversary of the US had already intervened in the dispute, when it was a hegemon in the regional subsystem of the target state, when it had ideological linkages to a group in the target state, when it had ethnic/tribal linkages to a group in the target state, when there was a high level of refugees resulting from the dispute, and when there was a high level of fatalities resulting from the dispute. These results, particularly the ones concerning the non-strategic linkages, reflect a number of unique characteristics of foreign policy-making in the U.S., including the role of anti-Communist ideology during much of the Cold War, the role of ethnic-based interest groups (e.g. Jewish-Americans, Greek-Americans, Irish-Americans, etc.), and the role of non-governmental (humanitarian) organizations (Schraeder, 1989, 283; Joyner, 1989, 199; Brewer, 1992, 74-75; Spanier and Hook, 1998, 78-82). Unlike the other countries in this study, the US was not more likely to intervene when it was geographically proximate to the target state.[30] While the US has frequently intervened in neighboring target states, it has also frequently intervened in non-neighboring target states. As an international hegemon during three different periods of the 20th century (1918-1929, 1942-1957, 1989-2000), the US had the opportunity and ability to project its diplomatic, economic, and military capabilities throughout the world.

Two strategic linkages (geographic proximity and regional hegemon) and four non-strategic linkages (ideological linkage, religious linkage, refugees, and fatalities) had significant effects on the occurrence of interventions by Russia/Soviet Union during the 20th

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[30] For the purposes of this study, Canada, Mexico, Cuba, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic were coded "geographically-proximate" to the US.

century. The result concerning geographic proximity confirms Kaw's (1989) finding that the Soviet Union was more likely to intervene in disputes involving bordering states, but the result concerning military alliance (i.e. not statistically significant in the hypothesized direction) contradicts Kaw's (1989) finding that the Soviet Union was more likely to intervene in disputes involving allied states.

Overall, Russia/Soviet Union was more likely to intervene when it was geographically-proximate to the target state, when it was a hegemon in the regional subsystem of the target state, when it had ideological linkages to groups in the target state, when it had religious linkages to groups in the target state, when there was a high level of refugees resulting from the dispute, and when there was a high level of fatalities resulting from the dispute. These results generally reflect Russia/Soviet Union's strategic concern with "absolute security along its extensive borders" and the influence of Marxist-Leninist doctrine on foreign policy making in the Soviet Union during the Cold War (Kennedy, 1987, 488; Nogee and Donaldson, 1988, 13-17; Stern, 1968, 79). Unlike the US, the leaders of Russia/USSR were generally not influenced to intervene in intrastate disputes as a result of ethnic/tribal considerations. On the other hand, the leaders of Russia/USSR were influenced to intervene in intrastate disputes when there were high levels of refugees and fatalities resulting from the dispute.

In the case of China, one strategic linkage (geographic proximity) and one non-strategic linkage (ideological linkage) had significant effects on the occurrence of interventions in intrastate disputes. China was more likely to intervene when it was geographically proximate to the target state and when it had an ideological linkage with a

group in the target state. For most of the 20th century, China was too concerned with internal problems to get involved in domestic political disputes in other countries, although the country increasingly looked beyond its own borders after the Chinese civil war ended in 1949. When China did get involved in disputes in other countries, it tended to intervene in bordering countries in the Asia/Pacific region due to its relatively limited military and economic capabilities. However, China also tended to intervene for ideological reasons (e.g. support for communist rebel movements in the 1950s and 1960s and support for national liberation movements in the 1960s and 1970s) during much of the Cold War period (Macfarlane, 1985, 11). Unlike the cases of the US and Russia/Soviet Union, humanitarian considerations did not have significant effects on the decisions of Chinese leaders to intervene in domestic political disputes throughout the world.

Like the other major powers, a combination of strategic linkages (geographic proximity and former colony) and non-strategic linkages (fatalities) had significant effects on the occurrence of French interventions in domestic political disputes in other countries. France was more likely to intervene when it was geographically proximate to the target state, when the target state was a former colony/protectorate, and when there was a high level of fatalities resulting from the dispute. These results generally reflect France's extensive involvement in domestic political disputes in former colonies in the Asia/Pacific, Middle East/North Africa/Persian Gulf, and Sub-Saharan Africa regions throughout the post-World War II period. One of the general principles of French foreign policy during the past century has been the belief that France "is not only a natural political leader in Europe, but also a natural cultural leader, that French ideas and civilization should be exported to less favoured

nations, at first in Europe, and, with the coming of the colonial era, to overseas possessions" (Pickles, 1968, 205). Like the US and Russia/Soviet Union, humanitarian considerations also significantly influenced the decisions of French leaders to intervene in intrastate disputes throughout the world.

Two of the strategic linkages (geographic proximity and former colony) and three non-strategic linkages (ideological linkage, ethnic/tribal linkage, religious linkage, and fatalities) had significant effects on the occurrence of Egyptian interventions in intrastate disputes during the 20th century.[31] Egypt was more likely to intervene when it was geographically proximate to the target state, when the target state was a former colony/protectorate (i.e. Sudan), when it had ideological linkages with a group in the target state, when it had ethnic/tribal linkages with a group in the target state, when it had religious linkages with a group in the target state, and when there was a high level of fatalities resulting from the dispute. As a regional major power in the Middle East/North Africa/Persian Gulf region, Egypt tended to limit its external involvements to neighboring countries. However, Egypt also supported governments and opposition groups in domestic political disputes beyond neighboring countries as a result of ideological, ethnic/tribal, and religious affinities.

In the case of Libya, one strategic linkage (geographic proximity) and three non-strategic linkages (ideological linkage, ethnic/tribal linkage, fatalities) had significant effects on the occurrence of interventions in domestic political disputes. Libya was more likely to

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[31] In a model controlling for the Middle East/North Africa/Persian Gulf region, the results were similar, except that the coefficients for geographic proximity and fatalities were no longer statistically significant.

intervene when it was geographically proximate to the target state, when it had ideological linkages with a group in the target state, when it had ethnic/tribal linkages with a group in the target state, and when there was a high level of fatalities as a result of the dispute. These results partly reflect the strong support by Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi for national liberation and Arab nationalist movements throughout the world in the 1970s and 1980s.

Finally, how are the results of the case study analyses different from the results of the aggregate analyses? First, geographic proximity was generally a significant factor in the case study analyses, but was an insignificant factor in the aggregate analyses. This difference may be caused by the strong influence of the relative high number of US interventions in the aggregate analyses (geographic proximity was not statistically significant in the US models in the case study analyses). Second, prior allied interventions and prior adversary interventions were largely significant factors in the aggregate analyses, but were largely insignificant factors in the case study analyses. In the case study analyses, there was little evidence that a state is more likely to intervene in a domestic political dispute when an ally or adversary of that state has already intervened in the dispute. Third, former colony was a significant factor in the case study analyses for two of three of those selected countries that previously had control over colonies or protectorates (France and Egypt). This result was not found in the aggregate analyses. Finally, ideological, ethnic/tribal, and religious linkages were significant factors in the case study analyses, but were generally not significant in the aggregate analyses. These result confirm the suspicion that evidence of these types of non-strategic linkages is difficult to find in the aggregate analyses where it was hypothesized that there was a higher likelihood of a state intervention in domestic political disputes that had

ideological, ethnic/tribal, and religious dimensions.

CONCLUSION

I have argued that the political leaders of states choose to intervene in domestic political disputes in other states as a consequence of international influences and domestic pressures that largely originate from linkages already existing between potential third party states and target states. I have also argued that these linkages occur at both the international system level (strategic linkages) and the transnational level (non-strategic linkages). The results of both aggregate and case study analyses confirm that indicators of both of these categories of linkages significantly influenced the occurrence of state interventions in domestic political disputes during the 20th century. The findings confirm the results of Heraclides (1990, 377) who found that affective motives of external state interventions in secessionist conflicts were just as important as instrumental motives. In particular, the results of this study suggest three main conclusions. First, even when controlling for strategic linkages, one or more of the indicators of non-strategic linkages had significant effects on the occurrence of intermediary, participatory, and military interventions by states in domestic political disputes. The fact that both strategic and non-strategic linkages were found to influence the intervention decisions of leaders of states contradicts realist arguments that strategic considerations are sufficient for explaining these types of decisions. Second, among the various types of strategic linkages, military linkages seem to have little or no influence on intervention decisions of state leaders. This result also contradicts realist arguments that the foreign policies of states are influenced by the foreign policies of military allies and adversaries. Finally, among the non-strategic linkages, ideological linkages seem

to have the most consistent effect on intervention decisions of the leaders of the six selected states. Except for France, the intervention decisions of each of the states examined in this study were influenced in one way or another by ideological considerations.

CHAPTER FOUR

EXPLAINING THE OCCURRENCE OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION (IGO) INTERVENTIONS IN INTRASTATE DISPUTES

The study of third party intervention in intrastate disputes has largely focused on state interventions (Pearson 1974b; Tillema 1994; Regan 1996, 1998; Yoon 1997), but states are not the only international actors that engage in interventions in domestic political disputes. In recent decades, non-state actors such as the United Nations (UN) and other regional intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) have increasingly become involved in intrastate disputes throughout the world. Although a growing proportion of all third party interventions in these type of disputes have been conducted by IGOs, international relations scholars have done very little analysis of the occurrence, timing, type, and effectiveness of IGO interventions in intrastate disputes. In one of the few studies of regional organizations and internal conflict, Linda Miller (1967b) asked whether regional and global approaches to world order were "compatible or competitive," and she concluded that limited interventions by regional IGOs, such as fact-finding and military observation, were "extremely valuable, given the frequent inability of the UN to undertake them" and that "such responses would underscore the compatibility of regional and global approaches, a compatibility threatened by elaborate peacekeeping operations that appear competitive" (596-597). Here, I limit my analysis to the factors hypothesized to influence the occurrence of interventions by IGOs, including the United Nations (UN) and regional IGOs, in domestic political disputes. I am primarily interested in understanding why the UN and regional IGOs would choose to intervene in some domestic political disputes, but choose not to intervene in other disputes.

For the purposes of this study, third party intervention is broadly defined as *diplomatic/political, economic, or military involvement by a third party actor in a dispute for the purpose of assisting one of the parties to the dispute or for the purpose of assisting both of the parties to manage or resolve the dispute without taking sides.* Diplomatic/political involvement refers to third party actions such as condemnations, diplomatic non-recognition, ceasefire appeals, fact-finding, and mediation. Economic involvement refers to third party actions such as economic assistance and economic sanctions. Military involvement refers to third party actions such as military assistance, military sanctions, peacekeeping, and use of military force.

Third party interventions are broadly categorized according to two different dimensions. First, third party interventions may be categorized as either a participatory (partisan) intervention or an intermediary (non-partisan) intervention. Participatory interventions are those interventions in which the third party gets involved on one particular side of the dispute, and include verbal expressions, assistance/sanctions, threats of military force, displays of military force, and uses of military force. Intermediary interventions are those interventions in which the third party does not take sides in the dispute, but rather acts as a neutral or impartial party in order to assist in the management or resolution of the dispute. Intermediary interventions include verbal expressions, diplomatic approaches, legal/judicial processes, administrative/civilian functions, and military involvements. Second, third party interventions may be categorized as either a military intervention or a non-military intervention. Military interventions are those interventions in which the third party employs a military technique (see "military involvements" above) in a partisan or non-

partisan manner. Non-military interventions are those interventions in which the third party employs a "non-military" technique (see "diplomatic/political involvements" and "economic involvements" above) in a partisan or non-partisan manner.

The chapter is divided into two main parts. In the first part, I seek to explain the occurrence of UN interventions in intrastate disputes since the establishment of the universal organization in 1945. I develop a theoretical framework that suggests that UN organs and agencies are influenced by a combination of security, political, humanitarian, and normative considerations. In the second part, I seek to explain the occurrence of regional IGO interventions in intrastate disputes since 1945. Again, I argue that regional IGOs are influenced by a combination of security, political, humanitarian, and normative considerations. The occurrence of UN interventions and regional IGO interventions are analyzed separately because two of the hypotheses for the UN and two of the hypotheses for regional IGOs are not applicable to both types of IGOs, but rather are applicable to either the UN or regional IGOs. At the end of the chapter, I summarize the results of the analyses from the two parts, and discuss the implications of the findings for the future study of third party interventions in intrastate disputes.

UNITED NATIONS (UN) INTERVENTIONS

Why do UN decision-makers choose to intervene in some domestic political disputes, but choose not to intervene in other disputes? Previous research on UN interventions has tended to focus on the question of what accounts for the effectiveness (or lack thereof) of UN interventions in international conflicts (Haas et al. 1972; Haas 1983; Wilkenfeld and Brecher 1984; Haas 1993; Bertram 1995; Diehl et al. 1996), and relatively little research has dealt with the question of what factors influence the occurrence of UN interventions in the first place. The question of why the UN decides to intervene in some disputes and not in other disputes may have implications for analyses of the effectiveness of UN interventions. For example, if the UN systematically intervenes in some situations and not in other situations, then analyses of the effectiveness of UN interventions that have occurred may be biased.[32]

In deciding whether or not to intervene in a domestic political dispute, UN organs (e.g. Security Council, General Assembly, Secretariat/Secretary-General) and UN agencies (e.g. United Nations High Commission for Refugees-UNHCR, United Nations Children's Fund-UNICEF, World Food Program-WFP, World Health Organization-WHO) face a number of international and regional constraints and pressures. These constraints and pressures are grouped into four categories: (1) security considerations - potential threats to the stability of the international system or a regional subsystem caused by domestic political disputes; (2) political considerations - constraints and pressures that stem from relationships and interactions between the UN, regional IGOs, and states; (3) humanitarian considerations

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[32] Regan (1996, 342) makes essentially this same point in his analysis of the effectiveness of third party interventions in intrastate disputes.

- adverse effects of domestic political disputes on non-combatant civilians in target states; and (4) normative considerations - international norms or principles that are prevalent in the international system at any given time.

Security Considerations

The primary purpose of the UN enumerated in the Charter of the UN is "to maintain international peace and security" (Ruggie, 1989, 398). There are two scenarios involving domestic political disputes that could be construed by UN organs and agencies as threats to international peace and security, and therefore, could result in a decision by the UN to intervene in such disputes. First, one member-state of the UN intervenes militarily against the government of another state involved in a domestic political dispute. Such an intervention would possibly be a violation of Article 2 (4) of the UN Charter, which declares that member-states should "refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state." Under this scenario, it would not be uncommon for the government of the target state to bring the external state military intervention to the attention of the UN Security Council or the UN secretary-general. Since the dispute would involve at that point more than one member-state, the UN could legitimately intervene in the dispute in order to prevent the dispute from escalating into a wider international conflict or to assist the government of the target state in resisting the external military intervention (Schachter, 1974, 410).

Second, a domestic political dispute that has escalated to military hostilities between the parties could result in a decision by the UN to intervene in the dispute. A member-state could bring military hostilities occurring in a neighboring state to the attention of the UN if

that member-state believed that the military hostilities threatens, at the very least, the stability of the region. For example, civilians in the target state could flee from the conflict to neighboring states, quickly overwhelming the ability of the neighboring states to care for the refugees. Since a domestic political dispute could potentially spread beyond the borders of the target state to involve more than one UN member-state, the UN could legitimately intervene in the dispute in order to prevent the dispute from escalating into a wider regional or international conflict.

Hypothesis 1a: There is a higher likelihood of a UN intervention when one or more UN member-states have intervened against the government of the target state.

Hypothesis 1b: There is a higher likelihood of a UN intervention when the dispute has escalated to military hostilities.

Political Considerations

The UN might be less willing to intervene in domestic political disputes occurring in regions dominated by regional hegemons (Schachter, 1974, 416-417). Since the end of the Second World War, regional hegemons have been reluctant to permit the UN to intervene in their "spheres of influence." Regional hegemons prefer to maintain peace and security in their regions without the interference of external parties. Some regional hegemons, such as the US, Soviet Union and Britain, have even had the ability as permanent members to veto UN Security Council resolutions or to prevent UN Security Council discussions concerning disputes in regions in which they have a preponderance of military and economic capabilities. For similar reasons, the UN might be less willing to intervene in a domestic political dispute in a target state that is a former colony of a major international or regional power. Former colonial powers also prefer to deal with problems in their former colonies

without the interference of external parties. For example, France has often unilaterally intervened, without the involvement of the UN, to maintain peace and security in many of its former colonies in Africa since the 1960s.

On the other hand, the UN might be more willing to intervene in a domestic political dispute in which a regional IGO has already intervened (Schachter, 1974, 418-420). Since the end of the Second World War, regional IGOs have frequently attempted to manage or resolve regional disputes prior to any involvement by the UN. In fact, Article 52 (1) and (2) of the UN Charter states that "nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security," and that UN member-states should "make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes before referring them to the Security Council." In theory, the UN and regional organizations have separate responsibilities for dealing with threats to regional and international peace and security, but in practice, the UN and regional organizations have cooperated extensively in the area of dispute management and resolution for more than fifty years. For example, the UN and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) worked together to manage and resolve the civil conflict in Cambodia between 1978 and 1991. The UN, OAU, Commonwealth of Nations (CON), and other regional organizations intervened extensively during the Biafran conflict in Nigeria between 1967 and 1970. The UN and OAS intervened during the political crisis in the Dominican Republic in 1965, and in recent years, the UN and OAS have intervened cooperatively in domestic political disputes in El Salvador, Nicaragua, Guatemala, and Haiti. In many of these and other cases, the UN intervened after the regional organization initially attempted

(often unsuccessfully) to manage or resolve the disputes.

Finally, the UN might be more willing to intervene in a domestic political dispute in a target state when one or more of the UN organs or agencies have previously intervened in a dispute in the target state. If the UN has a history of successful involvement in a particular state, it is more likely to be asked to get involved in that state in the future, and it is more likely to accept a request to intervene in a domestic political dispute in that state. Indeed, it is not unreasonable to conclude that the UN would want to "protect its investment" in a country in which it has already expended valuable resources in managing a dispute or resolving a previous dispute. Furthermore, if there is a history of UN involvement in a state, other potential third party actors might be more inclined to defer to the UN in the event of a domestic political dispute in that target state. In fact, UN organs and agencies have intervened on two or more occasions in a number of states since the end of World War II, including Indonesia, Greece, Cyprus, Yugoslavia, Georgia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Lebanon, South Africa, Congo-Kinshasa, Angola, Mozambique, Somalia, Rwanda, Burundi, Liberia, Nicaragua, Haiti, and Guatemala.

Hpothesis 2a: There is a lower likelihood of a UN intervention when the target state is located in a region with a hegemon.

Hypothesis 2b: There is a lower likelihood of a UN intervention when the target state is a former colony/protectorate of a major international/regional power.

Hypothesis 2c: There is a higher likelihood of a UN intervention when a regional IGO has intervened in the dispute.

Hypothesis 2d: There is a higher likelihood of a UN intervention when the UN has previously intervened in a dispute in the target state.

Humanitarian Considerations

The UN might be more willing to intervene in a target state that is experiencing a serious humanitarian crisis (Schachter, 1974, 414-415; Joyner, 1989, 195). One of the main purposes of the UN as stated in the UN Charter is "to achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character." In the event of a serious humanitarian crisis, the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) might establish a mission to provide humanitarian assistance or repatriation assistance to refugees or internally displaced persons (IDPs) in a target state or in a neighboring state. In addition, the UN Security Council might authorize member-states to militarily intervene in a target state to protect the delivery of humanitarian assistance by non-governmental organizations (NGOs), or the UN Security Council might authorize member-states to establish "safe havens" or "humanitarian zones" in target states. In recent years, there have been several cases of UN-authorized "humanitarian interventions" throughout the world, including Iraq, Somalia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Russia/Chechnya, Angola, Liberia, Tajikistan, Serbia/Kosovo, and the Democratic Republic of Congo.

Hypothesis 3a: There is a higher likelihood of a UN intervention when there is a high level of refugees/internally-displaced persons resulting from the dispute in the target state.

Hypothesis 3b: There is a higher likelihood of a UN intervention when there is a high level of fatalities resulting from the dispute in the target state.

