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Empowering the Marginalized Voter: Clientelism in Heterogeneous Electorates

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This paper explores the effect of clientelism in societies that have many voter groups. We present results that suggest that clientelism could boost outcomes typically associated with robust programmatic politics. Those outcomes include political accountability, government effectiveness, the rule of law and control of corruption. This is only the case, however, in politically heterogeneous countries that are characterized by many distinct voter groups. In addition, we present evidence that clientelism, when applied to similar fragmented contexts, also increases the number of groups with access to state power, thereby boosting representation. While we do not find that clientelism makes governance outcomes better, it does attenuate the negative impact that ethno-cultural heterogeneity has. Those counter-intuitive findings are supported by what we call the theory of marginalized voter empowerment.

Introduction

The “responsible party governance” model that has guided most theoretical and empirical work on how politicians get reelected suggests that success in office depends on politicians’ ability to package and deliver popular policies. More recent work, however, argues that politicians, even in democratic countries, do not rely exclusively on policy and also engage in clientelism, among other modes of exchange. Some existing empirical tests suggest that clientelism undermines governance outcomes such as redistribution, economic growth and even literacy.

A different strand of literature explores the impact that ethno-cultural diversity and polarization has on democratic or governance indicators. Some of the findings suggest that more polarized and diverse countries also tend

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1 This paper is based on a dataset collected under the auspices of the project Political Accountability in Democratic Party Competition and Economic Governance, implemented by a political science research group at Duke University (Principal Investigator: Herbert Kitschelt, Department of Political Science). We gratefully acknowledge funding for the data collection by the World Bank, the Chilean Science Foundation (research grant directed by Juan Pablo Luna and David Altman, Catholic University of Chile), and Duke University.
to struggle more when it comes to outcomes ranging from election quality to redistribution and governance more broadly.

This paper bridges the two strands of research and suggests a novel twist: clientelism could, in fact, reduce the negative impact of ethno-cultural polarization on governance. This is a story of gradual moderation, rather than complete negation: clientelism improves governance and representation in heterogeneous and polarized contexts, but not to the extent that programmatism or homogeneity would by themselves.

In the remainder of the paper, we explore existing literature on ethno-cultural heterogeneity and clientelism, develop a theoretical argument linking the two to governance and representation and subject it to empirical testing, using a comprehensive cross-national dataset on clientelism.

Literature Review

Clientelism is a distinct mode of political linkage. Parties promise to deliver non-policy benefits that range from a particular private good or service to access to courts or jobs (Kitschelt et al. 2009). Those benefits are targeted to a particular voter or group of voters. Their delivery is immediate, typically following verification that the potential citizen benefactor has indeed cast her or his vote for the party that is about to deliver the benefits. Clientelism, therefore, is characterized by immediate gratification for both the party (which gains a vote) and the voters, but produces lower long-term accountability. It is also contingent on the voter supporting the particular party and the party delivering what it promised.

Clientelism has also been defined as a market exchange not so much between individual patrons and voters, but between a centralized party apparatus and citizens (Hopkin 2006). While still providing excludable benefits, under such circumstances clientelism also plays a much more thorough economic and social role and leads to expansion of the functions of the state (Hopkin 2006, 9).

Regardless of the nuance in definitions, clientelism is considered to be a suboptimal, albeit often democratic and legal, political linkage mechanism (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2006a). Its main alternative, programmatism, is typically viewed much more favorably. At the core of the distinction between the two modes of political exchange lies the fact that when parties issue programmatic electoral appeals, they refer to policies and outcomes
that will affect a broad subset of society. For instance, if a party promises lower unemployment, the policies that are created once in office will apply to all citizens that have no jobs, regardless of the electoral district they live in, who they voted for, their ethnicity or religion. In addition, the promise is usually enacted and developed throughout the given government’s term. Due to the more prolonged nature of this interaction (which typically takes one electoral cycle of more), programmatic politics is supposed to be characterized by more robust accountability mechanisms and a more direct involvement on behalf of citizens, who have a vested interest in making sure that the promises they were given are pursued by the government throughout its time in office.

