The Politics of Seeking a Permanent Seat on the United Nations Security Council: An Analysis of the Case of Japan

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The membership and structure of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) have been among the most controversial and intractable issues considered by UN member-states since the establishment of the organization in the mid-1940s. A number of emerging global and regional powers throughout the world—including Japan, Germany, India, Brazil, Indonesia, Nigeria, South Africa, and Egypt—have sought permanent seats on the UNSC during the past few decades. In this article, we examine the politics of UNSC restructuring from the perspective of an aspiring permanent member. We focus on the following questions: (1) Which factor, or sets of factors, influences the strategy choices of aspiring permanent members, as well as changes in the strategies of aspiring permanent members of the UNSC?; and (2) Which factor, or set of factors, is a relatively stronger influence on the strategy choices of aspiring permanent members of the UNSC? We hypothesize that a combination of factors from the international, regional, and domestic political systems influence the choice of strategies, as well as changes in the choice of strategies, of aspiring permanent members. Analyzing the case of Japan, we find compelling evidence that global factors, particularly the distribution of power in the international political system, have significantly impacted Japanese foreign policy, including Japan’s strategy for pursuing a permanent seat on the UNSC, since the end of the Second World War. We also find evidence that factors from the regional and domestic political systems influence Japanese foreign policy, but may not have a significant impact on Japan’s strategy for pursuing a permanent seat.

Introduction

The membership and structure of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) have been among the most controversial and intractable issues considered by UN member-states since the establishment of the organization in the mid-1940s.¹

¹ Article 23 of the United Nations Charters states that “the Security Council shall consist of fifteen Members of the United Nations. The Republic of China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America shall be permanent members of the Security Council. The General Assembly shall elect ten other Members of the United Nations to be non-permanent members of the Security Council, due regard being specially paid, in the first instance to the contribution of Members of the United Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organization, and also to equitable geographical distribution.” The seat for the Republic of China has been occupied by the People’s Republic of China since November 1971, and the seat for the USSR has been occupied by the Russian Federation since January 1992.
The importance of the UNSC, particularly the council’s permanent seats, stems from the status and prestige associated with its decision-making authority on questions of global peace and security. In fact, permanent membership is equated with “great power” status in the international political system (Tillema, 1989, 182).

As a consequence, it is perhaps not surprising that a number of emerging global and regional powers throughout the world – including Japan, Germany, India, Brazil, Indonesia, Nigeria, South Africa, and Egypt – have sought permanent seats on the UNSC during the past few decades. Despite a tremendous amount of discussion and debate, there has been little consensus on the matter of UNSC restructuring, including to what extent the council ought to be enlarged, how many new permanent and non-permanent members ought to be added, whether the new members ought to be extended the veto privilege, and which specific countries ought to be added as permanent members (Malik, 2005, 19).

While these questions are important, we do not focus explicitly on them in this article. Instead, we provide one of the first analyses of the politics of UNSC restructuring from the perspective of an aspiring permanent member. Although much has been written about UNSC restructuring during the past decade from an institutional perspective (e.g. Russett et al., 1996; Daws, 1997; Schlichtmann, 1999; Afoaku and Ukaga, 2001; Berween, 2002; Weiss, 2003; Thakur, 2004; Blum, 2005; Malik, 2005; Price, 2005; Soussan, 2005), there has been relatively little focus on the politics of seeking a permanent seat on the UNSC from the perspective of an existing or emerging global or regional power. In one of the few analyses of a country’s “quest” for a permanent seat on the UNSC, Reinhard Drifte (2000) examines Japan’s bid for a permanent seat beginning in the 1960s through the 1990s. Specifically, Drifte (2000) describes in significant detail the steps that Japan took during this period to obtain a permanent seat on the UNSC, as well as the domestic and international factors influencing Japan’s quest for a permanent seat. While Drifte’s largely descriptive analysis of Japan’s bid for a permanent seat on the UNSC is very informative, it contains neither a thorough discussion of the potential strategies for obtaining a permanent seat nor a theoretical framework that might be used to further analyze Japan’s bid for a permanent seat or analyze the bids of other countries seeking permanent seats on the UNSC.