Normative Considerations

Several international norms and principles prevalent in the international system during the 20th century, including the principles of "non-intervention," "right of self-determination," and "territorial integrity of sovereign states," might influence the decisions of UN organs and agencies to intervene or not intervene in domestic political disputes (Ganguly and Taras, 1998, 79). During the 20th century, the principle of non-intervention meant that states and international organizations were expected to refrain from interfering in the domestic affairs of other sovereign states (Vincent, 1974, 14; Little, 1975, 15; Joyner, 1989, 191-192; Legault et al., 1994-1995, 71-72; Esman and Telhami, 1995, 11-12). The principle of non-intervention was included in both the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Charter of the UN. Article 10 of the Covenant of the League of Nations declared that the "members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all members of the League," and Article 2 (7) of the UN Charter prohibited UN organs and agencies from intervening in "matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state." Reaffirming the provisions regarding intervention in the UN Charter, the UN General Assembly approved the resolution, "Declaration on Inadmissability of Intervention in Domestic Affairs of States and Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty," on December 21, 1965, which declared that "no state has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other state" and that "armed intervention and all other forms of interference or attempted threats against the personality of the state or against its political, economic, and cultural elements, are condemned" (Vincent, 1974, 391-

393; Joyner, 1989, 194). In practice, states often unilaterally or multilaterally intervened in domestic political disputes in other states during much of the 20th century; however, UN organs and agencies were less likely than states to violate the principle of non-intervention unless a domestic political dispute posed a significant threat to international peace and security (Northedge, 1974, 121; Bertram, 1995, 392).

There is some evidence that with the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s, there has been an erosion of the principle of "non-intervention." First, the end of the US-Soviet Union rivalry has allowed the UN Security Council to deal with many domestic political disputes without the threat of a veto by one or more of the permanent members (Cooper and Berdal, 1993, 119; Bertram, 1995, 388). During the Cold War, permanent members vetoed some 280 UN Security Council resolutions (many dealing with matters that involved domestic political disputes), but there have been relatively few vetoes of UN Security Council resolutions since the end of the Cold War. Partly as a result of this development, the UN Security Council has authorized interventions in several domestic political disputes throughout the world, including Angola, Cambodia, Nicaragua, Iraq, El Salvador, Morocco (Western Sahara), Liberia, Mozambique, Somalia, Rwanda, Georgia, Guatemala, Haiti, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Tajikistan, Albania, Indonesia (East Timor), and Serbia, (Kosovo). In a few of these cases, the UN Security Council has even authorized the deployment of troops on the territory of member-states without the permission of the governments of those states (Makinda, 1996, 149).

Second, leaders of the UN and states throughout the world have increasingly suggested that the principle of state sovereignty is not absolute, and that third party actors

have a right, if not an obligation, to intervene in the domestic affairs of sovereign states to deal with serious humanitarian crises or gross violations of human rights (Blechman, 1995, 63). For example, UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali suggested in June 1992 that the "time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty" had passed, and that there was a important role for the UN in the prevention, management, and resolution of disputes within states (Boutros-Ghali 1992). In April 1999, Prime Minister Tony Blair of Britain proclaimed a new doctrine on intervention in which "acts of genocide can never be a purely internal matter" (Morrison 1999). In September 1999, Foreign Minister Lamberto Dini of Italy stated that the UN "must work out rules and procedures that justify the erosion of sovereignty in the name of global responsibility" in the area of human rights (Elliott 1999). As a result of the erosion of the principle of non-intervention, UN organs and agencies are increasingly less constrained in intervening in domestic political disputes in sovereign states during the post-Cold War period.

Even prior to the end of the Cold War, there was one important exception to the principle of non-intervention. The principle of the "right of self-determination" refers to the "right of the peoples in the overseas colonies to become independent or to achieve self-government" (Schachter, 1974, 412-413). This principle meant that the UN often permitted, or even encouraged, interventions in support of national liberation movements throughout the world (Macfarlane, 1985, 23). The UN Charter contains several provisions that provide for UN involvement in the process of decolonization. Article 1 (2) of the UN Charter states that one of the purposes of the UN is "to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples." Chapters XII and

XIII of the UN Charter provide for the establishment of an "international trusteeship system" and "trusteeship council" to administer territories placed under the control of the UN. One of the basic objectives of the trusteeship system was "to promote the political, economic, social, and educational advancements of the inhabitants of the trust territories, and their progressive development towards self-government or independence." In addition, the UN General Assembly approved the resolution, "Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples" by a vote of 89-0-9 on December 14, 1960, which called for "immediate steps" to be taken to provide for the independence of colonies throughout the world (Kay, 1972 152). As a result of the principle of the right of self-determination, the UN took an active role in a number of national liberation/independence disputes during the post-World War II period, including Dutch East Indies (Indonesia), French Algeria, and Portuguese Angola (Miller, 1967a, 36-39).

The principle of the "right of self-determination" did not, however, extend to secessionist/separatist movements within sovereign states. While the right of a nationalist group to separate a colony from the rule of a colonial government has been recognized by most UN member-states, the right of an ethnic group within a state to separate a part of the territory of the state from the rule of the central government has not similarly been recognized by most UN member-states (Schachter, 1974, 407). In addition, Article 2 (4) of the UN Charter declares that all "members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state." Given the principle of the "territorial integrity of sovereign states," member-states of the UN have generally been reluctant to support secessionist/separatist movements in other

states, particularly states that have secessionist/separatist movements within their own borders (Heraclides, 1990, 342-343).

Hypothesis 4a: There is a higher likelihood of a UN intervention during the post-Cold War period.

Hypothesis 4b: There is a higher likelihood of a UN intervention in national liberation/ independence disputes.

Hypothesis 4c: There is a lower likelihood of a UN intervention in secessionist/separatist disputes.

RESEARCH DESIGN

The hypotheses regarding UN interventions are tested against a set of data on some 350 intrastate disputes that occurred between January 1, 1945 and December 31, 2000. The unit of analysis is the dispute phase. The intrastate disputes that occurred during the post-World War II period consist of 866 dispute phases. The historical record was examined for information on the occurrence of diplomatic/political, economic, and military interventions by UN organs and agencies in the 866 dispute phases, and a total of 573 UN interventions were identified. Of the 573 UN interventions, 450 (78.5%) were intermediary interventions (385 non-military, 65 military) and 123 (21.5%) were participatory interventions (108 non-military, 15 military). Overall, some 86 percent of UN interventions were non-military interventions, and some 14 percent of UN interventions were military interventions.

Figure 4-1 (a) - (e) provides frequencies of the occurrence of UN interventions in the five regions of the world. The frequency of UN interventions in each of the regions was generally quite low (zero to five interventions per year) between the mid-1940s and the late-1980s, although UN activity was relatively higher in the Asia/Pacific, Middle East/North

Africa/Persian Gulf, and Sub-Saharan Africa regions than in the Europe/Russia/Former Soviet Union and Western Hemisphere regions. There was a lower level of UN activity in the 1940s, 1950s, and 1980s compared to the 1960s and 1970s in nearly all of the regions. The frequency of UN interventions increased substantially in each of the regions in the post-Cold War period, except for the Middle East/North Africa/Persian Gulf and Western Hemisphere regions. Figure 4-1 (f) suggests that the frequency of UN interventions throughout the world decreased somewhat in the 1980s, and then increased significantly after 1990.

Figure 4-1: Frequencies of the Occurrence of United Nations Interventions (Regions)



Abbreviations: A/P = Asia/Pacific; E/R/FSU = Europe/Russia/Former Soviet Union; ME/NA/PG = Middle East/North Africa/Persian Gulf; SSA = Sub-Saharan Africa; WH = Western Hemisphere.

Dependent Variable

In order to account for the different dimensions of UN interventions, I have operationalized the dependent variable in the following four ways: (1) there was a UN intermediary or participatory intervention during the dispute phase = 1; there was not a UN intermediary or participatory intervention during the dispute phase = 0; (2) there was a UN intermediary intervention during the dispute phase = 1; there was not a UN intermediary intervention during the dispute phase = 0; (3) there was a UN participatory intervention during the dispute phase = 1; there was not a UN participatory intervention during the dispute phase = 0; (4) there was a UN military intervention during the dispute phase = 1; there was not a UN military intervention during the dispute phase = 0. Since each variant of the dependent variable is dichotomous, separate logistic regression models for each will be estimated.

Independent Variables

I have included eleven different indicators of security, political, humanitarian, and normative considerations in each of the models.

* Partisan Intervention {there was an intervention against the government in the target state by a UN member-state = 1; otherwise = 0}.

* Military Hostilities {the dispute in the target state has escalated to military hostilities = 1; otherwise = 0}.

* Regional Hegemon {the target state is located in a region with a hegemon = 1; otherwise = 0}. See Appendix F for a list of regional hegemons.

* Former Colony {the target state is a former colony/protectorate of a major international/regional power = 1; otherwise = 0}. See Appendix A for information on the former status of states in the international system.

* Regional IGO Intervention {a regional IGO has intervened in the target state during the current or previous dispute phase = 1; otherwise = 0}.

* Prior UN Intervention {the UN has previously intervened in a dispute in the target state = 1; otherwise = 0}.

* Refugees {there are 25,000 or more refugees/ internally displaced persons resulting from the dispute = 1; otherwise = 0}. Data on refugee levels was obtained from the *United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees* (UNHCR), the *United States Committee for Refugees* (USCR), and standard sources of information (see Appendix C).

* Fatalities {there are 100 or more annual civilian/military fatalities resulting from the dispute = 1; otherwise = 0}. Data on fatalities was obtained from standard sources of information (see Appendix C).

* Post-Cold War Period {the dispute phase began after January 1, 1991 = 1; otherwise = 0}.

* National Liberation Dispute {the dispute is a national liberation/independence dispute = 1; otherwise = 0}.

* Secessionist Dispute {the dispute is a secessionist/separatist dispute = 1; otherwise = 0}.

DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS

Table 4-1 provides the results of the Logistic regression analyses of the effects of security, political, humanitarian, and normative considerations on the occurrence of UN interventions in intrastate disputes. The hypotheses predicted that the coefficients for partisan intervention, military hostilities, regional IGO intervention, prior UN intervention, refugees, fatalities, post-Cold War period, and national liberation dispute in the models would be positive, and the hypotheses predicted that the coefficients for regional hegemon, former colony, and secessionist dispute would be negative. In the first column, the dependent variable is the occurrence of either intermediary or participatory UN interventions. Both of the coefficients for security considerations are statistically significant in the hypothesized directions. Consistent with hypothesis 1a and 1b, there was a higher likelihood of UN intervention when one or more UN member-states have intervened against the government of the target state and when the dispute has escalated to military hostilities. Two of the four coefficients for political considerations are statistically significant in the hypothesized directions. Consistent with hypotheses 2c and 2d, there was a higher likelihood of UN intervention when a regional IGO has intervened in the dispute and when the UN has previously intervened in a dispute in the target state. Both of the coefficients for humanitarian considerations are statistically significant in the hypothesized directions. Consistent with hypotheses 3a and 3b, there was a higher likelihood of UN intervention when there was a high level of refugees/internally-displaced persons and fatalities resulting from the dispute. Finally, two of the three coefficients for normative considerations are statistically significant in the hypothesized directions. Consistent with hypotheses 4a and 4b,

there was a higher likelihood of UN intervention during the post-Cold War period and in national liberation/independence disputes.

In the second column in table 4-1, the dependent variable is the occurrence of UN intermediary interventions. The results are almost identical to the results in the first model, except that the coefficient for fatalities no longer statistically significant in the second model. The dependent variable in the third column is the occurrence of UN participatory interventions. None of the coefficients for security considerations are statistically significant in the third model, and only one of the coefficients for political considerations (regional IGO intervention) is statistically significant in the hypothesized direction. Consistent with hypothesis 2c, there was a higher likelihood of a UN participatory intervention when a regional IGO had already intervened in the dispute. One of the coefficients for humanitarian considerations (fatalities) and two of the coefficients for normative considerations (post-Cold War period and national liberation dispute) are statistically significant in the hypothesized directions. Consistent with hypothesis 3b, there was a higher likelihood of a UN participatory intervention when there was a high level of fatalities resulting from the dispute, and consistent with hypotheses 4a and 4b, there was a higher likelihood of a UN participatory intervention during the post-Cold War period and in national liberation/independence disputes.

Table 4-1: Estimates of Logit Models of the Occurrence of United Nations Interventions

Independent Variables	All Interventions	Intermediary Interventions	Participatory Interventions	Military Interventions
Security Considerations				
Partisan Intervention	.62 (.24)**	.60 (.26)*	.06 (.36)	1.03 (.40)**
Military Hostilities	.65 (.24)**	.96 (.25)**	-.19 (.38)	2.54 (.53)**
Political Considerations				
Regional Hegemon	.03 (.22)	-.03 (.22)	.10 (.36)	.41 (.36)
Former Colony	-.05 (.23)	-.08 (.24)	.16 (.37)	-.54 (.39)
Regional IGO Intervention	1.03 (.25)**	1.06 (.27)**	1.27 (.37)**	.91 (.43)*
Prior UN Intervention	.89 (.23)**	.84 (.24)**	.37 (.33)	.41 (.36)
Humanitarian Considerations				
Refugees	.77 (.32)**	1.02 (.37)**	.55 (.55)	.11 (.70)
Fatalities	.84 (.31)**	.45 (.34)	1.69 (.58)**	.29 (.70)
Normative Considerations				
Post-Cold War Period	1.16 (.25)**	1.09 (.27)**	.94 (.42)*	1.37 (.41)**
Nat. Liberation Dispute	1.60 (.36)**	1.31 (.40)**	1.61 (.58)**	.14 (.90)
Secessionist Dispute	.12 (.29)	.04 (.32)	-.10 (.51)	-.96 (.53)*
Constant	-3.72 (.30)**	-3.87 (.33)**	-5.20 (.52)**	-6.41 (.72)**
Number of Cases	866	866	866	866
Log Likelihood (LL)	-327.43	-304.92	-148.59	-97.69
Chi-Square Statistic	158.66	138.16	71.81	92.15
Probability > Chi-Square	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00

Note: Estimates are Logit regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. Robust standard errors are adjusted for clustering on the dispute (i.e. the assumption of the independence of observations is relaxed within each dispute).

* $p \leq .05$, one-tailed test.

** $p \leq .01$, one-tailed test.

Finally, the dependent variable in the model in the fourth column is the occurrence of UN military interventions. Both of the coefficients for the security considerations are statistically significant in the hypothesized directions. Consistent with hypotheses 1a and 1b, there was a higher likelihood of a UN military intervention when one or more UN member-states have intervened against the government of the target state and when the dispute has escalated to military hostilities. One of the political considerations (regional IGO intervention) is statistically significant in the hypothesized direction. Consistent with hypotheses 2c, there was a higher likelihood of a UN military intervention when a regional IGO had intervened in the dispute. Finally, two of the coefficients for normative considerations (post-Cold War period and secessionist dispute) are statistically significant in the hypothesized directions. Consistent with hypothesis 4a and 4c, there was a higher likelihood of a UN military intervention during the post-Cold War period, and there was a lower likelihood of a UN military intervention in secessionist/separatist disputes.

Overall, the results provide evidence that some of the indicators of each of the four sets of considerations significantly influenced the occurrence of UN interventions. Except for participatory interventions, there was strong evidence that security considerations influenced the likelihood of UN interventions. Among the political considerations, there was no evidence that the UN was less likely to intervene in regions dominated by a regional hegemon or in former colonies of major international/regional powers. However, there was rather strong evidence that the likelihood of a UN intervention was higher when a regional IGO had already intervened in a dispute and when the UN had previously intervened in a dispute in a target state. Among the humanitarian considerations, there was strong evidence

that high levels of refugees and fatalities increased the likelihood of a UN intervention (except for military interventions). Finally, among the normative considerations, there was strong evidence that the likelihood of a UN intervention was greater during the post-Cold War period and in national liberation/independence disputes (except for UN military interventions). There was also evidence that secessionist disputes decreased the likelihood of only UN military interventions.

REGIONAL IGO INTERVENTIONS

Similar to UN interventions, there has been little or no scholarly research on the factors influencing the occurrence of regional IGO interventions in domestic political disputes. Most of the previous research that has focused on regional IGOs has been analyses of the effectiveness of regional IGO interventions (Haas et al. 1972; Meyers, 1974, 345-373; Haas 1983; Scheman and Ford, 1985, 197-232; Wolfers, 1985, 175-196; Haas 1993). Consequently, the previous literature provides little theoretical guidance for analyzing the factors that might influence the decisions of regional IGOs to intervene or not intervene in intrastate disputes. On the other hand, we know from the previous section that there is some theoretical guidance with respect to the occurrence of UN interventions that is applicable to the occurrence of regional IGO interventions. Regional IGOs, much like UN organs and agencies, face a number of international and regional constraints and pressures on their decisions. Therefore, I argue that the occurrences of regional IGO interventions in intrastate disputes are similarly influenced by security, political, humanitarian, and normative considerations.

Security Considerations

Several regional IGOs, including the League of Arab States (LAS), Organization of American States (OAS), and Organization for African Unity (OAU), were established at least in part to maintain regional peace and security. There are two scenarios involving domestic political disputes that could threaten regional peace and security, and therefore, increase the likelihood of regional IGO interventions. The first scenario is a situation in which one or more member-states of a regional IGO have intervened against the government of a target

state. In these cases, the government of the target state might bring the external intervention to the attention of the regional IGO, and the regional IGO might intervene in order to prevent an escalation of the dispute or to bring an end to the external intervention. The second scenario is a situation in which a domestic political dispute in a target state has escalated to military hostilities between the parties. In these cases, a regional IGO might intervene in order to bring about a cessation of military hostilities between the parties or to prevent the conflict from escalating into a wider regional conflict.

Hypothesis 1a: There is a higher likelihood of a regional IGO intervention when one or more regional IGO member-states have intervened against the government of the target state.

Hypothesis 1b: There is a higher likelihood of a regional IGO intervention when the dispute has escalated to military hostilities.

Political Considerations

Regional IGOs, like the UN, are less likely to intervene in domestic political disputes in regions or subregions that are dominated by hegemons. Historically, regional or subregional hegemons have preferred to maintain regional peace and security without the interference of other states and international organizations (e.g. US in the Western Hemisphere), unless a regional hegemon believes that a regional organization can provide legitimacy for a particular intervention in a particular intrastate dispute (e.g. US intervention in Grenada under the auspices of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States-OECS). Likewise, regional IGOs are less likely to intervene in domestic political disputes in target states that are former colonies/protectorates of major international/regional powers. Regional IGOs tend to defer to major international/regional powers in dealing with threats to regional

peace and security in their former colonies.

Regional IGOs are more likely to intervene in a domestic political dispute when the UN has intervened in the dispute. The involvement of the UN in a domestic political dispute "opens the door" for regional IGOs to also get involved in the dispute. Linda Miller (1967b, 588) suggested several years ago that "regional organizations and the UN have shared compatible goals" in internal conflicts, and that "both have tried to restore and maintain international peace and security, pursuant to their principles and purposes." In recent years, regional IGOs have frequently engaged in complimentary interventions or joint interventions with the UN in intrastate disputes that threaten international and regional peace and security (Weiss, 1994, 150; Wedgewood, 1996, 281). For example, the OAS sent election observers to monitor a referendum and parliamentary elections in Guatemala in 1999 after the UN mediated a peace agreement between the government and rebels in December 1996 (and established a military observation mission to monitor the terms of the peace agreement beginning in January 1997). In addition, the OAS and UN established a joint human rights monitoring mission in Haiti on February 9, 1993, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and UN established a joint electoral assistance mission in Azerbaijan on September 15, 1995.

Finally, a regional IGO is more likely to intervene in a domestic political dispute when the regional IGO has previously intervened in a dispute in the target state. Once a regional IGO has a track record, particularly a successful track record, in a target state, there is an increased likelihood that an intrastate dispute will be referred to a regional IGO and that the regional IGO will choose to intervene in a target state in subsequent disputes. As an

example, the OAS has intervened in the Dominican Republic at least 18 times since 1960.[33]

Hypothesis 2a: There is a lower likelihood of a regional IGO intervention when the target state is located in a region dominated by a hegemon.

Hypothesis 2b: There is a lower likelihood of a regional IGO intervention when the target state is a former colony/protectorate of a major international/regional power.

Hypothesis 2c: There is a higher likelihood of a regional IGO intervention when the UN has intervened in the dispute.

Hypothesis 2d: There is a higher likelihood of a regional IGO intervention when a regional IGO has previously intervened in a dispute in the target state.