On its own, clientelism has negative expected consequences on the political process, according to existing research. Some bundle clientelism with institutional control, electoral fraud and even repression, which are inherently undemocratic (Gibson 2005). Others consider it to be an intermediate stage on the way to true political citizenship (Fox 1994) and consolidated democracy (Heller 2000; Weyland 1996). Perhaps more importantly, reliance on patronage is highlighted as the key explanation for the persistence of bureaucratic corruption and inefficiency (Golden 2003), as well as lower economic development and redistribution (Kitschelt and Freeze 2010). In a related vein, personalistic voting and particularism are demonstrated to decrease the level of literacy (Hicken and Simmons 2008). However, more recent empirical investigations benefitting from the systematic data of the Democratic Accountability Project suggests that clientelism’s effect on governance outcomes could be contingent. For instance, clientelism tends to boost economic and human development for the weakest parts of society (Pierskalla and Fernandez 2009).

Social heterogeneity has also been linked to adverse governance outcomes. Ethno-cultural diversity tends to lead to a diminished supply of public goods (Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly 1999; Banerjee, Iyer, and Somanathan 2005), and reduce their quality (Khwaja 2007). This adverse impact is magnified when ethnic divisions coincide with economic inequities (Baldwin and Huber 2010). Public goods are inadequately or inefficiently allocated in heterogeneous contexts because there is a dearth of cultural ties and norms of reciprocity to draw on in order to reduce collective action costs (Habyarimana et al. 2007).
Therefore, taken separately, both clientelism and heterogeneity predict a diminished quality of governance. However, previous scholarship has neglected to investigate their intersection, which is the subject of this inquiry.

Some existing research has also focused explicitly on the relationship between ethnicity and clientelism. On the voter demand side, young, poor and uneducated voters have been shown to be more sensitive to clientelistic appeals (Brusco, Nazareno, and Stokes 2004). Combining poverty with ethnicity, other research has demonstrated that when a society is characterized by similar incomes within ethnic groups and different incomes across them, parties tend to rely on clientelism more (Kolev and Wang 2010). This finding builds on an older idea that clientelism is a coping mechanism of “cooperative social arrangement” that to some extent addresses certain shortcomings of programmatic politics for smaller or less fortunate subsets of society (Powell 1970) and even empowers marginalized voters. In his classic theory of “manifest and latent functions”, for instance, Robert Merton (1968) suggested that the bosses in charge of political machines in 1900s America met certain social needs that were otherwise ignored by the government. This idea is the foundation of the theory presented in this paper as well.

Merton’s analysis represents a body of literature, typically conducted through case studies, that positions clientelism as a mitigating force during political transitions. This research illustrates how nascent democracies, characterized by social disorganization and highly fragmented electorates, lead politicians to extend particularistic and tangible benefits to myriad politically relevant groups. This precedes processes of class formation that have yet to aggregate voter preferences into blocs large enough to extend benefits through non-excludable policy changes. Instead, voting blocs are aggregated through a systemic organization of clientelistic exchanges, creating political machines. In this analysis, political machines are not intended to entrench nepotism or abet expropriation, but as rational responses to the unique demands of a fragmented electoral base that seeks to organize politically (Scott 1972).

Other studies extend this argument, which closely mirrors our theory of marginalized voter empowerment. They see the dense network of patron-client ties as a palliative for ethnic factionalism. Clientelism serves as a “social adhesive” that establishes reciprocal relationships between diverse actors who would otherwise not cooperate, thereby buttressing national integration (Lemarchand 1972; Sandbrook 1972). Not only has clientelism
been shown to address political deficiencies in diverse societies, but heterogeneity also has been demonstrated to produce more durable clientelistic networks, as shared interests among clients that threaten the incentive structure underlying the initial reciprocal bargain made between client and patron are less likely to develop (Scott 1972).

On the supply side, modernization and political competition have been shown to lead to lower supply of particularistic private benefits in favor of public goods (Diaz-Cayeros and Magaloni 2004), while ability to monitor the vote bolsters the “perverse accountability” of clientelism (Stokes 2005). Combining existing demand and supply explanations, Calvo and Murillo (2004) illustrate that parties will engage in clientelistic exchange more often when their electorates are cheap to buy off – i.e. when they have low skills and low incomes. Those interactions are more likely in newly-established democracies, where the lack of institutionalization prevents political actors from making the credible longer-term commitments of programmatic politics (Keefer 2007), and less likely in advanced capitalist democracies (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2006b).