In our preliminary analysis of the politics of seeking a permanent seat on the UNSC, we focus on the following questions: (1) Which factor, or sets of factors, influences the strategy choices of aspiring permanent members, as well as changes in the strategies of aspiring permanent members of the UNSC?; and (2) Which factor, or set of factors, is a relatively stronger influence on the strategy choices of aspiring permanent members of the UNSC? The primary purpose of this article is to examine these questions by analyzing Japan’s quest for a permanent seat on the UNSC beginning in the early 1960s.
Although the UNSC has been restructured only once in more than sixty years, there have been several attempts over the years to achieve this goal.\footnote{The procedures for restructuring the UNSC are as follows: (1) to increase the number of permanent or non-permanent members of the UNSC, Article 23 of the UN Charter must be amended; (2) amendments to the UN Charter must be approved by at least a two-thirds vote in the UN General Assembly; and (3) amendments approved by the UN General Assembly must be ratified by two-thirds of the member-states of the UN, including all five permanent members of the UNSC.} As a result of several new UN member-states due to decolonization in the late 1940s and early 1950s, Spain and several Latin American countries proposed amendments to the UN Charter in 1956 to increase the number of non-permanent seats on the UNSC from six to eight (Bourantonis, 2005, 15). After several years of debate and disagreement, including the Soviet Union’s insistence on linking the issue of UNSC restructuring to the issue of mainland China’s membership in the UN, there was a “breakthrough” on the issue in the early 1960s (Bourantonis, 2005, 22). In December 1963, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) formally approved amendments increasing non-permanent seats from six to ten, and the amendments were ratified by the required number of member-states in 1965 (Afoaku and Ukaga, 2001, 159; Weiss, 2003, 149; Blum, 2005, 637).

As a result of continued decolonization, overall membership in the UN continued to grow significantly from the mid-1960s to the late-1970s. At the same time, developing countries were increasingly dissatisfied with the abuse of the veto power by the permanent members and the lack of “equitable representation” for Asian and African countries on the various councils of the UN. Consequently, India and several developing countries proposed amendments to the UN Charter in 1979 to increase the number of non-permanent seats on the UNSC from 11 to 14 (Bourantonis, 2005, 31). In 1980, several African, Asian, and Latin American countries proposed increasing the number of non-permanent seats on the UNSC from 10 to 16 (Blum, 2005, 637). Unlike the previous effort to restructure the UNSC in the early 1960s, these subsequent efforts were unsuccessful largely because of heightened tensions between the U.S. and the Soviet Union during this period (Archibugi, 1993, 301).

With the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s, there was renewed interest in restructuring the UNSC to reflect the changes in the international political system (Russett et al., 1996, 65; Drifte, 2000, 114; Miyashita, 2002, 162). In December 1992, the UNGA approved a resolution sponsored by India calling upon the UN secretary-general to invite member-states to submit proposals for UNSC reform, resulting in proposals from some 80 countries (Drifte, 2000, 115). A year later, the UNGA established an “Open-Ended Working Group” to consider the proposals for UNSC reform (Daws, 1997, 256; Price, 2005, 8; Schlichtmann, 1999, 509; Bourantonis, 2005, 47). Several options for UNSC restructuring were among the proposals submitted to the working group, including a proposal by the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) calling for an increase in permanent seats from five to nine and non-permanent seats from ten to seventeen (Berween, 2002, 54-55).
In 1995, the UNGA approved the *Declaration on the 50th Anniversary of the United Nations*, which stated the UNSC should be “expanded and its working methods continue to be reviewed in a way that will further strengthen its capacity and effectiveness, enhance its representative character, and improve its working efficiency and transparency” (Schlichtmann, 1999, 510). Two years later, UN Ambassador Ismael Razali of Malaysia proposed adding five permanent seats (without veto power) and four non-permanent seats to the UNSC. The *Razali Plan*, which permitted the UNGA to choose the countries to be given permanent seats, was ultimately blocked by members of the NAM, as well as countries such as Italy, Egypt, Mexico, and Pakistan (Bourantonis, 2005, 77-82).

After a decade of sometimes intense debate on UN reform, Secretary-General Kofi Annan established a 16-member high-level panel in 2003 to evaluate and recommend specific options. In 2004, the panel proposed two different options for UNSC restructuring: (1) six new permanent seats without veto power and three additional non-permanent seats; and (2) eight four-year renewable seats and one additional non-permanent seat (Blum, 2005, 640-641; Price, 2005, 8). After debating these and other options for UNSC reform during much of 2005, the UNGA was unable to come to a consensus on how to restructure the council. Brazil’s UN Ambassador Ronaldo Mota Sardenberg expressed frustration with the outcome of the debate by stating that a “few countries, seeking to avoid any decision on this matter, take refuge on claims for consensus and on allegations on the disruptive nature of the issue” and that the actions of these countries “only contribute to the perpetuation of current inequalities in the structure of the organization, and to the frustration of the aspirations of all members, for a more balanced distribution of power in the work of the Security Council.”

The remainder of this article is divided into three sections. In the first section, we develop an analytical framework for examining the factors influencing strategy choices of aspiring permanent members of the UNSC. As a part of our preliminary analysis of the politics of seeking a permanent seat, we derive from the analytical framework several testable hypotheses. Our objective is to assess, from multiple levels of analysis, a wide range of plausible explanations of the strategy choices of aspiring permanent members of the UNSC. In the second section, we assess each of the hypotheses by analyzing in some depth the case of one particular aspiring permanent member. In the concluding section, we discuss the results of the preliminary analysis and the implications of the results for further research on the politics of seeking permanent representation on the UNSC.