Humanitarian Considerations

Regional IGOs are more likely to intervene in a domestic political dispute when a humanitarian crisis is occurring in the target state. In particular, regional IGOs are motivated to get involved when there are high levels of refugees/internally-displaced persons (IDPs) or high levels of fatalities resulting from the dispute. As an example, the OAS established *Operation Socorro* to provide humanitarian assistance to some 500,000 individuals displaced during a domestic political dispute in the Dominican Republic in May 1965 (Donald, 1975, 36-49).

Hypothesis 3a: There is a higher likelihood of a regional IGO intervention when there is a high level of refugees/internally-displaced persons resulting from the dispute in the target state.

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[33] OAS interventions in the Dominican Republic include the following: (1) fact-finding mission, 1960; (2) diplomatic sanctions against the government, 1960; (3) military sanctions against the government, 1960; (4) economic sanctions against the government, 1961-1962; (5) fact-finding mission, 1961; (6) technical assistance mission, 1961; (7) election observation, 1962; (8) ceasefire appeal, 1965; (9) good offices commission, 1965; (10) humanitarian assistance, 1965; (11) peacekeeping mission, 1965; (12) conciliation commission, 1965; (13) election observation, 1966; (14) election observation, 1978; (15) election observation, 1990; (16) election observation, 1994; (17) election observation, 1996; and (18) election observation, 2000.

Hypothesis 3b: There is a higher likelihood of a regional IGO intervention when there is a high level of fatalities resulting from the dispute in the target state.

Normative Considerations

The same international norms and principles that influenced decisions by the UN to intervene or not intervene in domestic political disputes might also influence such decisions by regional IGOs. As in the UN Charter, the principle of non-intervention is included in the charters of several regional IGOs, including the OAS and OAU (Padelford, 1964, 533). Specifically, Article 15 of the OAS Charter states that "no state or group of states has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatsoever, in the internal or external affairs of any other states," and Article III (paragraph 2) of the OAU Charter declares that "non-interference in the internal affairs of States" is one of the principles of the organization. Dealing with the matter of political instability in the Dominican Republic in the early 1950s, the OAS Council declared that "the principles of representative democracy...and of suffrage and participation in government...do not in any way...authorize any government or groups of governments to violate the principle of non-intervention" (Slater, 1964, 269).

The principle of non-intervention was a constraint on the ability and willingness of regional IGOs to intervene in domestic political disputes during the Cold War period, but there has been a significant increase in the ability and willingness of regional IGOs to intervene in such disputes in the post-Cold War period (Ganguly and Taras, 1998, 119). In recent years, several regional IGOs have established programs and structures to deal with regional disputes. For example, the OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government established the "Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution" on June

30, 1993. Edmond Keller (1997, 314) noted that "the African heads of state at their annual summit formally approved the establishment of this mechanism, even though it implied that member states might on occasion have to surrender their sovereignty in the interest of regional security." Subsequent to the establishment of the mechanism, the OAU has intervened in domestic political disputes in Comoros, Mozambique, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Liberia, Uganda, Guinea-Bissau, Zimbabwe, Ivory Coast, Nigeria, Somalia, Rwanda, Togo, Ghana, Burundi, Niger, Namibia, and the Democratic Republic of Congo.

The principle of the "right of self-determination" has also been an important influence on the decisions of regional IGOs. Several regional IGOs joined with the UN in promoting the independence of colonies throughout the world. Boutros Boutros-Ghali (1974, 167) suggested that one of the principal aims of the LAS "at the time of its formation was the liberation from foreign domination of member states not yet fully independent." Subsequently, the LAS intervened in support of Syrian nationalists in 1945, Libyan nationalists in 1947 and 1948, Moroccan nationalists in 1948 and 1953, Tunisian nationalists in 1953, and Algerian nationalists in 1961. One of the main purposes of the OAU when it was established in 1963 was "to eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa" (Bennett, 1995, 243). In the 1960s and 1970s, the OAU supported independence movements in Portuguese Guinea (Guinea-Bissau), Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), and Southwest Africa (Namibia).

Finally, the principle of the "territorial integrity of sovereign states" has had a particularly strong influence on the decisions of regional IGOs. Many regional IGOs, particularly the OAU, have been reluctant to get involved in domestic political disputes

involving secessionist/separatist movements within states in their regions. Indeed, Article III (paragraph 3) of the OAU states that "respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each State and for its inalienable right to independent existence" is one of the main principles of the organization. As an example, the OAU supported the territorial integrity of Nigeria during the Biafran secessionist conflict in 1967-1970. In September 1967, the OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government "re-affirmed their adherence to the principle of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of member states, and recognized the situation as an internal affair which was primarily the responsibility of Nigerians themselves" (Akuchu, 1977, 45). In general, regional IGOs are less likely to get involved in secessionist/separatist disputes than other types of intrastate disputes because of their firm adherence to the principle of the territorial integrity of states.

Hypothesis 4a: There is a higher likelihood of a regional IGO intervention in the post-Cold War period.

Hypothesis 4b: There is a higher likelihood of a regional IGO intervention when the dispute is a national liberation/independence dispute.

Hypothesis 4c: There is a lower likelihood of a regional IGO intervention when the dispute is a secessionist/separatist dispute.

RESEARCH DESIGN

The hypotheses regarding regional IGO interventions are tested against a set of data on some 350 intrastate disputes that occurred between January 1, 1945 and December 31, 2000. The unit of analysis is the dispute phase. The intrastate disputes that occurred during some part of the post-World War II period consist of 866 dispute phases. The historical record was examined for information on the occurrence of diplomatic/political, economic, and military interventions by regional IGOs in the 866 dispute phases, and a total of 860 interventions by regional IGOs were identified. Table 4-2 provides a breakdown of regional IGOs and corresponding numbers of interventions in the disputes. Thirty-four different regional and subregional IGOs were involved in at least one intervention in domestic political disputes during the post-World War II period. As is evident from the information in the table, five of the 34 regional IGOs (EC/EU, CSCE/OSCE, OAU, OAS, COE) accounted for more than two-thirds of the 860 regional IGO interventions, and eleven of the 34 regional IGOs were involved in only one intervention.

Figure 4-2 (a) - (e) provides frequencies of the occurrence of regional IGO interventions in the five regions of the world. Interestingly, the frequencies of regional IGO interventions in the regions are similar to the corresponding frequencies of UN interventions (see figure 4-1). The frequency of regional IGO interventions in the Asia/Pacific region ranged from zero to three interventions per year between 1945 and 1995, but ranged from two to fifteen interventions per year between 1996 and 2000.

Table 4-2: Regional Inter-Governmental Organization (IGO) Interventions in Intrastate Disputes

Regional IGO	*Number of Interventions*
European Community (EC)/European Union (EU)	142
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)/Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)	129
Organization of African Unity (OAU)	117
Organization of American States (OAS)	115
Council of Europe (COE)	86
Commonwealth of Nations (CON)	64
League of Arab States (LAS)/Arab League (AL)	40
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)	35
Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie (OIF)	20
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)	19
Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)	16
Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC)	15
Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM)/International Organization for Migration (IOM)	12
Caribbean Community (CARICOM)	8
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)	8
Western European Union (WEU)	7
Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC)/ Southern Africa Development Community (SADC)	5
Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries (CPSC)	3
European Human Right Commission (EHRC)/European Court of Human Rights (ECHR)	2
Organization of the Front Line States (OFLS)	2
Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO)/Warsaw Pact (WP)	2
South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC)	2
Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO)	1
Rio Group (RG)	1
Organization of Central American States (OCAS)	1
Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS)	1
Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD)	1
East African Community (EAC)	1
Common African, Malagasy, and Mauritanian Organization (Organisation Commune Africaine et Malgache - OCAM)	1
Council of the Entente (Conseil de l'Entente - CDE)	1
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)	1
Nordic Council (NC)	1
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)	1
Total	860

The frequency of regional IGO interventions in the Europe/Russia/Former Soviet Union region ranged from zero to three interventions per year between 1945 and 1989, but ranged from 14 to 50 interventions per year between 1990 and 2000. The frequency of regional IGO interventions in the Middle East/North Africa/Persian Gulf region ranged from zero to ten interventions per year between 1945 and 2000. The frequency of regional IGO interventions in the Sub-Saharan Africa region ranged from zero to fifteen interventions per year between 1960 and 1991, and ranged from approximately ten to forty interventions per year between 1992 and 2000. Finally, the frequency of regional IGO interventions in the Western Hemisphere region ranged from zero to ten interventions per year between 1945 and 1990, and ranged from five to fifteen interventions per year between 1991 and 2000. Figure 4-2 (f) indicates that the frequency of regional IGO interventions ranged from zero to 25 interventions per year between 1945 and 1990, and ranged from 30 to 115 interventions per year between 1991 and 2000. The significant increase in the frequency of worldwide regional IGO interventions in the post-Cold War period is largely a function of the significant increases in the frequencies of interventions in the Europe/Russia/Former Soviet Union and Sub-Saharan Africa regions.

Figure 4-2: Frequencies of the Occurrence of Regional IGO Interventions (Regions)



Abbreviations: A/P = Asia/Pacific; E/R/FSU = Europe/Russia/Former Soviet Union; ME/NA/PG = Middle East/North Africa/Persian Gulf; SSA = Sub-Saharan Africa; WH = Western Hemisphere.

Dependent Variable

In order to account for the different dimensions of regional IGO interventions, I have operationalized the dependent variable in the following four ways: (1) there was a regional IGO intermediary or participatory intervention during the dispute phase = 1; there was not a regional IGO intermediary or participatory intervention during the dispute phase = 0; (2) there was a regional IGO intermediary intervention during the dispute phase = 1; there was not a regional IGO intermediary intervention during the dispute phase = 0; (3) there was a regional IGO participatory intervention during the dispute phase = 1; there was not a regional IGO participatory intervention during the dispute phase = 0; (4) there was a regional IGO military intervention during the dispute phase = 1; there was not a regional IGO military intervention during the dispute phase = 0. Since each variant of the dependent variable is dichotomous, separate logistic regression models for each will be estimated.

Independent Variables

* Partisan Intervention {there was an intervention against the government in the target state by a regional IGO member-state = 1; otherwise = 0}.

* Military Hostilities {the dispute in the target state has escalated to military hostilities = 1; otherwise = 0}.

* Regional Hegemon {the target state is located in a region with a hegemon = 1; otherwise = 0}. See Appendix F for a list of regional hegemons.

* Former Colony {the target state is a former colony/protectorate of a major international/regional power = 1; otherwise = 0}. See Appendix A for information on the former status of states in the international system.

* UN Intervention {the UN has intervened in the target state during the current or previous dispute phase = 1; otherwise = 0}.

* Prior Regional IGO Intervention {a regional IGO has previously intervened in a dispute in the target state = 1; otherwise = 0}.

* Refugees {there are 25,000 or more refugees/ internally displaced persons resulting from the dispute = 1; otherwise = 0}. Data on refugee levels was obtained from the *United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees* (UNHCR), the *United States Committee for Refugees* (USCR), and standard sources of information (see Appendix C).

* Fatalities {there are 100 or more annual civilian/military fatalities resulting from the dispute = 1; otherwise = 0}. Data on fatalities was obtained from standard sources of information (see Appendix C).

* Post-Cold War Period {the dispute phase began after January 1, 1991 = 1; otherwise = 0}.

* National Liberation Dispute {the dispute is a national liberation/independence dispute = 1; otherwise = 0}.

* Secessionist Dispute {the dispute is a secessionist/separatist dispute = 1; otherwise = 0}.

DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS

Table 4-3 provides the results of the Logistic regression analyses of the effects of security, political, humanitarian, and normative considerations on the occurrence of regional IGO interventions in intrastate disputes. The hypotheses predicted that the coefficients for partisan intervention, military hostilities, UN intervention, prior regional IGO intervention, refugees, fatalities, post-Cold War period, and national liberation dispute in the models would be positive, and the hypotheses predicted that the coefficients for regional hegemon,

former colony, and secessionist dispute would be negative. In the first column, the dependent variable is the occurrence of a regional IGO intermediary or participatory intervention. One of the two coefficients for security considerations (partisan intervention) is statistically significant in the hypothesized direction. Consistent with hypothesis 1a, there was a higher likelihood of a regional IGO intervention when one or more regional IGO member-states have intervened in the target state. Three of the four coefficients for political considerations (former colony, UN intervention, and prior regional IGO intervention) are statistically significant in the hypothesized directions. Consistent with hypotheses 2b, 2c, and 2d, there was a lower likelihood of a regional IGO intervention when the target state was a former colony/protectorate of a major international/regional power, and there was a higher likelihood of a regional IGO intervention when the UN had already intervened in the dispute and when a regional IGO had previously intervened in a dispute in the target state. One of the two coefficients for humanitarian considerations (fatalities) is statistically significant in the hypothesized direction. Consistent with hypothesis 3b, there was a higher likelihood of a regional IGO intervention when there was a high level of fatalities resulting from the dispute. Finally, two of the three coefficients for normative considerations (post-Cold War Period and Secessionist Dispute) are statistically significant in the hypothesized directions. Consistent with hypotheses 4a and 4c, there was a higher likelihood of a regional IGO intervention during the post-Cold War period, and there was a lower likelihood of a regional IGO intervention in secessionist disputes.

Table 4-3: Estimates of Logit Models of the Occurrence of Regional IGO Interventions

Independent Variables	All Interventions	Intermediary Interventions	Participatory Interventions	Military Interventions
Security Considerations				
Partisan Intervention	.85 (.28)**	.74 (.29)**	.67 (.29)*	.30 (.43)
Military Hostilities	-.43 (.27)	-.24 (.29)	-.79 (.34)*	1.06 (.46)*
Political Considerations				
Regional Hegemon	.36 (.23)	.44 (.24)	.06 (.29)	-.01 (.42)
Former Colony	-.54 (.23)**	-.41 (.24)*	-.06 (.27)	.02 (.41)
UN Intervention	.93 (.24)**	.93 (.24)**	.80 (.29)**	1.19 (.39)**
Prior Reg. IGO Intervention	.46 (.21)*	.56 (.21)**	-.14 (.31)	1.08 (.45)**
Humanitarian Considerations				
Refugees	.43 (.34)	.24 (.37)	.47 (.36)	.98 (.65)
Fatalities	.60 (.28)*	.55 (.30)*	.93 (.37)**	-.36 (.77)
Normative Considerations				
Post-Cold War Period	2.22 (.25)**	2.02 (.25)**	1.23 (.31)**	.60 (.48)
Nat. Liberation Dispute	-.03 (.35)	-.70 (.42)	.90 (.45)*	-.16 (.74)
Secessionist Dispute	-.73 (.33)*	-.91 (.33)**	.41 (.39)	-.25 (.55)
Constant	-2.06 (.20)**	-2.33 (.21)**	-3.44 (.30)**	-5.29 (.61)**
Number of Cases	866	866	866	866
Log Likelihood (LL)	-398.08	-375.63	-235.60	-120.01
Chi-Square Statistic	157.29	156.95	72.17	66.93
Probability > Chi-Square	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00

Note: Estimates are Logit regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. Robust standard errors are adjusted for clustering on the dispute (i.e. the assumption of the independence of observations is relaxed within each dispute).

* $p \leq .05$, one-tailed test.

** $p \leq .01$, one-tailed test.

In the second column of table 4-3, the dependent variable is the occurrence of regional IGO intermediary interventions. As in the previous model, the coefficients for partisan intervention, former colony, UN intervention, prior regional IGO intervention, fatalities, post-Cold War period, and secessionist dispute are statistically significant in the hypothesized directions.

In the third column of table 4-3, the dependent variable is the occurrence of regional IGO participatory interventions. Like the previous two models, the coefficients for partisan intervention, UN intervention, fatalities, and post-Cold War period are statistically significant in the hypothesized directions. Consistent with hypotheses 1a, 2c, 3b, and 4a, there was a higher likelihood of a regional IGO participatory intervention when one or more regional IGO member-states had intervened against the government of the target state, when the UN had already intervened in the dispute, when there was a high level of fatalities resulting from the dispute, and during the post-Cold War period

However, unlike the previous two models, the coefficients for former colony, prior regional IGO intervention, and secessionist dispute are not statistically significant in the hypothesized directions. In addition, the coefficient for national liberation dispute is statistically significant in the hypothesized direction in the model regarding regional IGO participatory interventions. Consistent with hypothesis 4b, there was a higher likelihood of a regional IGO participatory intervention in national liberation disputes.

In the fourth column of table 4-3, the dependent variable is the occurrence of regional IGO military interventions. One of the coefficients for security considerations (military hostilities) and two of the coefficients for political considerations (UN intervention and prior

regional IGO intervention) are statistically significant in the hypothesized directions. Consistent with hypotheses 1b, 2c, and 2d, there was a higher likelihood of a regional IGO military intervention when the dispute has escalated to military hostilities, when the UN had already intervened in the dispute, and when a regional IGO had previously intervened in a dispute in the target state. There was no evidence that humanitarian considerations and normative considerations significantly influence the occurrence of regional IGO military interventions.

SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS

At the beginning of this chapter, I inquired as to why the UN and regional IGOs would choose to intervene in some domestic political disputes, but choose not to intervene in other disputes. As a result of empirical analyses of both UN interventions and regional IGO interventions, I found that some indicators of security, political, humanitarian, and normative considerations had similar effects (or lack of effects) on the occurrence of UN and regional IGO interventions. First, the UN and regional IGOs were both generally more likely to intervene in a domestic political dispute when one or more respective member-states had intervened against the government of the target state. Second, there was no evidence that either the UN or regional IGOs were less likely to intervene in intrastate disputes when there was a hegemon in the region of the target state. Third, the UN was more likely to intervene in a domestic political dispute when a regional IGO had already intervened in the dispute, and regional IGOs were more likely to intervene in a domestic political dispute when the UN had already intervened in the dispute. Fourth, the UN and regional IGOs were both more likely to intervene when they had previously intervened in a dispute in the target state. In

other words, the existence of a "track record" in managing or resolving a previous dispute in a target state made a subsequent intervention by the UN and regional IGOs significantly more likely. Fifth, the UN and regional IGOs were both more likely to intervene in domestic political disputes when there were high levels of fatalities resulting from the dispute. Finally, the UN and regional IGOs were both generally more likely to intervene in intrastate disputes during the post-Cold War period than during the Cold War period.

There were also some important differences between the occurrence of UN interventions and the occurrence of regional IGO interventions. First, while the UN was more likely to intervene when the dispute had escalated to military hostilities, regional IGOs were generally not more likely to intervene under such circumstances. This difference may reflect the UN's greater emphasis on dealing with threats to global peace and security, including situations in which domestic political disputes escalate to military hostilities and threaten regional peace and security. Second, while the UN was not less likely to intervene in domestic political disputes in former colonies of major international/regional powers, regional IGOs were, for the most part, less likely to intervene under such circumstances. Third, while the UN was generally more likely to intervene in domestic political disputes when there were high levels of refugees resulting from the dispute, regional IGOs were not more likely to intervene under such circumstances. Finally, while the UN was more likely to intervene in national liberation/independence disputes, regional IGOs were, for the most part, not more likely to intervene under such circumstances.

This study of the occurrence of IGO interventions in intrastate disputes is important for a couple of reasons. First, we know much more about the factors that influence the occurrence of interventions by the UN and regional IGOs as a result of this study. Prior research had generally ignored the causes of IGO interventions in domestic political disputes, and therefore, this study significantly expands existing knowledge on this phenomenon. Subsequent analyses might focus on other factors thought to influence the occurrence of IGO interventions, as well as factors thought to affect the timing of an IGO intervention (or the duration of time from the beginning of a crisis to the beginning of an IGO intervention). Second, this study reveals the important role of IGOs, including the UN and regional IGOs, in global affairs. Traditional emphasis on the role of states in the field of international politics has meant relatively little research on the increasingly important role that IGOs play in the prevention, management, and resolution of disputes between parties within states in the international system. Subsequent research might examine differences in the effectiveness of interventions by states and IGOs in intrastate disputes. Finally, this study has expanded the definition of intervention to encompass the wide array of techniques from which IGO decision-makers may choose when faced with an opportunity to intervene. These techniques were organized according to two different dimensions of intervention: (1) intermediary (non-partisan) - participatory (partisan) interventions; and (2) military - non-military interventions. It was shown that there were some differences in the extent to which some factors influenced the occurrence of the different dimensions of intervention. Subsequent research might explore these differences further by analyzing the factors influencing the specific category or technique of intervention chosen by an IGO when faced with an opportunity to intervene.

CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSION

The central dilemma presented in the first chapter of this study involved the question of why third party actors decide to intervene in some intrastate disputes, but decide not to intervene in other disputes? Three different sets of analyses were undertaken in order to deal with this dilemma. First, I described the phenomenon of third party intervention in the second chapter. Second, I sought to explain the occurrence of state interventions in intrastate disputes through aggregate and case study analyses in the third chapter. Finally, I sought to explain the occurrence of IGO interventions, including UN interventions and regional IGO interventions, in domestic political disputes in the fourth chapter. In the current chapter, I will briefly summarize the results of the various analyses, attempt to integrate the findings of the analyses, provide some implications of the results for the study of third party interventions, and discuss avenues for future research on the phenomenon of third party interventions in intrastate disputes.

In the second chapter, I provided graphs of the frequency of the occurrence of third party interventions during the 20th century. The relative frequency of interventions (i.e. the annual number of third party interventions divided by the annual number of intrastate disputes ongoing) remained at a consistently low level between 1900 and 1960, increased to a slightly higher level between 1960 and 1980, decreased to a lower level between 1980 and 1990, and then increased to a significantly higher level between 1990 and 2000. The descriptive results suggest three research questions: First, why was there a modest increase

in the frequency of interventions around 1960? Second, why did the frequency of interventions decrease to the pre-1960 levels around 1980? Third, why was there a large increase in the frequency of interventions around 1990?

How did the relative frequency of interventions differ from one region to the next? The descriptive results showed that each of the regions experienced moderate-to-large increases in the frequency of interventions in the early 1960s, suggesting that the global increase in the frequency of interventions at that time was not caused by dramatic changes in any single region of the world. On the other hand, it was clear from the descriptive results that the Sub-Saharan Africa and Middle East/North Africa/Persian Gulf regions experienced somewhat larger increases in the relative frequency of interventions than the other three regions. In addition, each of the regions, with the exception of the Europe/Russia/Former Soviet Union region, experienced a noticeable decrease in the frequency of interventions in the early 1980s. There was no significant change in the level of interventions in the Europe/Russia/Soviet Union region in the 1980s. Lastly, each of the regions experienced a sudden and significant upward shift in the frequency of interventions in the early 1990s. Again, these results indicate that the global changes in the frequency of interventions tended to occur, not only in one or two regions of the world, but rather across most of the various regions of the world.

Was there a difference in the frequencies of intermediary and participatory interventions? Yes, the frequency of participatory interventions was generally greater than the frequency of intermediary interventions in each of the five regions of the world between 1900 and 1990. However, the frequency of intermediary interventions was generally greater

than the frequency of participatory interventions in at least three of the regions (Asia/Pacific, Europe/Russia/Former Soviet Union, and Sub-Saharan Africa) between 1990 and 2000. These descriptive results suggest two additional research questions: First, why were there differences in the relative frequencies of interventions among the various regions of the world? Second, why did the frequency of the occurrence of intermediary interventions increase relative to the frequency of the occurrence of participatory interventions during the 1990s?

In the third chapter, I statistically analyzed a set of hypotheses regarding the occurrence of state interventions in domestic political disputes in the 20th century. The results of analyses of state interventions differed somewhat depending on the type of data used. Using aggregate data on state intermediary and participatory interventions, I found that states were generally influenced to intervene in intrastate disputes by both strategic linkages (military alliances, prior allied intervention, prior adversary intervention, and regional hegemon) and non-strategic linkages (refugees and fatalities). Using data on intermediary and participatory interventions by six selected states (US, Russia/USSR, China, France, Egypt, and Libya), I similarly found that the states were generally influenced to intervene in intrastate disputes by both strategic linkages (geographic proximity, military alliance, prior adversary intervention, regional hegemon, and former colony) and non-strategic linkages (ideological linkage, ethnic/tribal linkage, religious linkage, refugees, and fatalities). The main differences between the two types of analyses were the evidence in support of two additional strategic linkages (geographic proximity and former colony) and several additional non-strategic linkages (ideological linkage, ethnic/tribal linkage, and religious linkage) in the

case study analyses.

In the fourth chapter, I statistically analyzed a set of hypotheses regarding the occurrence of IGO interventions in domestic political disputes in the post-World War II period. I found that the UN was influenced to intervene in intrastate disputes by security considerations (participatory intervention and military hostilities), political considerations (regional IGO intervention and prior UN intervention), humanitarian considerations (refugees and fatalities), and normative considerations (post-Cold War period and national liberation dispute). Likewise, I found that regional IGOs were influenced to intervene in intrastate disputes by security considerations (participatory intervention), political considerations (former colony, UN intervention, and prior regional IGO intervention), humanitarian consideration (fatalities), and normative considerations (post-Cold War period and secessionist dispute).

Can the results of the statistical analyses of the occurrence of state and IGO interventions in domestic political disputes be integrated? Table 5-1 summarizes the results of the analyses of the occurrence of state and IGO interventions. Although there were essentially two different sets of hypotheses regarding the occurrence of state interventions and IGO interventions, there are at least three main similarities concerning the likelihood of interventions by the three types of third party actors. First, it is clear from the analyses that states, the UN, and regional IGOs respond to or are motivated by both "realist" factors and "liberal" factors. In the table, strategic linkages, security considerations, and political considerations are grouped together as "realist" factors, while non-strategic linkages, humanitarian considerations, and normative considerations are grouped together as "liberal"

factors. Given this distinction, there is little doubt that any explanation of the factors influencing the occurrence of the various categories of third party interventions in intrastate disputes would be incomplete without accounting for both realist and liberal factors.

Second, there is some indication from the results that third party actors, including states, the UN, and regional IGOs, often intervene in domestic political disputes in response to prior interventions by one or more other third party actors. States were generally more likely to intervene after an allied state or adversarial state had already intervened in the dispute. UN organs and agencies were more likely to intervene after one or more UN member-states had already intervened in the dispute and after a regional IGO had already intervened in the dispute. Lastly, regional IGOs were more likely to intervene after regional IGO member-states had already intervened in the dispute and after the UN had already intervened in the dispute. Overall, these results suggest that once any third party actor has intervened in a domestic political dispute, there is an increased likelihood that one or more other third party actors will also intervene in the dispute.

Finally, the results indicate that states, the UN, and regional IGOs may each be motivated to intervene in intrastate disputes for humanitarian reasons. When there were higher levels of refugees or fatalities resulting from a dispute, the third party actors were generally more likely to intervene in the dispute that when there were not high levels of refugees or fatalities. The impulse to intervene for humanitarian purposes is strong even in the absence of strategic interests.

Table 5-1: Summary of the Analyses of the Occurrence of Third Party Interventions

	Strategic (Geographic, Military, Political) Linkages; Security & Political Considerations	Non-Strategic (Ideological, Ethnic/Tribal, Religious, Humanitarian) Linkages; Humanitarian & Normative Considerations
States/Coalition of States (aggregate)	Prior Allied Interv. (+): A, I, P, M Prior Adversary Interv. (+): A, P, M Regional Hegemon (+): A, I, P	Refugees (+): A, I, P, M Fatalities (+): A, I, P, M
United Nations (UN)	Partisan Intervention (+): A, I, M Military Hostilities (+): A, I, M Regional IGO Interv. (+): A, I, P, M Prior UN Intervention (+): A, I	Refugees (+): A, I Fatalities (+): A, P Post-Cold War Period (+): A, I, P, M Nat. Lib. Dispute (+): A, I, P Secessionist Dispute (-): M
Regional Inter-Governmental Organizations (IGOs)	Partisan Intervention (+): A, I, P Military Hostilities (+): M Regional Hegemon (+): I Former Colony (-): A, I UN Intervention (+): A, I, P, M Prior Reg. IGO Interv. (+): A, I, M	Fatalities (+): A, I, P Post-Cold War Period (+): A, I, P Nat. Lib. Dispute (+): P Secessionist Dispute (-): A, I

Note: The negative sign (-) refers to a negative, statistically significant relationship between the independent variable and the occurrence of intervention; positive sign (+) refers to a positive, statistically significant relationship between the independent variable and the occurrence of intervention.
Abbreviations: A = All Interventions; I = Intermediary Interventions; P = Participatory Interventions; M = Military Interventions.

What are some of the implications of these findings for the study of third party interventions in intrastate disputes? First, it is clear from the frequencies provided in figures 3-1, 4-1, and 4-2 that the end of the Cold War has resulted in significant increases in the number of interventions in domestic political disputes by states, the UN, and regional IGOs. Whether the increases in interventions are caused by the change in the structure of the international system from a bipolar system to a multipolar system, by a change in international norms, or by some other recent development, there is little doubt that one or more third party actors are likely to intervene in most intrastate disputes during the post-Cold War period. In short, if there is a domestic political dispute that has escalated to a crisis in the current period, there will most likely be a third party intervention during the crisis.

Second, it is increasingly clear that the UN and regional IGOs have evolved from largely irrelevant actors in international politics during the Cold War period to significant actors in international politics in the post-Cold War period. Figures 3-1, 4-1, and 4-2 suggest that the UN and regional IGOs have been more active than states in terms of external involvement in domestic political disputes during the last decade of the 20th century. Prior to 1990, the involvement of the UN and regional IGOs was insignificant compared to the involvement of states in intrastate disputes. In fact, states intervened more than three times as frequently as the UN and regional IGOs during the Cold War period, but the UN and regional IGOs have intervened nearly three times as frequently as states since 1990. At the very least, states are now much more likely to defer to international organizations, such as the UN, EU, OSCE, NATO, OAS, and OAU, to attempt to manage and resolve domestic political disputes in nearly every region of the world. There is no indication that this trend

has been reversed in recent years or will be reversed in the near future.

Finally and most importantly, the findings may have implications for the emergence of a "UN-centered security regime" in the post-Cold War period. To the extent that the UN and regional IGOs are increasingly bearing the burden of maintaining international and regional peace and security (and the empirical evidence seems to indicate that they are increasingly bearing the burden), it is reasonable to suggest that a "UN-centered security regime" has replaced the bipolar, balance-of-power system that maintained peace and security during much of the post-World War II period. I argue that there are three main characteristics of the UN-centered security regime: (1) the "principle of non-intervention" (i.e. the UN and regional IGOs are prohibited from intervening in the domestic affairs of sovereign states) has been replaced by the "principle of intervention" (i.e. the UN and regional IGOs are expected to intervene in domestic political disputes to promote human rights and democracy, to provide humanitarian assistance to non-combatant adversely affected by the dispute, and to assist the parties in managing and resolving the dispute); (2) "regional security systems" are increasingly institutionalized as a result of coordination and cooperation among IGOs in each of the five regions of the world and as a result of new rules, structures, and mechanisms developed by regional IGOs to deal with humanitarian, human rights, and governance issues and problems; and (3) "regional security systems" are closely linked to (and increasingly coordinate their efforts with) the UN in maintaining international and regional peace and security.[34]

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[34] I define "regional security system" as consisting of a regional IGO and five or more multi-regional or sub-regional IGOs that deal to some extent with political/security matters within a particular region of the world. The IGOs have overlapping jurisdictions within a region, and

How do know that there is security regime in the post-Cold War period? Robert Jervis (1982, 360-362) suggested four conditions that must be met in order for a security regime to exist: (1) the major powers must want to establish it - that is, they must prefer a more regulated environment to one in which all state behave individualistically; (2) the actors must also believe that others share the value they place on mutual security and cooperation; and (3) security regimes cannot form when one or more actors believe that security is best provided for by expansion; and (4) war and the individualistic pursuit of security must be seen as costly. Here again, it is reasonable to suggest that each of these conditions have been met in the post-Cold War period. The major powers (US, Russia, China, Britain, France, Germany, Japan) are arguably each committed to a regulated environment rather than an unregulated environment. To the extent that the major powers are committed to a regulated environment, it is likely that most of the major powers (including the US) would not prefer a US-regulated environment. All of the major powers have, for the most part,

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therefore, there is coordination and cooperation among them. I argue that there are five regional security systems: (1) *Asia/Pacific regional security system* - Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), Commonwealth of Nations (CON), Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), South Pacific Forum (SPF); (2) *Europe/Russia/Former Soviet Union regional security system* - Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Council of Europe (COE), European Union (EU), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Western European Union (WEU), European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS); (3) *Middle East/North Africa/Persian Gulf regional security system* - League of Arab States (LAS), Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), OIC, NAM, Arab Magreb Union (AMU); (4) *Sub-Saharan Africa regional security system* - Organization of African Union (OAU), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Council of the Entente (CE), Southern Africa Development Community (SADC), CON, OIC, NAM, Organisation Internationationale de la Francophonie (OIF), Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Development; and (5) *Western Hemisphere regional security system* - Organization of American States (OAS), CON, NAM, Caribbean Community (CARICOM), Organization of Central American States (OCAS), Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS), Rio Group (RG).

demonstrated their support for and commitment to multilateral solutions to international crises in recent years (e.g. US-led coalition in the Persian Gulf War, Somalia, and Haiti; Italian-led coalition in Albania; NATO interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo; and UN interventions in East Timor, Sierra Leone, and Democratic Republic of Congo), and there is little evidence that any of the major powers really believes that any of the other major powers do not value mutual security and cooperation. Finally, it is difficult to find evidence in recent years that any of the major powers are engaged in expansionistic policies, wars with other states, or unilateral pursuits of security.

If there is a security regime, the most likely possibility is a "UN-centered security regime." Again, the evidence presented in this chapter suggests that the relative importance of the UN and regional organizations has significantly increase, while at the same time the relative importance of states has decreased. This does not mean that states are not important; on the contrary, states remain the most important actors in international politics. States have, however, chosen to maintain international and regional peace and security largely through organs, agencies, structures, and mechanisms of the UN and regional organizations in recent years. The promise of the UN and many regional organizations established in the aftermath of the devastating Second World War, while mostly unfulfilled during the Cold War period, has arguably been kept during the post-Cold War period.

Given the results of the analyses in this study, where do we go from here? I would suggest that international relations scholars focus on three main areas of research in the near future. First, there is the question of what factors influence the timing of third party interventions in intrastate disputes? In this study, I analyzed the occurrence of interventions

by various third party actors (i.e. Did an intervention of any type or did a particular type of intervention occur during a particular dispute phase?); however, I did not analyze the timing of interventions (i.e. the duration of time from the beginning of a dispute phase to the beginning of an intervention). Timing is a potentially important attribute of intervention since, once a third party actor has decided to intervene in a domestic political dispute, the third party actor may choose to intervene early in a dispute phase, late in a dispute phase, or at some point in between. The timing of an intervention may have an impact on whether or not other third party actors might intervene during the current or subsequent dispute phase, or may have an impact on the success or failure of the intervention (i.e. did the intervention occur during a "ripe moment" in the dispute). The difference in the timing of intervention decisions (i.e. when an intervention occurs) is potentially important information about third party interventions that was not accounted for in the analyses of the occurrence of third party interventions in this study.

Second, there is the question of why do third party actors choose to intervene in a particular manner in one situation and choose to intervene in another manner in another, possibly similar, situation? In other words, what factors influence how a third party actor will intervene in an intrastate dispute? Similarly, why does one third party actor intervene in one manner and another third party actor intervene in another manner in the same dispute phase? For example, a particular third party actor might choose to offer to mediate between two parties to a domestic political dispute, but another third party actor might choose to provide military assistance to one of the parties in the same domestic political dispute. Given the wide range of intervention options available to decision-makers, it is possible that third

party actors are generally motivated to intervene in particular ways under particular circumstances.

Finally, there is the question of what accounts for the success or failure of a third party intervention? One of the limitations of previous studies of the effectiveness of third party interventions has been the problem of analyzing the effectiveness of interventions that have occurred without information about why third party actors chose to intervene in the first place. Now that we have some additional information regarding the factors that influence the occurrence of third party interventions in domestic political disputes, it is possible to analyze the factors hypothesized to influence the effectiveness of third party interventions. This question is particularly important to policymakers in the US and other countries interested in developing intervention strategies that maximize the likelihood of success and minimize the likelihood of failure.

APPENDIX A

INDEPENDENT STATES IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

State	Dates of Independence	Former Status	Type of Government
Afghanistan	August 19, 1919-present	Part of the British sphere of influence	Monarchy (August 1919-July 1973); Republic (July 1973-present)
Albania	November 28, 1912-present	Part of the Ottoman Empire	Republic (Nov. 1912-Aug. 1928); Monarchy (Sept. 1928-April 1939); Republic (Jan. 1946-present)
Algeria	July 5, 1962-present	Colony of France	Republic
Angola	November 11, 1975-present	Colony of Portugal (Portuguese Angola)	Republic
Antigua and Barbuda	November 1, 1981-present	Colony of Britain	Commonwealth
Argentina	July 9, 1816-present	Colony of Spain	Republic
Armenia	May 26, 1918-December 30, 1922; September 23, 1991-present	Part of the Ottoman Empire and Russia Empire; Part of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics	Republic
Australia	January 1, 1901-present	Colony of Britain	Commonwealth
Austrian-Hungarian Empire	1867-November 11, 1918		Monarchy
Austria	November 12, 1918-present	Part of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire	Republic
Azerbaijan	May 28, 1918-April 28, 1920; August 30, 1991-present	Part of the Russian Empire; Part of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics	Republic
Bahamas	July 10, 1973-present	Colony of Britain (British Bahamas)	Commonwealth
Bahrain	August 15, 1971-present	Colony of Britain	Monarchy

Bangladesh	December 16, 1971-present	Part of Pakistan (East Pakistan)	Republic
Barbados	November 30, 1966-present	Colony of Britain	Commonwealth
Belarus	January 1, 1919-December 30, 1922; August 25, 1991-present	Part of the Russian Empire; Part of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics	Republic
Belgium	October 4, 1830-present	Part of the Netherlands	Constitutional Monarchy
Belize	September 21, 1981-present	Colony of Britain (British Honduras)	Commonwealth
Benin (Dahomey)	August 1, 1960-present	Colony of France	Republic
Bhutan	August 8, 1949-present	Part of British India	Monarchy
Bolivia	August 6, 1825-present	Colony of Spain	Republic
Bosnia and Herzegovina	March 3, 1992-present	Part of Yugoslavia	Republic
Botswana	September 30, 1966-present	Colony of Britain (British Bechuanaland)	Republic
Brazil	September 7, 1822-present	Colony of Portugal	Monarchy (Sept. 1822-Nov. 1889); Republic (Nov. 1889-present)
Brunei	January 1, 1984-present	Colony of Britain	Constitutional Monarchy (Sultanate)
Bulgaria	September 22, 1908-present	Part of the Ottoman Empire	Monarchy (Sept. 1908-Sept. 1946); Republic (Sept. 1946-present)
Burkina Faso (Upper Volta)	August 5, 1960-present	Colony of France	Republic
Burundi	July 1, 1962-present	United Nations Trusteeship under Belgian Administration	Republic
Cambodia (Kampuchea)	December 29, 1954-present	Colony of France (French Indochina-Cambodia)	Monarchy (Dec. 1954-March 1970); Republic (March 1970-present)

Cameroon	January 1, 1960-present	United Nations Trusteeship under French Administration (French Cameroon)	Republic
Canada	July 1, 1867-present	Colony of Britain	Commonwealth
Cape Verde Islands	July 5, 1975-present	Colony of Portugal	Republic
Central African Republic	August 13, 1960-present	Colony of France	Republic (Aug. 1960-Dec. 1976); Monarchy (Dec. 1976-Sept. 1979); Republic (Sept. 1979-present)
Chad	August 11, 1960-present	Colony of France	Republic
Chile	September 18, 1810-present	Colony of Spain	Republic
China	February 12, 1912-present	Chinese Empire (*Ch'ing Dynasty*)	Republic
Colombia	July 20, 1810-present	Colony of Spain	Republic
Comoros	December 31, 1975-present	Colony of France	Republic
Congo-Brazzaville	August 15, 1960-present	Colony of France	Republic
Congo-Kinshasa (Zaire)	June 30, 1960-present	Colony of Belgium (Belgian Congo)	Republic
Costa Rica	September 15, 1821-present	Colony of Spain	Republic
Croatia	June 25, 1991-present	Part of Yugoslavia	Republic
Cuba	May 20, 1902-present	Colony of Spain (Occupied by the US since December 10, 1898)	Republic
Cyprus	August 16, 1960-present	Colony of Britain (British Cyprus)	Republic
Czechoslovakia	October 28, 1918-December 31, 1992	Part of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire	Republic
Czech Republic	January 1, 1993-present	Part of Czechoslovakia	Republic
Denmark	1849-present		Constitutional Monarchy
Djibouti	June 27, 1977-present	Colony of France (French Territory of the Afars and Issas)	Republic