Our work is motivated by existing studies that focus on the effect that either heterogeneity or clientelism has on governance and representation or the causal link between the two. Yet, while we acknowledge this existing research, we suggest that heterogeneity and clientelism, in interaction, affect more distant governance and voter empowerment outcomes and are not interested in the causal linkage between the two. This is among the key contributions that we make with this paper. We also suggest that heterogeneity might yield clientelism or vice versa, but what has been left out is a more serious discussion and empirical investigation of whether societies that have heterogeneous electorates and clientelistic parties experience systematic effects in terms of their quality of governance and political representation.

**Theoretical Argument**

The logic behind the theory of marginalized voter empowerment is that clientelism provides tangible benefits to voters who would otherwise not be catered to by governments and bureaucracies, even in democratic countries.

In highly fragmented electorates, smaller but unified and cohesive voter clusters might easily fall prey to the “tyranny of the majority”. Such groups might be weaker for a variety of societal, cultural, economic reasons, as well
as their sheer size, relative to the population. Such voter groups face two
broad scenarios. First, they can simply decide to not vote and check out of
the political process altogether or protest the outcomes of the elections. That
is, they can decide to not go out and cast a ballot, but also not follow or
accept political developments following elections they have not perceived as
legitimate or otherwise satisfactory. Such voters will be less likely to be or
feel represented and hold politicians accountable. They could subsequently
behave in a way that is not consistent with a robust political system. A voter
that has decided to not vote due to a lack of viable alternatives is likely to
also not perceive the state as legitimate. The higher the proportion of citizens
that share this sentiment, the more likely it will be that the government will
not be held accountable and the rule of law - not respected. These are
favorable conditions for corruption to flourish – both because government is
not kept in check and because citizens will seek to obtain what they need via
extra-institutional means.

Alternatively, fringe voter groups can falsify their preferences and vote
for a party that represents a more powerful voter group and is sufficiently
close to their own position on the ideological spectrum. This will be
increasingly difficult in countries that have a highly fragmented electorate
that is characterized by different levels of education, income or societal
empowerment and further undermined by winner-take-all electoral
institutions, such as presidentialism and single-member district plurality
electoral formulas for legislative elections (Blais and Carty 1990). The
propensity of such institutions to generate centrist two-party systems will
strengthen the tyranny of the majority, insofar as the main parties will cater
only to the more numerous voters that occupy the ideological middle.

Assuming that many non-majority groups exist, non-median voters will
have to amend their preferences to a higher degree, all else being equal. This
will have a clear impact on their level of representation, since they will have
made a compromise with regards to their ideal preferences to begin with. It
is also likely to affect the extent to which such voters will stay engaged after
the election and keep the elected government accountable, non-corrupt and
respectful of the rule of law.

From the perspective of the parties, it is also more likely that they will be
responsive to citizens that turned out and voted, stay engaged throughout
the electoral cycle and belong to a party’s core group of voters. After all,
even if a fringe voter compromises his or her preferences and supports a
party that is ideologically somewhat distant, it is not necessarily realistic to
expect the party to be as responsive to the demands of such voters once in office. Such a party will still tailor policies to its mainstream supporters first. The more heterogeneous the electorate, the more likely it will be that this scenario will play out. Voting and staying informed and involved is a costly activity that is only justified if the programmatic political system will, in fact, deliver some benefits. When this is not the case and voters are likely to incur the cost of being engaged but not get anything in return, they are more likely to opt out of the political process for the zero-cost, zero-benefit situation of abstention or at least disengagement.

So far, the argument has been that a society characterized by programmatic parties and many voter groups is more likely to have underrepresented or disengaged voters than a society that has programmatic parties and only a few voter groups. Since rational voters from fringe electorates will see no benefit in incurring the cost of voting and participating in the political process, over time such a scenario can bring about a sustained and profound lack of information and awareness on behalf of citizens from marginalized electorates. Such voter groups, however, as dormant as they might be, will present a clear opportunity for political party leaders that have clientelistic networks and resources to distribute through them.

A clientelistic exchange provides immediate rewards to voters that have historically seen low programmatic benefits. In other words, dormant and marginalized voters are likely to be “activated” as a result of receiving some particularistic benefits. Clientelistic practices, we argue, will provide them with the unusual opportunity to interact with political party operatives – something they might have not otherwise done under purely programmatic competition. They will also see direct benefits from participating in the most basic political activity – voting.