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Analytical Framework

Since the establishment of the UN in 1945, several countries that were not granted one of the original five permanent seats on the UNSC have established the common goal of eventually obtaining a permanent seat (Malik, 2005, 19). This goal has been pursued by aspiring permanent members such as Japan, Germany, India, and Brazil in a variety of different ways, ranging from low-key, private lobbying to high-profile, public campaigning. For these countries, the particular strategy chosen may be one of their most important foreign policy decisions. In order to be successful, aspiring permanent members must convince two-thirds of the members of the UNGA to amend the UN Charter for the purpose of expanding the number of permanent seats, and they must convince two-thirds of the UN member-states, including the five existing permanent members, to ratify an amendment to the UN Charter. Furthermore, aspiring permanent members must convince other countries in their respective regions that they, more than other regional candidates, deserve permanent representation on the UNSC. As briefly described below, there are three broad strategy options available to aspiring permanent members of the UNSC.

First, the trial balloon strategy, which is the least aggressive of the available strategies, is intended to determine or measure the extent of support for or opposition to the goal of a permanent seat. The strategy consists of one or more of the following tactics: (1) private and public expressions of support by the government for UNSC restructuring; (2) private discussions with government officials of other countries about the possibility of seeking a permanent seat; (3) public expressions of interest in obtaining a permanent seat; and (4) formal announcement of candidacy for a permanent seat.

Second, the lobby strategy is intended to build support for a formal bid for a permanent seat by an aspiring permanent member of the UNSC from other members of the UN, including other countries seeking permanent seats. The lobby strategy, which is more aggressive than the trial balloon strategy, consists of one or more of the following tactics: (1) seek commitments of support from the governments of other UN member-states; (2) seek commitments of support from the governments of the existing permanent members; and (3) form coalitions with one or more other aspiring permanent members.

Finally, the negotiation strategy is intended to directly influence, mainly through public bargaining, the official decisions of the UN and UN member-states regarding UNSC restructuring. The negotiation strategy, which is the most aggressive of the available strategies, consists of one or more of the following tactics: (1) discussion of possible draft resolutions in the UNGA; (2) formal submission of draft resolutions in the UNGA regarding UNSC restructuring; (3) public statements indicating inflexibility or unwillingness to compromise on the goal of a permanent seat (hard bargaining); and (4) public statements indicating flexibility or willingness to compromise on the goal of a permanent seat (soft bargaining).
Given the set of available strategies for pursuing a permanent seat on the UNSC, what are the factors that influence the strategy choices of aspiring permanent members? Following the direction of scholars who have analyzed foreign policy decision-making, we argue that a variety of different constraints and pressures influence the choice of strategies. These constraints and pressures have international, regional, and domestic sources. Furthermore, we argue that the various factors from the international, regional, and domestic political systems may have both direct and indirect effects on the foreign policy decision making process of an aspiring permanent member (see figure 1). For example, we argue that changes in the international and regional political systems directly influence foreign policy decisions, but we also argue that changes in the international and regional political systems indirectly influence foreign policy decisions through their direct impact on the domestic political system.

**International Influences.** In recent decades, a number of prominent scholars have suggested that the foreign policy decisions of countries are largely influenced by factors originating at the level of the international political system (e.g. Gourevitch, 1978; Waltz, 1979; Ikenberry et al., 1988; Kaarbo et al., 2002). For example, Juliet Kaarbo et al. argued the “lack of an overarching government in the international system is one of the most important external conditions that affect foreign policy” (2002, 8). Specifically, the scholars suggested that “[w]ithout the protection of a legal system and an ‘international police force,’ states must look out for their own interests” and the “driving force…behind foreign policies is the constant need to acquire and safeguard one’s security and power” (2002, 9). Likewise, Peter Gourevitch suggested the “anarchy of the international environment poses a threat to states within it: the threat of being conquered, occupied, annihilated or made subservient” (1978, 896). Kenneth Waltz, however, pointed out that the presence of anarchy in the international political system is a constant (i.e. “enduring anarchic character of international politics”), and therefore, it is not particularly useful in explaining changes in the behaviors of countries (1979, 67).