Dominican Republic	February 27, 1844-present	Part of Haiti	Republic
Ecuador	May 24, 1822-present	Colony of Spain	Republic
Egypt (United Arab Republic)	March 15, 1922-present	British Protectorate	Monarchy (March 1922-July 1952); Republic (July 1952-present)
El Salvador	September 15, 1821-present	Colony of Spain	Republic
Equatorial Guinea	October 12, 1968-present	Colony of Spain (Spanish Guinea)	Republic
Eritrea	May 24, 1993-present	Part of Ethiopia	Republic
Estonia	February 2, 1920-August 6, 1940; September 6, 1991-present	Part of the Russian Empire; Part of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics	Republic
Ethiopia (Abyssinia)			Monarchy (until Sept. 1974); Republic (Sept. 1974-present)
Fiji	October 10, 1970-present	Colony of Britain	Commonwealth (Oct. 1970-Oct. 1987); Republic (Oct. 1987-present)
Finland	December 6, 1917-present	Part of the Russian Empire	Republic
France	September 1792-present		Republic (Sept. 1792-1804); Monarchy (1804-Feb. 1848); Republic (Feb. 1848-1852); Monarchy (1852-Sept. 1870); Republic (Sept. 1870-present)
Gabon	August 17, 1960-present	Colony of France	Republic
Gambia	February 18, 1965-present	Colony of Britain	Commonwealth (Feb. 1965-April 1970); Republic (April 1970-present)
Georgia	April 9, 1991-present	Part of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics	Republic

Germany	January 18, 1871-May 7, 1945; October 3, 1990-present	Prussia, Hanover, Bavaria, Saxony, and other German territories	Monarchy (Jan. 1871-Nov. 1918); Republic (Nov. 1918-May 1945, Oct. 1990-present)
Germany (East)	October 7, 1949-October 2, 1990	Part of Germany	Republic
Germany (West)	May 23, 1949-October 2, 1990	Part of Germany	Republic
Ghana	March 6, 1957-present	Colony of Britain (British Gold Coast)	Commonwealth (March 1957-June 1960); Republic (July 1960-present)
Greece	1829-present	Part of the Ottoman Empire	Monarchy (1830-April 1924); Republic (May 1924-Nov. 1935): Monarchy (Nov. 1935-May 1973); Republic (June 1973-present)
Grenada	February 7, 1974-present	Colony of Britain	Commonwealth (Feb. 1974-present)
Guatemala	September 15, 1821-present	Colony of Spain	Republic
Guinea	October 2, 1958-present	Colony of France (French Guinea)	Republic
Guinea-Bissau	September 10, 1974-present	Colony of Portugal (Portuguese Guinea)	Republic
Guyana	May 26, 1966-present	Colony of Britain (British Guiana)	Commonwealth (May 1966-Feb. 1970); Republic (Feb. 1970-present)
Haiti	January 1, 1804-present	Colony of France	Republic
Honduras	September 15, 1821-present	Colony of Spain	Republic
Hungary	October 17, 1918-present	Part of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire	Monarchy (Oct. 1918-Jan. 1946); Republic (Feb. 1946-present)
Iceland	June 17, 1944-present	Part of Denmark	Republic

India	August 15, 1947-present	Colony of Britain	Commonwealth (Aug. 1947-Jan. 1950); Republic (Jan. 1950-present)
Indonesia	December 27, 1949-present	Colony of the Netherlands (Dutch East Indies)	Republic
Iran (Persia)			Monarchy (through March 1979); Republic (April 1979-present)
Iraq	October 3, 1932-present	Part of the Ottoman Empire; League of Nations Mandate under British Administration (May 1, 1920-October 2, 1932)	Monarchy (Oct. 1932 -July 1958); Republic (July 1958-present)
Ireland (Irish Free State)	January 15, 1922-present	Part of the United Kingdom	Republic
Israel	May 14, 1948-present	League of Nations Mandate under British Administration	Republic
Italy	March 17, 1861-present		Monarchy (March 1861-June 1946); Republic (June 1946-present)
Ivory Coast (Cote d'Ivoire)	August 7, 1960-present	Colony of France	Republic
Jamaica	August 6, 1962-present	Colony of Britain	Commonwealth
Japan	660 B.C. - present		Constitutional Monarchy
Jordan (Transjordan)	May 25, 1946-present	League of Nations Mandate under British Administration	Constitutional Monarchy
Kazakhstan	December 16, 1991-present	Part of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics	Republic
Kenya	December 12, 1963-present	Colony of Britain (British East Africa)	Republic

Korea (North)	September 9, 1948-present	Part of Japanese Protectorate (July 25, 1907-August 14, 1945); Soviet Union occupation (August 15, 1945-September 8, 1948)	Republic
Korea (South)	August 15, 1948-present	Part of Japanese Protectorate (July 25, 1907-August 14, 1945); United States occupation (August 15, 1945-August 14, 1948)	Republic
Kuwait	June 19, 1961-present	Colony of Britain	Monarchy
Kyrgyzstan	August 31, 1991-present	Part of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics	Republic
Laos	December 29, 1954-present	Colony of France (French Indochina-Laos)	Republic
Latvia	August 11, 1920-August 6, 1940; September 6, 1991-present	Part of the Russian Empire; Part of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics	Republic
Lebanon	November 22, 1943-present	League of Nations Mandate under French Administration	Republic
Lesotho	October 4, 1966-present	Colony of Britain (Basutoland)	Constitutional Monarchy
Liberia	July 26, 1847-present		Republic
Libya	December 24, 1951-present	Part of the Ottoman Empire; Colony of Italy (November 5, 1911-December 24, 1951)	Monarchy (Dec. 1951-Sept. 1969); Jamahiriya (Sept. 1969-present)
Liechtenstein	January 23, 1719-present		Constitutional Monarchy (Jan. 1719-present)
Lithuania	July 20, 1920-August 6, 1940; September 6, 1991-present	Part of the Russian Empire; Part of the Union of Socialist Republics	Republic
Luxembourg	1839-present	Part of the Netherlands (1815-1839)	Constitutional Monarchy
Macedonia	November 20, 1991-present	Part of Yugoslavia	Republic

Madagascar (Malagasy)	June 26, 1960-present	Colony of France	Republic
Malawi	July 6, 1964-present	Colony of Britain (Nyasaland)	Republic
Malaysia	August 31, 1957-present	Colony of Britain	Constitutional Monarchy
Maldives	July 26, 1965-present	Colony of Britain	Republic
Mali	September 22, 1960-present	Colony of France (French Sudan)	Republic
Malta	September 21, 1964-present	Colony of Britain	Republic
Mauritania	November 28, 1960-present	Colony of France	Republic
Mauritius	March 12, 1968-present	Colony of Britain	Commonwealth
Mexico	September 16, 1810-present	Colony of Spain	Republic
Moldova	August 27, 1991-present	Part of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics	Republic
Monaco	1419-present		Constitutional Monarchy
Mongolia	January 5, 1946-present	Part of China	Republic
Morocco	March 2, 1956-present	Colony of France (French Morocco)	Constitutional Monarchy
Mozambique	June 25, 1975-present	Colony of Portugal	Republic
Namibia	March 21, 1990-present	League of Nations Mandate under South African Administration (Southwest Africa)	Republic
Nepal	1768-present		Monarchy
Netherlands	1579-present	Part of the Spanish Empire	Constitutional Monarchy
New Zealand	September 26, 1907-present	Colony of Britain	Commonwealth
Nicaragua	September 15, 1821-present	Colony of Spain	Republic
Niger	August 3, 1960-present	Colony of France	Republic
Nigeria	October 1, 1960-present	Colony of Britain	Republic

Norway	October 26, 1905-present	Part of Sweden	Constitutional Monarchy
Oman (Sultanate of Muscat and Oman)	1650-present	Part of the Portuguese sphere of influence	Monarchy
Ottoman Empire	1326-October 28, 1923		Monarchy
Pakistan	August 14, 1947-present	Part of British India	Republic
Panama	November 3, 1903-present	Part of Colombia (November 28, 1821-November 2, 1903)	Republic
Papua New Guinea	September 16, 1975-present	United Nations Trusteeship under Australian Administration	Commonwealth
Paraguay	May 14, 1811-present	Colony of Spain	Republic
Peru	July 28, 1821-present	Colony of Spain	Republic
Philippines	July 4, 1946-present	Colony of the United States	Republic
Poland	November 11, 1918-present	Part of the Austrian-Hungarian, German, and Russian Empires	Republic
Portugal	1140-present		Monarchy (prior to Oct. 1910); Republic (Oct. 1910-present)
Qatar	September 3, 1971-present	Colony of Britain	Monarchy
Rhodesia (Zimbabwe)	April 18, 1980-present	Colony of Britain Southern Rhodesia)	Republic
Romania	1881-present	Part of the Ottoman Empire	Monarchy (1881-April 1948); Republic (April 1948-present)
Russia	1613-December 29, 1922; December 25, 1991-present	Part of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (December 30, 1922-December 24, 1991)	Monarchy (*Romanov Dynasty*, 1613-March 1917); Republic (Dec. 25, 1991-present)
Rwanda	July 1, 1962-present	United Nations Trusteeship under Belgian Administration	Republic
Saint Kitts and Nevis	September 19, 1983-present	Colony of Britain	Commonwealth

Saint Lucia	February 22, 1979-present	Colony of Britain	Commonwealth
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	October 27, 1979-present	Colony of Britain	Commonwealth
San Marino	301-present		Republic
Sao Tome and Principe	July 12, 1975-present	Colony of Portugal	Republic
Saudi Arabia	September 23, 1932-present		Monarchy
Senegal	August 20, 1960-present	Colony of France	Republic
Seychelles	June 29, 1976-present	Colony of Britain	Republic
Sierra Leone	April 27, 1961-present	Colony of Britain	Commonwealth (April 1961-April 1971); Republic (April 1971-present)
Singapore	August 9, 1965-present	Part of Malaysia	Republic
Slovakia	January 1, 1993-present	Part of Czechoslovakia	Republic
Slovenia	January 15, 1992-present	Part of Yugoslavia	Republic
Solomon Islands	July 7, 1978-present	Colony of Britain (British Solomon Islands)	Commonwealth
Somalia	July 1, 1960-present	Colony of Britain (British Somaliland) and Italy (Italian Somaliland)	Republic
South Africa	May 31, 1910-present	Colony of Britain	Republic
Spain	1492-present		Monarchy (1492-Dec. 1931); Republic (Dec. 1931-July 1947); Monarchy (July 1947-present)
Sri Lanka (Ceylon)	February 4, 1948-present	Colony of Britain	Republic
Sudan	January 1, 1956-present	Protectorate of Britain and Egypt (September 2, 1898-December 31, 1956)	Republic
Suriname	November 25, 1975-present	Colony of the Netherlands (Dutch Guiana)	Republic

Swaziland	September 6, 1968-present	Colony of Britain	Monarchy
Sweden	June 6, 1809-present		Constitutional Monarchy
Switzerland	August 1, 1291-present		Republic
Syria	April 17, 1946-present	League of Nations Mandate under French Administration	Republic
Tajikistan	September 9, 1991-present	Part of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics	Republic
Tanzania (Tanganyika and Zanzibar)	December 9, 1961-present	Tanzania was a United Nations Trusteeship under British Administration until December 9, 1961; Zanzibar was a colony of Britain until December 10, 1963.	Republic
Thailand (Siam)	1238-present		Monarchy
Togo	April 27, 1960-present	United Nations Trusteeship under French Administration	Republic
Tonga	June 4, 1970-present	Colony of Britain	Constitutional Monarchy
Trinidad and Tobago	August 31, 1962-present	Colony of Britain	Republic
Tunisia	March 20, 1956-present	Colony of France	Republic
Turkey	October 29, 1923-present	Part of the Ottoman Empire	Republic
Turkmenistan	October 27, 1991-present	Part of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics	Republic
Uganda	October 9, 1962-present	Colony of Britain	Republic
Ukraine	August 24, 1991-present	Part of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics	Republic
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR)	December 30, 1922-December 24, 1991	Russian Empire	
United Arab Emirates	December 2, 1971-present	Colony of Britain	

United Kingdom (*United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland*)	January 1, 1801-present	Britain, Scotland, Wales, and Ireland	Monarchy
United States of America (USA)	July 4, 1776-present	Colony of Britain	Republic
Uruguay	August 25, 1828-present	Colony of Spain	Republic
Uzbekistan	August 31, 1991-present	Part of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics	Republic
Vanuatu	July 30, 1980-present	Colony of Britain and France (New Hebrides)	Republic
Vatican City (Holy See)	February 11, 1929-present	Part of Italy	
Venezuela	July 5, 1811-present	Colony of Spain	Republic
Vietnam	May 1, 1975-present	North Vietnam and South Vietnam	Republic
Vietnam (North)	December 29, 1954-April 30, 1975	Colony of France (French Indochina-Vietnam)	Republic
Vietnam (South)	December 29, 1954-April 30, 1975	Colony of France (French Indochina-Vietnam)	Republic
Western Samoa	January 1, 1962-present	United Nations Trusteeship under New Zealand Administration	Constitutional Monarchy
Yemen	May 22, 1990-present	North Yemen and South Yemen	Republic
Yemen (North)	November 1918-May 22, 1990	Part of the Ottoman Empire	Monarchy
Yemen (South)	November 30, 1967-May 22, 1990	Colony of Britain (British-South Arabian Federation)	Republic
Yugoslavia (*Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes*)	December 1, 1918-present	Part of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire	Monarchy (Dec. 1918-Nov. 1945); Republic (Nov. 1945-present)
Zambia	October 24, 1964-present	Colony of Britain (Northern Rhodesia)	Republic

APPENDIX B

CASES OF INTRASTATE DISPUTES

Location	Dates	Dispute Type	Fatalities(1)	Refugees/IDPs(2)	Outcome(3)
1. UK/ South Africa	1880-1910	Nat. Lib.	2,500		Independence.
2. Germany/ S.W. Africa	1884-1920	Nat. Lib.	77,000		S. Africa granted LON mandate.
3. UK/India	1885-1947	Nat. Lib.	11,000		Independence.
4. United States/ Philippines	1898-1946	Nat. Lib,	220,000		Independence.
5. China	1898-1912	Civ/Pol			Manchu Dynasty overthrown.
6. Venezuela	1899-1948	Mil/Pol	15,000	30,00)	Constitution; elections.
7. UK/Ireland	1902-1922	Nat. Lib.	1,900		Ireland granted dominion status.
8. Spain	1902-1939	Civ/Pol	600,000	440,000	Nationalists gain control of govt.
9. Kingdom of Najd-Hijaz/ Saudi Arabia	1902-1932	Civ/Pol	10,000	50,000	Wahhabi tribesmen forced the abdication of Hussein ibn Ali of the Hashemite clan.
10. Dominican Republic	1902-1930	Civ/Pol	1,500		President Vasquez deposed in coup.
11. Cuba	1902-1952	Civ/Pol	500		President Socarras deposed in coup.
12. Russia	1903-1922	Civ/Pol	26 million	1 million	Czar Nicholas II abdicated; Bolsheviks defeat opposition.
13. Guatemala	1903-1921	Civ/Pol	100		President Herrera deposed in coup.
14. Uruguay	1903-1919	Civ/Pol	1,000		Constitution; elections.
15. Panama	1903-1932	Civ/Pol	100		Elections.
16. Honduras	1903-1920	Civ/Pol	1,000		Elections.
17. Romania	1904-1948	Civ/Pol	315,000		Communists gain control of govt.
18. Paraguay	1904-1924	Civ/Pol	1,000		Elections.
19. Russia/Finland	1904-1920	Nat. Lib.	27,300		Independence.
20. Ottoman Empire/Albania	1905-1913	Nat. Lib.	10,000		Independence.
21. Russia/ Lithuania	1905-1920	Nat. Lib.			Independence.
22. Russia/Estonia	1905-1920	Nat. Lib.			Independence.
23. Russia/Latvia	1905-1920	Nat. Lib.			Independence.

Location	Dates	Dispute Type	Fatalities	Refugees/IDPs	Outcome
24. Iran	1905-1926	Civ/Pol	5,000		Reza Khan deposed Shah Ahmad of the Qajar Dynasty.
25. Germany/ East Africa	1905-1920	Nat. Lib.	340,000		Britain granted LON mandate over East Africa.
26. Ecuador	1905-1948	Civ/Pol	1,500		Constitution; elections.
27. Portugal	1906-1933	Civ/Pol	2,000		Constitution.
28. Japan/Korea	1907-1948	Nat. Lib.	10,000		Independence.
29. UK/Egypt	1907-1922	Nat. Lib.	1,000		Britain terminated protectorate.
30. Ottoman Empire/Turkey	1907-1923	Civ/Pol	1 million	1 million	Nationalists gained control of govt.
31. Mexico	1907-1946	Civ/Pol	390,000		Elections.
32. Bulgaria	1908-1947	Civ/Pol	25,000		Communists gained control of govt.
33. Haiti	1908-1935	Civ/Pol	10,600		Constitution; elections.
34. Greece	1909-1941	Civ/Pol	100		Govt. surrendered to German and Italian troops.
35. Spain (Berbers)	1909-1927	Sec/Sep	95,000		Berber rebellion suppressed.
36. Nicaragua	1909-1936	Civ/Pol	1,025		President Juan Sacasa deposed in coup.
37. South Africa	1910-1924	Civ/Pol	875		Elections.
38. China/ Mongolia	1911-1946	Nat. Lib.			Independence.
39. China	1912-1949	Civ/Pol	6.5 million		Communists gained control of govt.
40. Italy/Libya	1912-1951	Nat. Lib.	125,000	100,000	Independence.
41. Muscat and Oman	1912-1920	Civ/Pol	350		Negotiated settlement.
42. Peru	1912-1948	Civ/Pol	1,750		President Bustamente deposed in coup.
43. Albania	1913-1955	Civ/Pol	100,000	330,000	Communists gained control of govt.
44. Austria-Hungary/ Czechoslovakia	1914-1918	Nat. Lib.			Independence.
45. Costa Rica	1914-1920	Civ/Pol	100		Constitution; elections.
46. UK/ Palestine	1917-1948	Nat. Lib.	6,300	750,000	Independence.
47. Bolivia	1917-1934	Civ/Pol	500		President Salamanca deposed in coup.

Location	Dates	Dispute Type	Fatalities	Refugees/IDPs	Outcome
48. Poland	1918-1945	Civ/Pol	3.2 million	1.3 million	Communists gained control of govt.
49. Germany	1918-1949	Civ/Pol	210,000	400,000	Constitution; elections.
50. Hungary	1918-1945	Civ/Pol	465,000		Communists gained control of govt.
51. Austria	1918-1955	Civ/Pol	300		Austria regained sovereignty from Allied occupation.
52. Yugoslavia	1918-1946	Civ/Pol	1.8 million		Communists gained control of govt.
53. Czechoslovakia	1918-1948	Civ/Pol	195,000	1.5 million	Communists gained control of govt.
54. Italy	1919-1948	Civ/Pol	11,300		Constitution; elections.
55. Afghanistan	1919-1933	Civ/Pol	30,100		Constitution.
56. France/Syria	1919-1946	Nat. Lib.	15,000		Independence.
57. UK/Burma	1920-1948	Nat. Lib.	55,000		Independence.
58. UK/Iraq	1920-1932	Nat. Lib.	9,000		Independence.
59. France/Tunisia	1920-1956	Nat. Lib.	3,000		Independence.
60. Estonia	1920-1940	Civ/Pol	100		Estonia annexed by Soviet Union.
61. Lithuania	1920-1940	Civ/Pol			Lithuania annexed by Soviet Union.
62. Latvia	1920-1940	Civ/Pol			Latvia annexed by Soviet Union.
63. Guatemala	1921-1945	Mil/Pol	100		Constitution; elections.
64. Ireland	1922-1949	Civ/Pol	5,000		Republic of Ireland proclaimed.
65. UK-Egypt/ Sudan	1922-1956	Nat. Lib.	100		Independence.
66. Egypt	1922-1952	Civ/Pol	100		King Farouk deposed in coup.
67. Turkey (Kurds)	1922-1946	Sec/Sep	250,000	1.5 million	Kurdish rebellions suppressed.
68. Brazil	1922-1946	Civ/Pol	9,000		Constitution; elections.
69. Honduras	1922-1963	Civ/Pol	300		President Morales deposed in coup.
70. Turkey	1923-1950	Civ/Pol	700		Elections.
71. USSR	1924-1958	Civ/Pol			Nikita Khrushchev appointed as prime minister.
72. Chile	1924-1932	Mil/Pol	100		Elections.
73. Paraguay	1928-1954	Civ/Pol	4,000		President Chavez deposed in coup.