How will reactivating cohesive, but dormant voter, groups through clientelism affect the outcomes we are generally interested in? As far as baseline political inclusion is concerned, we argue that clientelism increases participation by virtue of bringing people out to vote that would have otherwise not bothered. When marginalized groups are induced to participate in the political process through targeted benefits, they become incorporated within the larger political system. This incorporation grants marginalized groups access to party elites because those elites will interact with voters while setting up the clientelistic exchange. This mechanism could bring about, we argue, a motivation to advance citizen claims through
existing decision-making channels. Therefore, we theorize that in contexts with heterogeneous voting groups and high levels of clientelism, more groups will be granted access to state power. This statement assumes that a distant, vague and improbable programmatic benefit is less likely to accomplish this than an immediate and particularistic one. In addition, voters are also more likely to expect a modicum of accountability – at least insofar as they would want to receive the benefit that was promised to them in the first place.

The relationship between clientelism and the rule of law and corruption is a bit more distant. It is nonetheless possible to argue that newly engaged voters, even if they have been attracted through clientelism, are more likely to have a stake in the political process and make some effort to stay engaged and informed. Furthermore, if voters are incorporated within the broader political system, they are less likely to seek redress through extra-institutional means. This could eventually give rise to a robust civil society that is often seen as a prerequisite for governance on the basis of the rule of law and lack of corruption.

In summary, a situation characterized by heterogeneous electorates will provide opportunities for political entrepreneurs and marginalized voters from smaller voter groups alike. The key assumption of the theory of marginalized voter empowerment is that formerly passive voters will assert positive pressures on governance, even if they are re-activated through clientelism. That is, a voter that receives a clientelistic benefit is still more likely to care about government performance than a voter that abstains and fully minimizes his or her political participation. On the one hand, clientelistic exchange itself is bolstered by accountability: if the party or the voter does not deliver the benefits and the vote, respectively, the exchange will break down. It also encourages effectiveness, as does any cost-benefit calculation, regardless of whether it is being performed by the government or a regular citizen.

The theory of marginalized voter empowerment is somewhat counter-intuitive. However, it is important to keep in mind that it applies to a very specific scenario. Clientelism will have the suggested attenuation effect only in highly fragmented electorates that have a high number of politically relevant minority voter groups. In other words, the theory suggests an explicit interactive effect between electoral heterogeneity and clientelism, whereby governance and participation will be bolstered to the greatest extent when both of them are high. This does not imply that clientelism or
electoral heterogeneity, by themselves, is desirable. Referring to the Table 1, it is our claim that the societies with fewest minority voter groups, such as the Scandinavian countries and other OECD states, will be undermined by an additional dose of clientelism. However, patronage will have a positive role to play in countries like India, Russia, Namibia and Lebanon.

Table 1: Ranking of selected countries according to number of politically relevant voter groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Electorate Heterogeneity</th>
<th>No. of politically relevant minority voter groups</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Highest</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia, Pakistan, Indonesia, UK, Georgia</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark, El Salvador, Norway, Ireland, Uruguay, Portugal, South Korea, Italy, Sweden, Germany, Jamaica</td>
<td>Lowest</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Existing case study research confirms our expectation that ethno-cultural divisions and clientelism play an important role in governance in the most heterogeneous countries identified in Table 1. In the case of Russia, for instance, scholars have argued that a system of hierarchical patron-client relationships have guided political exchange prior to, during and after authoritarianism (Hosking 2000). Clientelism in Russia is seen as an institutional mechanism of exchange that also accompanies regional variation in ethno-cultural heterogeneity, too (Hale 2003).

India, another country that has high level of polarization, has also been studied extensively. For instance, Craig Jeffrey (2002) demonstrates that the caste system and the extent to which it is economically stratified plays a powerful role in the decision-making calculus of politicians that are able to deliver clientelistic benefit. Steven Wilkinson (2006), another scholar of India, has also argued that infrastructure provision in the country seems to be contingent and tied to ethnic heterogeneity. Wilkinson’s argument is especially relevant for our study, since he ties ethnicity and clientelism to the

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provision of classic public goods that are generally perceived of as outcomes of higher efficiency and more robust governance.

Below, we list two different hypotheses. They are separated for a couple of reasons. First, Hypothesis 1 explores whether the interaction between clientelism and heterogeneity influences participation, a phenomenon that occurs earlier than broader and more distant governance outcomes. Second, the data sources used to test the two hypotheses are different, as discussed in the empirical section.

**Hypothesis 1 (Participation Hypothesis):** When practiced in societies characterized by many voter groups, clientelism will attenuate the negative effect of heterogeneity on the number of relevant groups that participate in the political process.

**Hypothesis 2 (Governance Hypothesis):** When practiced in societies characterized by many voter groups, clientelism will attenuate the negative effect of heterogeneity on governance outcomes, such as accountability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, the rule of law and corruption.

**Variables and Model Specification**

**Dependent Variables**

The selection of dependent variables follows the two hypotheses outlined in the previous section. To test Hypothesis 1, we utilize the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) dataset’s (Wimmer, Cederman, and Min 2009) included groups variable, which measures representation by tracking the number of politically relevant ethnic groups with access to state power. Included groups can be junior partners, senior partners, dominant, or monopolist groups in terms of government membership. The theory presented above suggests that groups in heterogeneous societies that rely on clientelistic linkages will be included within the broader political system, but does not comment on the extent of that inclusion, which is why the included groups variable is employed rather than the specific categories.

The second set of dependent variables is taken from the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) project by the World Bank (Kaufmann, Kray, and Mastruzzi 2010). We incorporate five WGI indicators that are associated with good governance and are utilized to test the outcomes included in Hypothesis 2. The indicators reflect the extent to which a particular state’s
government provides voice and accountability, effectiveness, high regulatory quality, the rule of law and low corruption. Voice and accountability taps into the ability of citizens to select their government and the presence of freedom of expression, association and the media. It is a key indicator for testing the causal mechanism linking reliance on clientelism to a more active engagement of previously marginalized electorates. Government effectiveness reveals perceptions of the quality of public services, the integrity of the civil service and the quality of policies and their implementation. Regulatory quality reveals evaluation of government policies targeted at the private sector. Rule of law has to do with the extent to which contracts, property rights and the courts perform in a satisfactory manner. Finally, control of corruption summarizes the extent to which state capture is minimized.

**Main Independent Variable: Voter Group Heterogeneity**

The key independent variables utilized in the analysis have to do with voter heterogeneity and clientelism and, more importantly, the interaction between the two. Voter heterogeneity has traditionally been an elusive concept to capture and measure systematically. The key concern, discussed widely in the existing literature, has to do with the distinction between having many societal groups (in terms of ethnicity, language, or religion) and having many politically relevant groups (Chandra and Wilkinson 2008; Mozaffar, Scarritt, and Gladich 2003; Posner 2004). That is, a country with many ethno-cultural groups is not necessarily always politically heterogeneous, since primordial identities might not translate into diverse preferences and political differentiation more broadly. To address existing concerns, therefore, we implement two alternative measures of societal heterogeneity. We reject the more simplistic and controversial measure of simple ethno-linguistic fractionalization (ELF), which captures the diversity of a country according to the number with different ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics (Alesina et al. 2003). While results using this measure are not presented in the paper, we nonetheless tested our hypothesis with ELF used as a baseline, to ensure consistency of our results.

A more relevant and sophisticated measure of diversity is integrated form the EPR dataset (Wimmer, Cederman, and Min 2009). It contains a variable that counts the number of politically relevant groups in a country (called “groups”). This is a concept that captures the theoretical logic presented in this paper much better. That is, a country with a significant number of politically differentiated groups will be expected to provide a
higher number of smaller, but cohesive groups that could be marginalized by programmatic politics alone, but brought back into political participation via clientelism. The results presented in the empirical section below reflect the use of this measure.

**Main Independent Variable: Clientelism**

Thanks to an extensive data-gathering effort of Political Accountability in Democratic Party Competition and Economic Governance, researchers can now utilize cross-national data on clientelism in more than 88 countries and 506 parties that was completed in 2007-2008. There are two variables utilized in the empirical analysis. One is a summative index of clientelistic practices. Respondents ranked the parties’ propensity to engage in patronage by promising five distinct benefits to voters: consumer goods, material advantages in public social policy schemes, employment in public or publicly regulated private sector companies, government contracts, and favorable application of regulatory rules issued by government agencies. The extent to which each party within a given country engages in the five distinct practices is coded on a 0 (none at all) to 4 (to a very high extent) scale. Therefore, combining the five practices yields a 20-point index of clientelism.