Location	Dates	Dispute Type	Fatalities	Refugees/IDPs	Outcome
74. Argentina	1928-1943	Civ/Pol	100		President Castillo deposed in coup.
75. Japan	1930-1952	Civ/Pol			Constitution; elections.
76. France/Morocco	1930-1956	Nat. Lib.	3,000		Independence.
77. Dom. Republic	1930-1966	Mil/Pol	4,500	500,000	Elections.
78. El Salvador	1931-1950	Mil/Pol	10,200		Elections.
79. Uruguay	1931-1952	Civ/Pol	100		Constitutional amendment.
80. Siam/Thailand	1932-1947	Civ/Pol			Prime Minister Luang Dhamrong Nawasasat deposed in coup.
81. Iraq (Kurds)	1932-1970	Sec/Sep	60,000	300,000	Govt. and rebels negotiate settlement.
82. Iraq	1932-1958	Civ/Pol	1,180		King Faisal II deposed in coup.
83. Chile	1932-1973	Civ/Pol	5,150		President Allende deposed in coup.
84. Portugal	1933-1976	Civ/Pol	100		Constitution; elections.
85. US/Puerto Rico	1933-1993	Nat. Lib.	100		Puerto Ricans for commonwealth status.
86. Bolivia	1934-1947	Mil/Pol	300		Elections.
87. France	1935-1959	Civ/Pol	165,000	200,000	Constitution; elections.
88. Nicaragua	1936-1979	Mil/Pol	30,200		Sandinistas gained control of govt.
89. Spain	1939-1978	Mil/Pol	100		Constitution; elections.
90. France/Algeria	1939-1962	Nat. Lib.	185,000	200,000	Independence.
91. USSR/Estonia	1940-1991	Nat. Lib.	10,000	50,000	Independence.
92. USSR/Latvia	1940-1991	Nat/ Lib.	5,000	30,000	Independence.
93. USSR/ Lithuania	1940-1991	Nat. Lib.	360,000	420,000	Independence.
94. Panama	1940-1968	Civ/Pol	100		President Arias deposed in coup.
95. France/Vietnam	1941-1954	Nat. Lib.	600,000	200,000	Independence.
96. Iran	1941-1967	Civ/Pol	1,500		Elections; Mohammed Reza Pahlavi formally crowned as Shah.
97. Haiti	1941-1988	Civ/Pol	2,500		President Manigat deposed in coup.
98. Ethiopia	1942-1974	Civ/Pol	500		Emperor Haile Selassie overthrown.
99. Colombia	1942-1962	Civ/Pol	300,000	50,000	Elections.

Location	Dates	Dispute Type	Fatalities	Refugees/IDPs	Outcome
100. Lebanon	1943-1964	Civ/Pol	2,000		Elections.
101. Iran (Kurds)	1943-present	Sec/Sep	45,000	200,000	
102. Liberia	1943-1980	Civ/Pol	250		President Tolbert deposed in coup.
103. Argentina	1943-1958	Mil/Pol	4,300		Constitution; elections.
104. Greece	1944-1967	Civ/Pol	160,000	200,000	Prime Minister Kanellopoulos deposed in coup.
105. North Yemen	1944-1962	Civ/Pol	4,000		Iman Muhammad Badr deposed in coup.
106. Dutch East Indies	1945-1949	Nat. Lib.	21,000	215,000	Independence.
107. Poland	1945-1957	Civ/Pol	100		Political opposition to govt. suppressed.
108. France/ Cambodia	1945-1954	Nat. Lib.			Independence.
109. UK/Kenya	1945-1963	Nat. Lib.	14,525		Independence.
110. UK/ Gold Coast	1945-1957	Nat. Lib.	100		Independence.
111. Guatemala	1945-1954	Civ/Pol	1,000		President Arbenz deposed in coup.
112. Hungary	1946-1963	Civ/Pol	8,500	195,000	Anti-communist opposition defeated.
113. Nepal	1946-1963	Civ/Pol	200		Constitution.
114. Philippines	1946-1965	Civ/Pol	20,000		Election.
115. Jordan	1946-1976	Civ/Pol	3,600		Palestinian rebellion suppressed.
116. Syria	1946-1963	Civ/Pol	100		Prime Minister Azem deposed.
117. France/ Madagascar	1946-1960	Nat. Lib.	62,000		Independence.
118. Thailand	1947-1969	Mil/Pol			Constitution; elections.
119. India (Nagas)	1947-present	Sec/Sep	25,000		
120. India (Hyderabad)	1947-1949	Sec/Sep	2,200		Hyderabad rebellion suppressed.
121. Pakistan	1947-1958	Civ/Pol	100		President Mirza deposed in coup.
122. France/ Togoland	1947-1960	Nat. Lib.	100		Independence.
123. Bolivia	1947-1964	Civ/Pol	4,000		President Estenssoro deposed in coup.
124. Brazil	1947-1964	Civ/Pol	100		President Goulart deposed in coup.
125. Burma	1948-1962	Civ/Pol	1,000		Prime Minister U Nu deposed in coup.

Location	Dates	Dispute Type	Fatalities	Refugees/IDPs	Outcome
126. Burma (Karens)	1948-present	Sec/Sep	50,000	85,000	
127. Burma (Mons)	1948-1995	Sec/Sep		12,000	Negotiated settlement.
128. Malayan Federation	1948-1960	Civ/Pol	11,000		Communist rebellion suppressed.
129. Thailand (Muslims)	1948-present	Sec/Sep	1,000	5,000	
130. South Korea	1948-1961	Civ/Pol	300		Prime Minister Chang deposed.
131. Ceylon	1948-1972	Civ/Pol	1,400	11,500	Left-wing rebellion suppressed.
132. South Africa	1948-1994	Civ/Pol	20,000	40,000	Elections.
133. France-UK/ Cameroon	1948-1961	Nat. Lib.	2,775		Independence.
134. Venezuela	1948-1974	Civ/Pol.	1,000		Elections.
135. Costa Rica	1948-1962	Civ/Pol	2,750	1,000	Elections.
136. Peru	1948-1980	Mil/Pol	150		Constitution; elections.
137. Indonesia	1949-1966	Civ/Pol	290,000	800,000	President Sukarno deposed in coup.
138. Pakistan (Bengalis)	1949-1971	Sec/Sep	256,500	10 million	Independence.
139. France/Laos	1949-1954	Nat. Lib.			Independence.
140. China (Tibet)	1950-present	Sec/Sep	126,000	128,000	
141. France/ Ivory Coast	1950-1960	Nat. Lib.	100		Independence.
142. Ecuador	1950-1972	Civ/Pol	100		President Velasco deposed in coup.
143. El Salvador	1950-1960	Civ/Pol	100		President Lemus deposed in coup.
144. Libya	1951-1969	Civ/Pol			King Idris I deposed.
145. Egypt	1952-1970	Mil/Pol	100		Anwar Sadat elected president.
146. Cuba	1952-1959	Mil/Pol	8,000		Communists gain control of govt.
147. UK/Guyana	1953-1966	Nat. Lib.	125		Independence.
148. South Vietnam	1954-1975	Civ/Pol	3.5 million	8 million	Communists gain control of govt.
149. Laos	1954-1975	Civ/Pol	30,000	400,000	Communists gain control of govt.
150. Cambodia	1954-1975	Civ/Pol	250,000		Communists gain control of govt.
151. Oman	1954-1975	Civ/Pol	10,300		Left-wing rebellion suppressed.
152. Turkey	1954-1993	Civ/Pol	5,500		Elections.
153. UK/ Nyasaland	1954-1964	Nat. Lib.	100		Independence.

Location	Dates	Dispute Type	Fatalities	Refugees/IDPs	Outcome
154. Guatemala	1954-1986	Mil/Pol	15,000	100,000	Constitution; elections.
155. Paraguay	1954-1993	Mil/Pol	250		Constitution; elections.
156. United States	1954-1972	Civ/Pol	200		Elections.
157. UK/Cyprus	1955-1960	Nat. Lib.	600		Independence.
158. Sudan (Anya-Nya I)	1955-1972	Sec/Sep	500,000	1 million	Negotiated settlement.
159. Morocco	1956-1986	Civ/Pol	550		Elections.
160. Tunisia	1956-present	Civ/Pol	250		
161. Portugal/ Angola	1956-1975	Nat. Lib.	90,000		Independence.
162. Portugal/ Guinea	1956-1974	Nat. Lib.	15,000	56,000	Independence.
163. Ghana	1957-1972	Civ/Pol	100		Prime Minister Busia deposed in coup.
164. Pakistan	1958-1971	Mil/Pol	350		Elections.
165. Iraq	1958-present	Mil/Pol	43,500		
166. Sudan	1958-1964	Mil/Pol	100		General Ibboud re-signed as president.
167. Guinea	1958-1984	Civ/Pol		2 million	President Beuvogui deposed in coup.
168. Belgium/ Congo	1958-1960	Nat. Lib.	100		Independence.
169. Ethiopia (Eritrea)	1958-1993	Sec/Sep	575,000	450,000	Independence.
170. France/ Somaliland	1958-1977	Nat. Lib.	100	6,000	Independence.
171. Argentina	1958-1976	Civ/Pol	1,250		President Peron deposed in coup.
172. Spain (Basques)	1959-present	Sec/Sep	800		
173. UK/South Arabian Fed.	1959-1967	Nat. Lib.	4,250		Independence.
174. Spain/Guinea	1959-1968	Nat. Lib.			Independence.
175. Cuba	1959-present	Civ/Pol	1,000	400,000	
176. Cyprus	1960-present	Civ/Pol	5,750	265,000	
177. Chad	1960-1975	Civ/Pol	3,570		President Tombalbaye deposed in coup.
178. South Africa/ S.W. Africa	1960-1990	Nat. Lib.	25,000	40,000	Independence.
179. Congo-Kinshasa (Katanga)	1960-1964	Sec/Sep	100,000		Katangan rebellion suppressed.
180. Portugal/ Mozambique	1960-1975	Nat. Lib.	30,000		Independence.
181. Niger	1960-1974	Civ/Pol	100		President Dori deposed in coup.

Location	Dates	Dispute Type	Fatalities	Refugees/IDPs	Outcome
182. Niger (Tauregs)	1960-2000	Sec/Sep	400	15,500	Negotiated settlement.
183. Mali	1960-1968	Civ/Pol			President Keita deposed in coup.
184. Mali (Tauregs)	1960-1999	Sec/Sep	500	150,000	Negotiated settlement.
185. Gabon	1960-present	Civ/Pol	100		
186. Togo	1960-1967	Civ/Pol	100		President Grunitsky deposed in coup.
187. Somalia	1960-1969	Civ/Pol	100		Prime Minister Ibrahim Cigaal deposed in coup.
188. Dahomey/ Benin	1960-1972	Civ/Pol	100		President Ahomad-egbe deposed.
189. Upper Volta/ Burkina Faso	1960-1966	Civ/Pol			President Yameogo deposed in coup.
190. Congo-Brazzaville	1960-1968	Civ/Pol	100		President Massamba Debat deposed in coup.
191. Senegal	1960-present	Civ/Pol	100		
192. Nigeria	1960-1966	Civ/Pol	200		Prime Minister Tafawa Balewa deposed in coup.
193. El Salvador	1960-1995	Mil/Pol	75,000	1.5 million	Elections.
194. South Korea	1961-1988	Mil/Pol	250		Constitution; elections.
195. Burma (Kachins)	1961-1995	Sec/Sep			Negotiated settlement.
196. Tanganyika/ Zanzibar	1961-present	Civ/Pol	2,025		
197. Cameroon	1961-present	Civ/Pol	500		
198. Sierra Leone	1967-1992	Civ/Pol	100		President Momoh deposed in coup.
199. India (Mizos)	1962-1986	Sec/Sep	1,500		Peace agreement.
200. Burma	1962-present	Mil/Pol	6,200	16,000	
201. North Yemen	1962-1970	Mil/Pol	50,000		Royalist rebellion suppressed.
202. Rwanda	1962-1973	Civ/Pol	10,500	160,000	President Kayibanda deposed in coup.
203. Burundi	1962-1976	Civ/Pol	105,000	150,000	President Micombe-ro deposed in coup.
204. Uganda	1962-1971	Civ/Pol	2,000		President Obote deposed in coup.
205. Uruguay	1962-1985	Civ/Pol	350	400,000	Elections.
206. Trinidad and Tobago	1962-2000	Civ/Pol	100		
207. Pakistan (Baluchis)	1963-1977	Sec/Sep	8,600		Baluchi rebellion suppressed.

Location	Dates	Dispute Type	Fatalities	Refugees/IDPs	Outcome
208. Indonesia (Irian Jaya)	1963-present	Sec/Sep	20,000	12,000	
209. Syria	1963-1973	Mil/Pol	300		Constitution.
210. Honduras	1963-1982	Mil/Pol	100		Constitution; elections.
211. Canada (Quebec)	1963-1995	Sec/Sep			Referendum.
212. India	1964-present	Civ/Pol	20,000	130,000	
213. Israel/ Palestine	1964-present	Nat. Lib.	2,150	1 million	
214. Sudan	1964-1969	Civ/Pol	100		Prime Minister Mahgoub deposed.
215. UK/South Rhodesia	1964-1980	Nat. Lib.	30,000	1.1 million	Independence.
216. Brazil	1964-1990	Mil/Pol	5,000		Constitution; elections.
217. Bolivia	1964-1982	Mil/Pol	1,000	1,600	Elections.
218. Colombia	1964-present	Civ/Pol	112,000	1.4 million	
219. Afghanistan	1965-present	Civ/Pol	1.2 million	8 million	
220. Maldives	1965-1998	Civ/Pol	100		Elections.
221. Algeria	1965-1979	Mil/Pol	100		Colonel Bendjedid elected president.
222. Congo-Kinshasa	1965-1997	Mil/Pol	5,000	400,000	President Mobutu overthrown.
223. China	1966-1976	Civ/Pol	37,000		Mao Zedong died; Hua Guofeng designated as chair of the CPC.
224. Indonesia	1966-1998	Mil/Pol	1,600	5,000	President Suharto resigned; Abdurrahman Wahid elected president.
225. Nigeria	1966-1979	Mil/Pol	150	3,000	Elections.
226. Central African Republic	1966-1981	Mil/Pol	1,000		Emperor Bokassa overthrown; David Dacko elected president.
227. Upper Volta	1966-1978	Mil/Pol			Constitution; elections.
228. Malawi	1966-1999	Civ/Pol	100		Constitutional Amendment; elections.
229. Lesotho	1966-1986	Civ/Pol	290	770	Prime Minister Jonathan deposed.
230. Dominican Republic	1966-present	Civ/Pol	100		
231. Guyana	1966-present	Civ/Pol	100		

Location	Dates	Dispute Type	Fatalities	Refugees/IDPs	Outcome
232. India (Bodos)	1967-present	Sec/Sep	2,000		
233. Greece	1967-1975	Mil/Pol	100		Constitution; elections.
234. Czecho-slovakia	1967-1992	Civ/Pol	100	40,000	Czechoslovakia dissolved.
235. South Yemen	1967-1990	Civ/Pol	5,000	312,000	S. Yemen merged with N. Yemen.
236. Nigeria (Biafra)	1967-1970	Sec/Sep	620,000	3 million	Biafran rebellion suppressed.
237. Togo	1967-1992	Mil/Pol	100		Constitution; elections.
238. Malaysia	1968-1990	Civ/Pol	5,000		Neg. settlement.
239. Philippines	1968-present	Civ/Pol	50,000		
240. Philippines (Moros)	1968-1996	Sec/Sep	50,000	900,000	Negotiated settlement.
241. UK (N. Ireland)	1968-present	Sec/Sep	3,500		
242. Italy	1968-1990	Civ/Pol	400		Govt. suppressed rightist and leftist terrorist groups.
243. Lebanon	1968-1996	Civ/Pol	175,000	450,000	Neg. settlement; constitutional amendments.
244. Mali	1968-1992	Mil/Pol	250		Constitution; elections.
245. Eq. Guinea	1968-1979	Civ/Pol	50,000	100,000	President Nguema deposed in coup.
246. Swaziland	1968-present	Civ/Pol			
247. Congo-Brazzaville	1968-1992	Mil/Pol	250		Elections.
248. Panama	1968-1994	Mil/Pol	500		General Noriega overthrown; Ernesto Perez Ballasares elected president.
249. Mexico	1968-2000	Civ/Pol	2,000	5,200	Elections.
250. Thailand	1969-1992	Civ/Pol	10,000		Constitution; elections.
251. Libya	1969-present	Mil/Pol	1,000		
252. Sudan	1969-1986	Mil/Pol	21,000		Constitution; elections.
253. Somalia	1969-1991	Mil/Pol	25,000	2.8 million	President Siad Barre overthrown.
254. Yugoslavia (Croatia)	1970-1992	Sec/Sep	10,000	465,000	Independence.