In addition to the clientelism index, we utilize one other variable from the dataset. It has to do with the *effectiveness* of clientelism. Respondents are asked to assess the extent to which parties are able to employ clientelistic practices to truly mobilize voters. From a theoretical perspective, reliance on clientelism might not be sufficient if it does not change the behavior of previously marginalized voters. An effective clientelistic strategy, on the other hand, will achieve precisely that, thereby illuminating the mechanism linking heterogeneity, clientelism and improved governance.

**Control Variables**

Every model incorporates a standard set of control variables. Those are the electoral formula proportionality, presidentialism, population, economic development, and level of democracy.

The electoral formula is coded on a 1-3 scale, where 1 represents majoritarian, 2 – mixed and 3 – proportional representation electoral formula. This control is included to capture any potential positive effects of the electoral formula on democracy and representation, as outlined in existing literature (Lijphart 2004; Norris 2008; Reynolds 2011). Another way
to control for the impact of formal political institutions is by including an indicator variable for presidentialism (Elgie 2005; Linz 1990; Mainwaring 1993; Shugart and Carey 1992). This accounts for any “perils of presidentialism” dynamics on democracy and governance, as spelled out by Juan Linz (1990).

We include a standard control for population size to account for the possibility that democracy and representation is more challenging when a country is larger (Dahl and Tufte 1973). We also incorporate modernization and economic development arguments, advanced by Adam Przeworski (1991) by controlling for level of economic development. In addition, we control for levels of democracy by including the Polity IV score of the country, since we do expect democratic countries to both have higher voter participation and better governance.

**Empirical Tests and Results**

For the empirical analysis, we used national-level data, which contains party-level data that is weighted by party size and aggregated by country. The main interaction variables are centered by subtracting the mean from the actual value of the variable. This is done to avoid collinearity issues between the interaction term and the variables from which it is calculated (Cohen, West, Aiken 2003). A negative binomial regression was employed for the included groups variable because the observations are non-normally distributed towards the lower values.

**Effect of Level of Clientelism on Governance and Included Groups**

Table 2 presents the results obtained using the groups variable from EPR dataset (Wimmer, Cederman, and Min 2009), which indicates the number of politically relevant ethno-cultural groups, and national aggregates of clientelism.

The first row of results provides strong support for both Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2: higher levels of clientelism, when implemented in a society with numerous voter groups has a positive effect on the number of politically represented relevant groups (Model 1) improves accountability (Model 2), government effectiveness (Model 3), the rule of law (Model 5) and control of corruption (Model 6). Furthermore, clientelism in heterogeneous electorates increases the number of groups with access to state power.
Table 2: Level of Clientelism, Number of Politically Relevant Groups and Governance (groups)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Incl.Grps (1)</th>
<th>Account (2)</th>
<th>Gov't Eff. (3)</th>
<th>Regulat. (4)</th>
<th>Rule of Law (5)</th>
<th>Corrupt (6)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Clientelism *</td>
<td>0.0318***</td>
<td>0.00764*</td>
<td>0.00982**</td>
<td>0.00394</td>
<td>0.0123**</td>
<td>0.0117**</td>
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<tr>
<td>Groups</td>
<td>[0.00993]</td>
<td>[0.00452]</td>
<td>[0.00482]</td>
<td>[0.00546]</td>
<td>[0.00539]</td>
<td>[0.00510]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-0.382***</td>
<td>-0.120**</td>
<td>-0.142**</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>-0.180**</td>
<td>-0.174**</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Clientelism</td>
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<td>-0.112***</td>
<td>-0.195***</td>
<td>-0.230***</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>[0.0185]</td>
<td>[0.0197]</td>
<td>[0.0223]</td>
<td>[0.0220]</td>
<td>[0.0208]</td>
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<tr>
<td>El. System Prop.</td>
<td>-0.18</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>-0.111**</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
<td>-0.153***</td>
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<td>[0.0509]</td>
<td>[0.0577]</td>
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<td>Presidentialism</td>
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<td>0.0305</td>
<td>0.16</td>
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<td>[0.0902]</td>
<td>[0.0962]</td>
<td>[0.109]</td>
<td>[0.107]</td>
<td>[0.102]</td>
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<tr>
<td>Population (ln)</td>
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<td>-0.0476</td>
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<td>[0.0305]</td>
<td>[0.0346]</td>
<td>[0.0341]</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP pc ppp</td>
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<td>0.365***</td>
<td>0.337***</td>
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<td>[0.0664]</td>
<td>[0.0655]</td>
<td>[0.0620]</td>
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<tr>
<td>Polity</td>
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<td>[0.0268]</td>
<td>[0.0122]</td>
<td>[0.0130]</td>
<td>[0.0147]</td>
<td>[0.0145]</td>
<td>[0.0137]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>3.567***</td>
<td>-0.439</td>
<td>-3.002***</td>
<td>-1.756**</td>
<td>-2.540***</td>
<td>-1.942***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[1.721]</td>
<td>[0.651]</td>
<td>[0.694]</td>
<td>[0.786]</td>
<td>[0.775]</td>
<td>[0.734]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.131</td>
<td>0.825</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>0.811</td>
<td>0.864</td>
<td>0.889</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

However, the coefficient that relates clientelism to regulatory quality is not statistically significant, possibly reflecting the longer causal chain that separates elections and policy output.

Figure 1 presents the Clarify post-estimations of the substantive effects clientelism has on the dependent variables. For each dependent variable, we estimated the extent to which the Clarify estimate deviates from each respective dependent variable’s mean for societies with above-average levels of societal heterogeneity. The first (black) column represents the normalized dependent variable mean. The second (dark gray) column represents the Clarify estimate for the dependent variable when low clientelism is present. The third (light gray) column represents the Clarify estimate for the dependent variable when high clientelism is present. Two conclusions are evident on the basis of this figure. First, clientelism significantly strengthens governance outcomes and leads to a greater amount of included groups in five out of the
six model estimations run. This is revealed by the significant changes in the negative direction between the first and second rows across all five estimations. Second, heterogeneous societies tend to have significant challenges with governance, as revealed by the fact that, even when clientelism is employed, the level of governance is lower than the overall mean value for each variable. The only exception is the model that predicts the levels of politically relevant groups that are empowered. It is nonetheless not possible to claim that clientelism fully compensates for the effect of heterogeneity, but rather that it attenuates its negative impact.

These conclusions are also supported when plotting the marginal effects of the five models. Figure 2 presents the marginal change in the effect of politically relevant groups as levels of clientelism increase. For all of the governance dependent variables, the effect of politically relevant groups is strongly and significantly negative at low levels of clientelism. As clientelism levels increase, the deleterious effects of diversity on governance are reduced; however, even at high levels of clientelism, this effect never becomes significantly positive. In other words, the models show that clientelism *attenuates* the negative effect of politically relevant groups, but does not make this effect positive. Unlike the governance outcomes, the effect of social heterogeneity on the number of groups included in access to
political decision-making is negative at low levels of clientelism, but positive at high levels. Therefore, the statistical analysis supports the conclusion that social heterogeneity has a negative impact on political inclusion in programmatic systems, and a positive effect on political inclusion in clientelistic systems.

Figure 2: Marginal Effect of Politically Relevant Groups as Moderated by Clientelism
Conclusion

We started this paper by revisiting an argument about patronage being a political practice that at least partially supplements programmatic politics. Instead of following the conventional wisdom that clientelism is a factor that inhibits democratic performance, we outlined a theory of marginalized voter empowerment. It suggested that certain groups of the voting population in heterogeneous societies might be marginalized by the majoritarian inertia of programmatic politics. In such instances, clientelism will play the role of bringing them back to political awareness and participation. If our logic is correct, we outlined certain expectations about a positive role of clientelism in politically fragmented democracies on governance outcomes, which were accompanied by an increase in the number of included politically relevant groups. Those expectations were largely confirmed by the empirical analysis that we performed.

Future research could take this insight to greater lengths by exploring the longer-term effects of clientelism in fragmented societies. That is, are countries typically able to build upon increased governance if they indeed rely on clientelism? Does clientelism become a political liability at some level of democratic consolidation and/or electoral fragmentation? If yes, when is this level reached? Answering those questions might add more to the understanding of clientelism and its role in politics.
References