Location	Dates	Dispute Type	Fatalities	Refugees/IDPs	Outcome
255. Poland	1970-1991	Civ/Pol	100		Constitutional amendments; Lech Walesa elected president.
256. North Yemen	1970-1974	Civ/Pol	100		President Iryani deposed in coup.
257. Egypt	1970-present	Civ/Pol	2,000		
258. Pakistan	1971-1977	Civ/Pol	300		Prime Minister Bhutto deposed.
259. Bangladesh	1971-1975	Civ/Pol	2,600		President Rahman assassinated.
260. Qatar	1971-present	Civ/Pol			
261. Bahrain	1971-present	Civ/Pol			
262. Uganda	1971-1980	Mil/Pol	250,000	150,000	President Amin overthrown.
263. Sri Lanka	1972-present	Civ/Pol	5,000		
264. Bangladesh (Chakmas)	1972-1997	Sec/Sep	24,000	55,000	Negotiated settlement.
265. Spain/ W. Sahara	1972-1976	Nat. Lib.			Morocco and Mauritania assume control of territory.
266. Iraq (Kurds)	1972-present	Sec/Sep	67,000	1.2 million	
267. Ghana	1972-1992	Mil/Pol	100		Constitution; elections.
268. Zambia	1972-present	Civ/Pol	100		
269. Madagascar	1972-1993	Mil/Pol	150		Constitution; elections.
270. Benin	1972-1991	Mil/Pol	200		Constitution; elections.
271. Ecuador	1972-1979	Mil/Pol	100		Constitution; elections.
272. Jamaica	1972-1997	Civ/Pol	1,200		Elections.
273. Syria	1973-present	Civ/Pol	20,000		
274. Rwanda	1973-1991	Mil/Pol	1,000	70,000	Neg. settlement; constitution.
275. Chile	1973-1990	Mil/Pol	25,000		Elections.
276. North Yemen	1974-1990	Mil/Pol			N. Yemen merged with South Yemen.
277. Turkey (Kurds)	1974-present	Sec/Sep	37,000	575,000	
278. Niger	1974-1993	Mil/Pol	100		Constitution; elections.
279. Ethiopia	1974-1991	Mil/Pol		1 million	Govt. overthrown by rebels.
280. Grenada	1974-1984	Civ/Pol	180		Elections.
281. Bangladesh	1975-1991	Mil/Pol	750		Elections.
282. Papua New Guinea (Bougainville)	1975-present	Sec/Sep	15,000	70,000	

Location	Dates	Dispute Type	Fatalities	Refugees/IDPs	Outcome
283. Cambodia	1975-1998	Civ/Pol	2.2 million	2.5 million	Constitution; elections.
284. Laos	1975-present	Civ/Pol		400,000	
285. Chad	1975-1990	Mil/Pol	15,000	250,000	President Habre overthrown.
286. Iran	1975-present	Civ/Pol	25,000		
287. Sao Tome and Principe	1975-1996	Civ/Pol	100		Elections.
288. Angola	1975-present	Civ/Pol	500,000	1.7 million	
289. Angola (Cabinda)	1975-present	Sec/Sep	100	20,000	
290. Comoros	1975-1996	Civ/Pol			Constitution; elections.
291. Mozambique	1975-present	Civ/Pol	1 million	5.7 million	
292. Suriname	1975-2000	Civ/Pol	100	5,000	Neg. settlement; elections.
293. Sri Lanka (Tamils)	1976-present	Sec/Sep	62,000	750,000	
294. Indonesia (Aceh)	1976-present	Sec/Sep	15,000	6,000	
295. Indonesia (East Timor)	1976-present	Sec/Sep	200,000	500,000	
296. France (Corsica)	1976-present	Sec/Sep			
297. Morocco (W. Sahara)	1976-present	Sec/Sep	10,000	80,000	
298. Seychelles	1976-1998	Civ/Pol			Constitution; elections.
299. Burundi	1976-1993	Mil/Pol	70,000	143,000	Constitution; elections.
300. Argentina	1976-1983	Mil/Pol	25,000		Elections.
301. Pakistan	1977-1988	Mil/Pol			President Zia killed in plane crash; Benazir Bhutto appointed prime minister.
302. India (Kashmir)	1977-present	Sec/Sep	30,000	350,000	
303. Djibouti	1977-present	Civ/Pol	500	100,000	
304. Mauritania	1978-present	Mil/Pol	100	60,000	
305. Kenya	1978-present	Civ/Pol	2,000	300,000	
306. Gambia	1978-1994	Civ/Pol	1,000		President Jawara deposed in coup.
307. Nepal	1979-present	Civ/Pol	1,500		
308. India (Assam)	1979-present	Sec/Sep	5,000		
309. Algeria	1979-1992	Civ/Pol	100		President Benjedid deposed in coup.
310. Eq. Guinea	1979-present	Mil/Pol	530		

Location	Dates	Dispute Type	Fatalities	Refugees/IDPs	Outcome
311. Nigeria	1979-1983	Civ/Pol	5,000		President Shagari deposed in coup.
312. Nicaragua	1979-1996	Civ/Pol	30,000		Elections.
313. Ecuador	1979-present	Civ/Pol			
314. Vanuatu	1980-1998	Civ/Pol		1,400	Elections.
315. China (Uighurs)	1980-present	Sec/Sep	250		
316. India (Tripura)	1980-present	Sec/Sep	10,000	200,000	
317. Liberia	1980-1999	Mil/Pol	175,000	700,000	Neg. settlement; elections.
318. Uganda	1980-present	Civ/Pol	50,000	412,000	
319. Guinea-Bissau	1980-2000	Mil/Pol	2,000	210,000	Elections.
320. Zimbabwe	1980-present	Civ/Pol	2,000		
321. Burkina Faso	1980-present	Mil/Pol	150		
322. Ivory Coast	1980-present	Civ/Pol	200		
323. Peru	1980-present	Civ/Pol	30,000	560,000	
324. Yugoslavia (Kosovo)	1981-present	Sec/Sep	3,500	1 million	
325. Somalia (Issaqs)	1981-present	Sec/Sep		350,000	
326. Central African Republic	1981-1993	Mil/Pol			Const. amendment; elections.
327. Antigua & Barbuda	1981-1999	Civ/Pol			Elections.
328. Senegal	1982-present	Sec/Sep	1,200	15,000	
329. Bolivia	1982-present	Civ/Pol			
330. Honduras	1982-1993	Civ/Pol	100		Elections.
331. Sudan (Anya-Nya II)	1983-present	Sec/Sep	1.2 million	4.4 million	
332. Nigeria	1983-1999	Mil/Pol	1,500		Elections.
333. Philippines (Moros)	1984-present	Sec/Sep	1,000	550,000	
334. Guinea	1984-present	Mil/Pol	1,500	250,000	
335. China	1986-1997	Civ/Pol	1,000		Deng Xiaoping died; Jiang Zemin chosen as president.
336. Lesotho	1986-1993	Mil/Pol			Elections.
337. Guatemala	1986-1999	Civ/Pol	100,000	1 million	Neg. settlement; elections.
338. Fiji	1987-present	Civ/Pol			
339. Pakistan	1988-present	Civ/Pol	3,000		
340. Hungary	1988-1998	Civ/Pol			Elections.
341. Haiti	1988-1994	Mil/Pol	4,100	5,000	Elections.
342. Venezuela	1988-2000	Civ/Pol	275		Constitution; elections.
343. Bulgaria	1989-1997	Civ/Pol			Constitution; elections.

Location	Dates	Dispute Type	Fatalities	Refugees/IDPs	Outcome
344. Georgia (Abkhazia)	1989-present	Sec/Sep	10,500	350,000	
345. Romania	1989-present	Civ/Pol	1,150		
346. Georgia (South Ossetia)	1989-present	Sec/Sep	5,000	45,000	
347. Sudan	1989-present	Mil/Pol	100		
348. Solomon Is.	1990-present	Civ/Pol	100	20,000	
349. Albania	1990-present	Civ/Pol	2,000	35,000	
350. Yugoslavia (Slovenia)	1990-1992	Sec/Sep	100		Independence.
351. Russia (Chechnya)	1990-present	Sec/Sep	58,000	230,000	
352. Moldova (Trans-Dnestr)	1990-present	Sec/Sep	1,000	107,000	
353. Yemen	1990-present	Civ/Pol			
354. Chad	1990-present	Civ/Pol		25,000	
355. Moldova	1991-present	Civ/Pol			
356. Georgia	1991-present	Civ/Pol			
357. Bangladesh	1991-present	Civ/Pol	100		
358. Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabakh)	1991-present	Sec/Sep	55,000	1.7 million	
359. Croatia	1991-present	Civ/Pol			
360. Croatia (Serbs)	1991-present	Sec/Sep	10,000	200,000	
361. Ukraine (Crimea)	1991-present	Sec/Sep		1,400	
362. Ukraine	1991-present	Civ/Pol			
363. Russia	1991-present	Civ/Pol	150		
364. Belarus	1991-present	Civ/Pol			
365. Azerbaijan	1991-present	Civ/Pol			
366. Uzbekistan	1991-present	Civ/Pol	100	18,000	
367. Kyrgyzstan	1991-present	Civ/Pol	100	7,500	
368. Latvia	1991-1998	Civ/Pol			Const. amendment; elections.
369. Estonia	1991-1999	Civ/Pol			Elections.
370. Lithuania	1991-1997	Civ/Pol			Elections.
371. Tajikistan	1991-present	Civ/Pol	50,000	880,000	
372. Armenia	1991-present	Civ/Pol			
373. Turkmenistan	1991-present	Civ/Pol			
374. Macedonia	1991-present	Civ/Pol			
375. Yugoslavia	1991-present	Civ/Pol			
376. Kazakhstan	1991-present	Civ/Pol		20,000	
377. Somalia	1991-present	Civ/Pol	350,000	2.8 million	
378. Ethiopia	1991-present	Civ/Pol			
379. Rwanda	1991-present	Civ/Pol	500,000	5.5 million	
380. Bosnia-Herzegovina	1992-present	Civ/Pol	150,000	1.8 million	
381. Algeria	1992-present	Mil/Pol	100,000	200,000	

Location	Dates	Dispute Type	Fatalities	Refugees/IDPs	Outcome
382. Sierra Leone	1992-1996	Mil/Pol	100		Elections.
383. Mali	1992-present	Civ/Pol			
384. Congo-Brazzaville	1992-present	Civ/Pol	15,000	270,000	
385. Togo	1992-present	Civ/Pol	250	300,000	
386. Ghana	1992-present	Civ/Pol	100		
387. Slovakia	1993-1999	Civ/Pol			Elections.
388. Czech Rep.	1993-1998	Civ/Pol			Elections.
389. Lesotho	1993-present	Civ/Pol	100	1,000	
390. Burundi	1993-present	Civ/Pol	200,000	1.7 million	
391. Central African Republic	1993-present	Civ/Pol	1,000	70,000	
392. Paraguay	1993-present	Civ/Pol			
393. Gambia	1994-present	Mil/Pol			
394. Haiti	1994-present	Civ/Pol			
395. Niger	1996-1999	Mil/Pol			Constitution; elections.
396. Sierra Leone	1996-present	Civ/Pol	50,000	800,000	
397. Comoros (Anjouan)	1997-present	Sec/Sep	100		
398. Democratic Republic of the Congo	1997-present	Civ/Pol		450,000	
399. Indonesia	1998-present	Civ/Pol		5,000	
400. Namibia (Caprivi)	1998-present	Sec/Sep			
401. Comoros	1999-present	Mil/Pol			
402. Guinea-Bissau	2000-present	Civ/Pol			

Abbreviations: Nat. Lib. = National Liberation; Civ/Pol = Civil/Political; Mil/Pol = Military/Political; Sec/Sep = Secessionist/Separatist.

Notes:

1. Figures on fatalities are approximations.
2. Figures on refugees/internally-displaced persons are approximations.
3. Outcomes are not provided for disputes that did not end prior to January 1, 2001.

APPENDIX C

STANDARD SOURCES OF INFORMATION

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APPENDIX D

MILITARY ALLIANCES

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1. *Austria-Hungary-Germany-Italy Treaty of Alliance (Triple Alliance)* - May 20, 1882 (renewed on February 20, 1887, May 6, 1891, June 28, 1902, July 1, 1907, December 5, 1912)-August 1914.

2. *Japan-United Kingdom Treaty of Alliance* - January 30, 1902 (renewed for ten years on August 12, 1905).

3. *Bulgaria-Serbia Treaty of Alliance* - March 13, 1912 (treaty supplemented by a military convention on May 12, 1912).

4. *Bulgaria-Greece Treaty of Alliance* - May 29, 1912 (treaty supplemented by a military convention on October 5, 1912).

5. *Greece-Serbia Treaty of Alliance* - June 1, 1913.

6. *Germany-Turkey Treaty of Alliance* - August 2, 1914-November 11, 1918.

7. *Czechoslovakia-Yugoslavia Mutual Defense Treaty (Little Entente)* - August 14, 1920 (renewed on June 13, 1926 and May 21, 1929)-August 23, 1938.

8. *France-Poland Treaty of Mutual Assistance and Military Cooperation* - February 22, 1921.

9. *Hungary-Poland-Romania Treaty of Alliance* - March 3, 1921 (renewed on March 26, 1926).

10. *Czechoslovakia-Romania Mutual Defense Treaty (Little Entente)* - April 23, 1921 (renewed on June 13, 1926 and May 21, 1929)-August 23, 1938.

11. *Romania-Yugoslavia Mutual Defense Treaty (Little Entente)* - June 7, 1921 (renewed on June 13, 1926 and May 21, 1929)-August 23, 1938.

12. *Czechoslovakia-France Mutual Defense Treaty* - January 25, 1924.

13. *Czechoslovakia-France-Poland Mutual Defense Treaty* - October 16, 1925.

14. *Afghanistan-Persia-Turkey Treaty of Mutual Security* - April 22, 1926.

15. *France-Romania Treaty of Alliance* - June 10, 1926.

16. *Albania-Italy Pact of Friendship and Security (Tirana Pact)* - November 27, 1926 (another pact signed on November 22, 1927).

17. *Greece-Romania-Turkey-Yugoslavia Mutual Assistance Agreement (Balkan Pact)* - February 9, 1934.

18. *Estonia-Latvia-Lithuania (Baltic Pact)* - September 12, 1934-June 15, 1940.

19. *France-Soviet Union Treaty of Alliance* - May 2, 1935.

20. *Czechoslovakia-Soviet Union Mutual Assistance Agreement* - May 16, 1935.

21. *Mongolia-Soviet Union Treaty of Mutual Assistance* - March 28, 1936-February 26, 1946.

22. *Egypt-United Kingdom Treaty* - August 27, 1936-October 27, 1951.

23. *Germany-Japan Treaty of Alliance (Anti-Communist Pact)* - November 25, 1936-July 25, 1943 (Italy joined the *Anti-Communist Pact* on November 6, 1937; Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania joined the *Tripartite Pact* on November 23-25, 1940).

24. *France-Greece-United Kingdom* - April 13, 1939.

25. *France-Romania-United Kingdom* - April 13, 1939.

26. *Germany-Italy Treaty of Alliance* (*Berlin-Rome Axis*) - May 22, 1939-July 25, 1943.

27. *France-Poland-United Kingdom Pact of Mutual Assistance* - August 25, 1939-1945.

28. *France-Turkey-United Kingdom Pact of Mutual Assistance* - October 19, 1939.

29. *Japan-Siam Treaty of Alliance* - December 21, 1941-1945.

30. *Soviet Union-United Kingdom Treaty of Mutual Assistance* - May 26, 1942-1945.

31. *Czechoslovakia-Soviet Union Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance* - December 12, 1943.

32. *Australia-New Zealand Agreement (ANZAC)* - January 21, 1944.

33. *France-Soviet Union Treaty of Mutual Assistance* - December 10, 1944-1945.

34. *Soviet Union-Yugoslavia Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance* - April 11, 1945-September 28, 1949.

35. *Poland-Soviet Union Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance* - April 21, 1945.

36. *Mongolia-Soviet Union Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance* - February 27, 1946-Janaury 14, 1966.

37. *Poland-Yugoslavia Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance* - March 18, 1946-September 9, 1949.

38. *Transjordan-United Kingdom Treaty of Alliance* - March 22, 1946 (new treaty of alliance signed on March 15, 1948)-March 13, 1957.

39. *Czechoslovakia-Yugoslavia Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance* - May 9, 1946-October 4, 1949.

40. *Albania-Soviet Union Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance* - July 9, 1946-November 12, 1949.

41. *Albania-Yugoslavia Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance* - July 10, 1946-November 13, 1949.

42. *France-United Kingdom Treaty of Alliance* - March 4, 1947.

43. *Czechoslovakia-Poland Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance* - March 10, 1947.

44. *Iraq-United Kingdom Treaty of Alliance* - April 14, 1947.

45. *Treaty of Rio (Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance)* - September 2, 1947 (went into effect on December 3, 1948)-present.

Signatories: Argentina, Bahamas (November 24, 1982-present), Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba (September 2, 1947-March 29, 1960), Dominican Republic, Ecuador (November 7, 1950-present), El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua (November 12, 1948-present), Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago (June 12, 1967-present), United States, Uruguay, Venezuela.

46. *Bulgaria-Yugoslavia Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance* - November 27, 1947-October 1, 1949.

47. *Hungary-Yugoslavia Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance* - December 8, 1947-September 30, 1949.

48. *Albania-Bulgaria Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance* - December 16, 1947.

49. *Romania-Yugoslavia Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance* - December 19, 1947-October 2, 1949.

50. *Bulgaria-Romania Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance* - January 16, 1948.

51. *Hungary-Romania Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance* - January 24, 1948.

52. *Romania-Soviet Union Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance* - February 4, 1948.

53. *Hungary-Soviet Union Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance* - February 18, 1948.

54. *Bulgaria-Soviet Union Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance* - March 18, 1948.

55. *Finland-Soviet Union Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance* - April 6, 1948 (renewed for 20 years on September 19, 1955).

56. *Bulgaria-Czechoslovakia Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance* - April 23, 1948.

57. *Bulgaria-Poland Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance* - May 29, 1948.

58. *Hungary-Poland Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance* - June 18, 1948.

59. *Bulgaria-Hungary Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance* - July 19, 1948.

60. *Czechoslovakia-Romania Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance* - July 21, 1948.

61. *Poland-Romania Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance* - January 26, 1949.

62. *North Atlantic Treaty Organization* - April 4, 1949-present.

Signatories: Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany (May 6, 1955), France, Greece (February 18, 1952), Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain (May 30, 1982), Turkey (February 18, 1952), United Kingdom, United States.

63. *Czechoslovakia-Hungary Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance* - April 16, 1949.

64. *South Korea-United States Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement* - January 26, 1950-September 30, 1953.

65. *China-Soviet Union Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance* - February 14, 1950.

66. *Iran-United States Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement* - May 23, 1950.

67. *League of Arab States (Joint Defence and Economic Cooperation Treaty)* - June 17, 1950-present.

Ratifications: Algeria (September 11, 1964-present), Bahrain (November 14, 1971-present), Egypt (November 22, 1951), Iraq (August 7, 1952-present), Jordan (March 31, 1952-present), Kuwait (August 12, 1961-present), Lebanon (December 24, 1952), Libya (September 11, 1964-present), Morocco (June 13, 1961-present), North Yemen (October 11, 1953), Palestinian Liberation Organization (November 21, 1976-present), Qatar (November 14, 1971-present), Saudi Arabia (August 19, 1952), Somalia (May 20, 1974-present), South Yemen (November 23, 1971-present), Sudan (September 11, 1964-present), Syria (October 31, 1951), Tunisia (October 11, 1953-present), United Arab Emirates (October 11, 1953-present).

68. *Portugal-United States Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement* - January 5, 1951-present.

69. *Australia-United States Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement* - February 1, 1951-present.

70. *Philippines-United States Mutual Defense Treaty* - August 30, 1951 (went into effect on August 27, 1952)-present.

71. *Australia-New Zealand-United States Pacific Security Treaty (ANZUS Pact)* - September 1, 1951 (went into effect on April 29, 1952)-present.

72. *Japan-United States Defense Pact* - September 8, 1951-March 7, 1954.

73. *Liberia-United States Mutual Defense Agreement* - November 19, 1951.

74. *New Zealand-United States Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement* - June 19, 1952.

75. *Israel-United States Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement* - July 23, 1952-present.

76. *Ethiopia-United States Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement* -May 22, 1953.

77. *Libya-United Kingdom Treaty of Friendship and Alliance* - July 29, 1953-March 31, 1970.

78. *Spain-United States Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement* - September 26, 1953-present.

79. *South Korea-United States Mutual Defense Treaty* - October 1, 1953 (went into effect on November 17, 1954)-present.

80. *Japan-United States Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement* - March 8, 1954-June 22, 1960.

81. *Pakistan-United States Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement* - May 19, 1954.

82. *Greece-Turkey-Yugoslavia (Balkan Pact)* - August 9, 1954.

83. *Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty (SEATO)* - September 8, 1954 (went into effect on February 9, 1955)- June 30, 1977.

Signatories: Australia, Britain, France, New Zealand, Pakistan (February 19, 1955-June 6, 1968), Philippines, Thailand.

84. *Taiwan-United States Mutual Security Treaty* - December 2, 1954 (went into effect on March 3, 1955)-present.

85. *Baghdad Pact* - February 18, 1955-March 24, 1959.

Signatories: Britain, Iran (April 5, 1955-March 24, 1959), Iraq, Pakistan, Turkey, United States (June 3, 1957-March 24, 1959).

86. *Western European Union* - May 6, 1955-present.

Signatories: Belgium, Federal Republic of Germany, France, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom.

87. *Warsaw Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance (Warsaw Pact)* - May 14, 1955-July 1, 1991.

Signatories: Albania (May 14, 1955-September 12, 1968), Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany (May 14, 1955-September 1990), Hungary, Poland, Romania, Soviet Union.

88. *Egypt-Saudi Arabia Mutual Defense Treaty* - October 27, 1955.

89. *Lebanon-Syria Mutual Defense Treaty* - January 13, 1956.

90. *Malaya-United Kingdom Treaty of Mutual Assistance and Defense* - October 12, 1957.

91. *Central Treaty Organization* (CENTO) - August 19, 1959-September 28, 1979.

Signatories: Britain, Iran, Pakistan, Turkey.

92. *Japan-United States Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security* - January 19, 1960 (went into effect on June 23, 1960)-present.

93. *Mali-France Cooperation and Mutual Defense Agreement* - June 22, 1960.

94. *France-Madagascar Cooperation and Mutual Defense Agreement* - June 27, 1960.

95. *Chad-France Cooperation and Mutual Defense Agreement* - August 11, 1960 (went into effect on May 1, 1964).

96. *Central African Republic-France Cooperation and Mutual Defense Agreement* - August 13, 1960.

97. *Congo-Brazzaville-France Cooperation and Mutual Defense Agreement* - August 15, 1960.

98. *France-Gabon Cooperation and Mutual Defense Agreement* - August 17, 1960.

99. *North Korea-Soviet Union Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance* - July 6, 1961-July 5, 1971.

100. *China-North Korea Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance* - July 11, 1961.

101. *Jordan-Saudi Arabia* - August 29, 1962.

102. *Ethiopia-Kenya Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement* - December 27, 1963.

103. *Gambia-Senegal Mutual Defense Agreement* - February 18, 1965.

104. *Mongolia-Soviet Union Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance* - January 15, 1966-January 14, 1986.

105. *Egypt-Syria Defense Pact* - November 4, 1966.

106. *Egypt-Jordan Defense Pact* - May 30, 1967 (Iraq joined the defense pact on June 4, 1967).

107. *Chad-Nigeria Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance* - December 11, 1972.

108. *Mali-Nigeria Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance* - March 3, 1973.

109. *Libya-Niger Defense and Security Agreement* - March 9, 1974.

110. *Libya - Togo Treaty of Mutual Defense and Assistance* - January 5, 1976.

111. *Egypt-Sudan Joint Defense Agreement* - July 15, 1976 (January 5, 1977) - June 1989.

112. *Djibouti-French Defense Agreement* - June 27, 1977.

113. *Guinea-Liberia Mutual Defense Treaty* - January 23, 1979.

114. *Chad-Libya Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Defense* - June 15, 1980 (ratified by the Libyan parliament on January 7, 1981) - June 7, 1982.

115. *Mozambique-Zimbabwe Mutual Defense and Security Agreement* - January 10, 1981.

116. *Sudan-United States Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement* - April 8, 1981.

117. *Economic Community of West African States* (ECOWAS) *Defense Protocol on Mutual Assistance* - May 30, 1981.

Signatories: Benin, Burkina Faso, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo.

118. *Bahrain-Saudi Arabia Mutual Security Agreement* - December 20, 1981.

119. *Lesotho-South Africa Mutual Security Agreement* - January 25, 1986.

120. *Gulf Cooperation Council* (GCC) *Mutual Defense Agreement* - December 31, 2000.

Signatories: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates.

Sources: Ference, Gregory C. 1994. *Chronology of 20th Century Eastern European History*; Langer, William L. 1972. *An Encyclopedia of World History*; Renegger, N. J. and John Campbell. 1995. *Treaties and Alliances of the World*, 6th edition.

APPENDIX E

ADVERSARIES

Adversaries of the United States: Russia/Soviet Union (January 12, 1918-October 1, 1920, April 15, 1946-March 13, 1986); China (February 16, 1951-August 22, 1972); Mexico (January 25, 1911-February 25, 1920); Cuba (January 14, 1959-present); North Korea (June 27, 1950-present); Libya (August 13, 1979-present); Germany (February 10, 1915-November 11, 1918, October 24, 1939-May 7, 1945); Iran (November 4, 1979-present); Egypt (April 19, 1956-February 13, 1968); Japan (December 12, 1937-August 14, 1945); Nicaragua (March 17, 1982-March 15, 1988); Iraq (May 17, 1987-present); Cambodia (March 19, 1964-March 18, 1970); North Vietnam (December 15, 1961-January 27, 1973); Hungary (June 5, 1942-January 1945); Bulgaria (June 5, 1942-September 1944); Romania (June 5, 1942-August 1944); Austria-Hungary (December 7, 1917-November 11, 1918); Italy (December 11, 1941-September 9, 1943); Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) (July 16, 1992-October 6, 2000); United Kingdom (July 15, 1902-October 20, 1903).

Adversaries of Russia/Soviet Union: United States (January 12, 1918-October 1, 1920, April 15, 1946-March 13, 1986); China (May 30, 1900-February 15, 1948, April 22, 1962-July 12, 1986); Japan (September 14, 1899-September 15, 1905, November 21, 1917-August 11, 1938, October 17, 1953-November 23, 1984); Ottoman Empire/Turkey (September 20, 1902-May 15, 1921, February 15, 1940-August 17, 1962); Iran (April 16, 1908-October 30, 1921, April 11, 1933-November 21, 1963, June 21, 1978-November 2, 1987); France (November 21, 1917-April 30, 1920, March 21, 1948-October 28, 1961); Germany (August 1, 1914-March 6, 1918, November 12, 1936-May 7, 1945); Sweden (April 30, 1943-September 24, 1964, October 22, 1981-June 15, 1988); Norway (January 30, 1956-April 14, 1957, June 29, 1978-September 13, 1987); Italy (June 22, 1941-September 8, 1943); Poland (November 11, 1918-November 18, 1920, September 23, 1938-June 1941); West Germany (February 14, 1962-September 16, 1964); Finland (May 26, 1919-October 14, 1920, October 8, 1939-August 27, 1963); Austria-Hungary (August 6, 1914-December 15, 1917); Bulgaria (June 22, 1941-August 26, 1944); Hungary (June 27, 1941-January 20, 1945); Romania (June 22, 1941-August 23, 1944).

Adversaries of China: Russia/Soviet Union (May 30, 1900-February 15, 1948, April 22, 1962-July 12, 1986); Japan (May 30, 1900-May 7, 1958); United States (February 16, 1951-August 22, 1972); India (November 16, 1950-June 4, 1987); United Kingdom (June 24, 1950-November 17, 1968); Taiwan (October 1, 1949-September 8, 1967); France (December 14, 1949-November 23, 1950); North Vietnam (November 23, 1975-March 16, 1988); South Korea (June 24, 1950-January 22, 1966); South Vietnam (June 8, 1956-April 30, 1975); Nepal (February 14, 1956-July 31, 1960).

Adversaries of United Kingdom: China (June 24, 1950-November 17, 1968); Turkey (October 15, 1895-July 16, 1934); United States (July 15, 1902-October 20, 1903); Germany (July 1, 1911-November 5, 1921, March 11, 1938-May 7, 1945); Iraq (May 14, 1958-September 26, 1970, March 8, 1984-present); Argentina (February 4, 1976-August 9, 1983); Japan (January 31, 1932-August 14, 1945); Italy (October 28, 1927-September 9, 1943); Greece (June 6, 1916-July 29, 1922); Iran (July 10, 1984-November 26, 1986); Egypt (October 13, 1951-October 22, 1958); Guatemala (January 27, 1972-July 19, 1977); Bulgaria (August 17, 1914-October 14, 1915, February 8, 1941-October 1944); North Yemen (July 15, 1949-April 22, 1967).

Adversaries of France: Germany (July 1, 1911-July 11, 1923, March 7, 1936-May 7, 1945); Turkey (February 15, 1897-June 28, 1938); Italy (December 15, 1925-October 31, 1927, August 13, 1937-June 10, 1940); Russia/Soviet Union (November 21, 1917-April 30, 1920, March 21, 1948-October 28, 1961); China (December 14, 1949-November 23, 1950); Greece (January 11, 1916-July 29, 1922); Japan (December 14, 1938-June 20, 1940); Libya (July 2, 1977-September 11, 1987); Austria-Hungary (July 23, 1914-November 11, 1918); Tunisia (May 31, 1957-September 5, 1961); Thailand (November 23, 1940-March 7, 1952).

Adversaries of Japan: Russia/Soviet Union (September 14, 1899-September 15, 1905, November 21, 1917-August 11, 1938, October 17, 1953-November 23, 1984); China (May 30, 1900-May 7, 1958); South Korea (February 3, 1953-March 14, 1966); United Kingdom (January 31, 1932-August 14, 1945); United States (January 31, 1932-August 14, 1945); France (December 14, 1938-June 20, 1940).

Adversaries of Germany: France (July 1, 1911-July 11, 1923, March 7, 1936-May 7, 1945); United Kingdom (July 1, 1911-November 5, 1921, March 11, 1938-May 7, 1945); United States (February 10, 1915-November 11, 1918, October 24, 1939-May 7, 1945); Russia/Soviet Union (July 23, 1914-February 1, 1920, November 12, 1936-May 7, 1945); Belgium (July 23, 1914-July 11, 1923, March 7, 1936-May 7, 1945); Italy (July 23, 1914-November 5, 1921); Sweden (November 5, 1939-April 28, 1944); Portugal (July 23, 1914-November 11, 1918, July 25, 1940-May 15, 1944); Argentina (December 22, 1939-May 7, 1945); Greece (March 7, 1915-June 29, 1917); Romania (July 23, 1914-August 27, 1916); China (May 30, 1900-September 7, 1901, February 9, 1917-March 18, 1926); Norway (March 25, 1939-May 7, 1945).

Adversaries of Austria-Hungary: Italy (September 15, 1904-November 11, 1918); France (August 12, 1914-November 11, 1918); Serbia/Yugoslavia (October 6, 1908-November 11, 1918); Greece (June 27, 1917-November 11, 1918); United States (December 7, 1917-November 11, 1918); Russia/Soviet Union (August 6, 1914-December 15, 1917); Romania (August 27, 1916-May 7, 1918); Portugal (March 15, 1916-November 11, 1918); Montenegro (August 5, 1914-November 11, 1918); Japan (August 25, 1914-November 11, 1918); United Kingdom (August 12, 1914-November 11, 1918); China (August 14, 1917-November 11, 1918).

Adversaries of Ottoman Empire/Turkey: Greece (August 15, 1909-April 30, 1925, January 15, 1958-January 12, 1989); Russia/Soviet Union (September 20, 1902-May 15, 1921, February 15, 1940-August 17, 1962); France (January 11, 1905-June 28, 1938); Italy (January 11, 1905-November 15, 1924); United Kingdom (January 11, 1905-July 16, 1934); Bulgaria (October 5, 1908-September 22, 1915, August 23, 1935-May 1, 1952, July 20, 1986-October 3, 1987); Iraq (July 15, 1958-July 28, 1965, June 3, 1984-present); Syria (March 26, 1955-May 27, 1965); Cyprus (March 16, 1965-December 11, 1988); Iran (September 21, 1981-March 27, 1988); Serbia/Yugoslavia (September 3, 1912-November 11, 1918).

Adversaries of Italy: France (December 15, 1925-October 31, 1927, August 13, 1937-June 10, 1940); Turkey (January 11, 1905-November 15, 1924); Austria-Hungary (September 15, 1904-November 11, 1918); United Kingdom (October 28, 1927-September 9, 1943); Germany (July 23, 1914-November 5, 1921); Albania (September 13, 1914-July 28, 1920, June 23, 1934-April 8, 1939, June 8, 1952-June 8, 1957); Ethiopia (January 15, 1923-June 14, 1943); Spain (October 28, 1927-October 1, 1940); United States (December 11, 1941-September 9, 1943).

Adversaries of India: Pakistan (September 22, 1947-present); China (November 16, 1950-June 4, 1987); Bangladesh (April 19, 1976-June 25, 1987); Sri Lanka (December 17, 1984-March 17, 1992); Nepal (April 15, 1962-September 15, 1969).

Adversaries of Pakistan: India (September 22, 1947-present); Afghanistan (March 15, 1949-September 3, 1961, February 3, 1974-April 7, 1989).

Adversaries of Israel: Syria (May 14, 1948-present); Egypt (March 14, 1948-June 3, 1989); Jordan (May 14, 1948-October 24, 1973); Iraq (December 16, 1966-present); Saudi Arabia (January 12, 1957-November 9, 1981).

Adversaries of Egypt: Israel (May 14, 1948-June 3, 1989); Libya (August 4, 1975-December 2, 1985); United States (April 19, 1956-February 13, 1968); Jordan (April 23, 1959-December 22, 1963); United Kingdom (October 13, 1951-October 22, 1958); Iraq (March 10, 1959-February 28, 1962); Saudi Arabia (October 1, 1962-May 14, 1967).

Adversaries of Syria: Israel (May 14, 1948-present); Jordan (April 26, 1949-February 24, 1982); Turkey (March 26, 1955-May 27, 1965); Iraq (June 6, 1976-March 3, 1991); Lebanon (February 5, 1963-November 13, 1969).

Adversaries of Saudi Arabia: North Yemen (January 15, 1931-June 23, 1934, October 1, 1962-May 22, 1990); Iran (April 26, 1984-April 24, 1988); Israel (January 12, 1957-November 9, 1981); Egypt (October 1, 1962-May 14, 1967).

Adversaries of Iran: Iraq (February 10, 1953-September 8, 1992); Russia (April 16, 1908-October 30, 1921, April 11, 1933-November 21, 1963, June 21, 1978-November 2, 1987); United States (November 4, 1979-present); Kuwait (November 13, 1980-May 20, 1988); United Kingdom (July 10, 1984-November 26, 1986); Saudi Arabia (April 26, 1984-APril 24, 1988); Turkey (September 21, 1981-March 27, 1988); United Arab Emirates (May 9, 1984-April 18, 1992); Afghanistan (March 18, 1979-October 10, 1983); France (October 18, 1985-January 20, 1988); Bahrain (May 9, 1984-April 19, 1988); Qatar (May 9, 1984-May 22, 1987).

Adversaries of Iraq: Iran (February 10, 1953-September 8, 1992); United Kingdom (May 14, 1958-September 26, 1970, March 8, 1984-present); Kuwait (June 25, 1961-present); Israel (December 16, 1966-present); Greece (August 9, 1982-March 3, 1991); Egypt (April 13, 1957-February 28, 1962); Syria (June 6, 1976-March 3, 1991); Cyprus (July 4, 1984-May 14, 1988); Turkey (July 15, 1958-July 28, 1965, June 3, 1984-present).

Adversaries of Libya: United States (August 13, 1979-present); Egypt (August 4, 1975-December 2, 1985); France (July 2, 1977-September 11, 1987); Sudan (September 20, 1972-March 31, 1984); Chad (September 9, 1976-September 11, 1987); Tunisia (May 20, 1977-August 22, 1985).

Adversaries of Algeria: Morocco (July 2, 1962-June 15, 1984).

Adversaries of Morocco: Spain (November 23, 1957-June 17, 1980); Algeria (July 2, 1962-June 15, 1984); Mauritania (February 29, 1980-April 18, 1987).

Adversaries of Portugal: Germany (July 23, 1914-November 11, 1918, July 25, 1940-May 15, 1944); Senegal (December 15, 1961-May 25, 1973); Guinea (March 11, 1962-January 20, 1973); Zambia (May 18, 1966-June 14, 1973); India (August 7, 1954-December 19, 1961).

Adversaries of South Africa: Zambia (April 6, 1968-April 25, 1987); Botswana (August 26, 1984-July 21, 1988); Mozambique (April 12, 1983-December 27, 1987).

Adversaries of Ethiopia: Somalia (August 14, 1960-October 22, 1985); Sudan (July 2, 1967-October 7, 1988); Eritrea (May 24, 1993-present).

Adversaries of Somalia: Ethiopia (August 14, 1960-October 22, 1985); Kenya (December 29, 1963-June 26, 1977).

Adversaries of Kenya: Uganda (May 15, 1965-March 12, 1989); Somalia (December 29, 1963-June 26, 1977).

Adversaries of Tanzania: Uganda (January 27, 1971-June 3, 1979).

Adversaries of Nigeria: Cameroon (May 20, 1981-present).

Adversaries of Ghana: Togo (November 15, 1961-October 29, 1982).

Adversaries of Congo-Kinshasa (Zaire): Congo-Brazzaville (August 15, 1963-January 15, 1987); Zambia (April 29, 1971-February 21, 1990); Angola (August 15, 1975-March 20, 1978).

Adversaries of Argentina: Chile (May 15, 1900-July 7, 1909, July 15, 1952-October 19, 1984); United Kingdom (February 15, 1947-March 6, 1948, February 4, 1976-August 9, 1983); Germany (March 15, 1914-June 22, 1917, December 22, 1939-May 7, 1945).

Adversaries of Brazil: Germany (April 5, 1917-November 11, 1918, August 22, 1942-May 7, 1945); Peru (October 21, 1902-July 12, 1904).

Adversaries of Chile: Argentina (May 15, 1900-July 7, 1909, July 15, 1952-October 19, 1984); Peru (May 15, 1911-December 13, 1921, September 11, 1976-August 31, 1977).

APPENDIX F

REGIONAL HEGEMONS

Britain - South Asia region (1900-1947); Persian Gulf region (1918-1940); East Africa region (1942-1949.

India - South Asia region (1972-1999).

Japan - East Asia region (1942-1945); Australia/Pacific Islands region (1942-1945).

Soviet Union - Eastern Europe region (1946-1989).

Russia - Former Soviet Union region (1990-2000).

United States - North America/Central America/Caribbean region (1900-2000); Persian Gulf region (1991-2000).

Nigeria - West Africa region (1980-2000).

South Africa - Southern Africa region (1976-2000).

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APPENDIX G

MAJOR INTERNATIONAL/REGIONAL POWERS

Major International Powers

Britain (1900-2000)

France (1900-1940, 1944-2000)

Russia (1900-1917, 1992-2000)

Soviet Union (1918-1991)

United States (1900-2000)

Germany (1900-1945, 1990-2000)

Japan (1900-1945, 1990-2000)

China (1950-2000)

Major Regional Powers

(1) ***Asia/Pacific Region***

East Asia:

Major Regional Powers - Britain (Burma, Hong Kong, Malayan Federation, Singapore), France (French Indochina), Japan, Netherlands (Dutch East Indies), Russia/Soviet Union (1900-1941); Japan (1942-1945); Soviet Union, United States, Britain (1946-1949); China, Russia/Soviet Union, United States (1950-1991); China, Japan, Russia, United States (1992-2000).

South Asia:

Major Regional Powers - Britain (1900-1947); India, Pakistan (1947-1971); India (1972-2000).

Australia/Pacific Islands:

Major Regional Powers - Britain, France, Germany (Mariana Islands, Caroline Islands, Marshall Islands, German New Guinea, German Samoa), United States (Hawaii, Midway, Wake, American Samoa) (1900-1918); Britain, Japan, United States (1919-1941); Japan (1942-1945); Australia/New Zealand, Britain, United States (1946-2000).

(2) *Europe/Russia/Former Soviet Union Region*

Western Europe:

Major Regional Powers - Britain, France, Prussia/Germany, Italy (1900-1918); Britain, France, Italy (1919-1925); Britain, France, Italy, Germany (1926-1940); Britain, Italy, Germany (1941-1943); Britain, Germany, United States (1944-1945); Britain, France, United States (1946-1989); Britain, France, Germany, Italy, United States (1990-2000).

Eastern Europe:

Major Regional Powers - Austria-Hungary, Prussia/Germany, Ottoman Empire/Turkey, Russia (1900-1918); Germany, Russia/Soviet Union (1919-1945); Soviet Union (1946-1989); Germany, Russia/Soviet Union (1990-2000).

Russia/Former Soviet Union:

Russia (1900-1922,1992-2000).

(3) *Middle East/North Africa/Persian Gulf Region*

Middle East:

Major Regional Powers - Britain, France, Ottoman Empire/Turkey (1900-1918); Britain, France (1919-1923); Britain, France, Turkey (1924-1947); Israel, Syria, Turkey (1948-2000).

North Africa:

Major Regional Powers - Britain, France, Ottoman Empire (1900-1912); Britain, France, Italy (1913-1940); Britain, Germany (1941-1943); Britain, France, United States (1944-1969); Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco (1970-2000).

Persian Gulf:

Major Regional Powers - Britain, Ottoman Empire/Turkey, Russia (1900-1918); Britain (1918-1940); Britain, Soviet Union, United States (1941-1946); Britain, Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, United States (1947-1990); United States (1991-2000).

(4) *Sub-Saharan Africa Region*

West Africa:

Major Regional Powers - Britain, France, Germany (1990-1918); Britain, France (1919-1960); France, Nigeria, Ghana (1961-1979); Nigeria (1980-2000).

East Africa:

Major Regional Powers - Britain, Belgium, Germany, Italy (1900-1918); Britain, Belgium, Ethiopia, Italy (1919-1935); Britain, Belgium, Italy (1936-1941); Britain (1942-1949); Britain, Belgium, Ethiopia, Italy (1950-1963); Congo-Kinshasa/Zaire, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Tanzania (1964-1991); Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania (1992-2000).

Southern Africa:

Major Regional Powers - Britain, Germany, France, Portugal (1900-1915); Britain, Portugal, France, South Africa (1916-1965); Portugal, South Africa (1966-1975); South Africa (1976-2000).

(5) *Western Hemisphere Region*

North America/Central America/Caribbean:

Major Regional Powers - United States (1900-2000).

South America:

Major Regional Powers - Argentina, Brazil, Chile (1900-2000).

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