![Figure 1. Influences on Foreign Policy Decision Making](image-url)
On the other hand, Waltz also argued the structure of the international system may be useful in explaining changes in the behaviors of countries. Specifically, he suggested the "structure of a system changes with changes in the distribution of capabilities across the system’s unit…and changes in structure change expectations about how the units of the system will behave and about the outcomes their interactions will produce" (1979, 97). In other words, the structure of the international political system directly influences the foreign policies of countries through changes in the distribution of power in the system. Indeed, the foreign policies of both declining global powers and rising global powers would be expected to change in response to changes in the global hierarchy. As an example, Waltz suggested the “increased international activity of Japan and Germany reflects the changing structure of international politics” at the end of the Cold War when both countries were relatively more powerful than they had been during most of the Cold War (1993, 64).

The structure of the international political system also indirectly influences the foreign policies of countries through its impact on the domestic political systems of these countries. In particular, Waltz predicted emerging major powers would inevitably “aspire to a larger political role” in the international political system and “internal inhibitions about becoming a great power are likely to turn into public criticisms of the government for not taking its proper place in the world” (1993, 61-66).

Below, we provide two specific implications of the broad argument that international-level factors influence foreign policy decisions:

**Hypothesis 1**: An aspiring permanent member of the UNSC is likely to pursue a more (less) aggressive strategy if it is (is not) a major power or emerging major power in the international political system.

**Hypothesis 2**: An aspiring permanent member of the UNSC is likely to change from a relatively less (more) aggressive strategy to a relatively more (less) aggressive strategy in response to changes in the distribution of power in the international political system that enhance (diminish) the relative power of the aspiring permanent member.

**Regional Influences.** Similar to the impact of international influences, foreign policy decisions may also be influenced by regional pressures and constraints. In particular, regional security arrangements and regional rivalries, as distinguished from global security arrangements and global rivalries, may influence foreign policy decisions. For example, one scholar argued “regional security processes may have considerable life apart from the global system and may refract the impact of the global system” (Morgan, 1997, 25). In addition, the influence of a regional security arrangement depends upon whether it is based upon cooperation or competition.
A regional collective security ("concert") system consists of regional powers working together in a cooperative or non-competitive manner to deal with any internal or external threats to the security and stability of the region (Kupchan and Kupchan, 1991, 116; Morgan, 1997, 34). As a result, regional powers in such systems are less likely to be threatened by each other’s foreign policy goals, including the desire to obtain permanent seats on the UNSC. According to some scholars, the *Concert of Europe* in the 19th century was an example of a collective (or cooperative) security system (Jervis, 1982, 362-365; Kupchan and Kupchan, 1991, 122-124).  

At the other end of the spectrum, a regional competitive security ("balance of power") system consists of regional powers unilaterally or multilaterally seeking to balance or contain the power of each other (Papayoanou, 1997, 135). In a competitive system, countries are motivated to seek security through a suitable or stable distribution of power (Morgan, 1997, 33). Consequently, the competing regional powers are more likely to be threatened by each other’s foreign policy goals, since one country’s relative gains are perceived by other regional powers as relative losses. The Middle Eastern and East Asian regions are contemporary examples of regional competitive security systems.

Finally, one might also suggest that in regions where there is a longstanding, and often bitter, rivalry between two regional powers, the rivalry itself can be a significant constraint on the foreign policies of both of the countries. Motivated to maximize its own relative power in the region, a regional power (state A) may be likely to use whatever influence it possesses to counter the influence of its regional rival (state B). This behavior on the part of the regional power (state A) may serve to constrain the potentially aggressive behavior of the regional rival (state B). Likewise, state B may be likely to use whatever influence it possesses to counter the influence of state A. An example of a pair of regional rivals that arguably have both pursued relatively non-aggressive foreign policies in the past few decades as a result of their regional rivalry is the case of Argentina and Brazil in South America (see Hilton, 1985).

On the other hand, the perceived military threat posed by a regional rival might also be a significant pressure on the foreign policy decisions of a country. Specifically, the government may choose to aggressively pursue its foreign policy goals—or at least be viewed by the public as aggressively pursuing its goals—in order to deal with the perceived threat posed by the regional rival. An example of a pair of regional rivals that arguably have both pursued relatively aggressive foreign policies in recent years (e.g. development and testing of nuclear weapons) is the case of India and Pakistan in South Asia.

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Below are two specific implications of the broader argument that regional pressures and constraints influence foreign policy decisions:

**Hypothesis 3**: An aspiring permanent member of the UNSC is likely to pursue a less (more) aggressive strategy if it exists within a region with a competitive security system (cooperative security system).

**Hypothesis 4**: An aspiring permanent member of the UNSC is likely to pursue a less (more) aggressive strategy if it has one or more regional rivals.

**Domestic Influences**. In contrast to the previous arguments focusing on external (global or regional) factors, several scholars have argued that a variety of internal (societal or domestic political) factors – including bureaucratic politics, public opinion, political culture, political parties, and constitutions – influence foreign policy decision making. For example, Graham Allison and Morton Halperin argued that “bargaining among players positioned hierarchically in the government” influences foreign policy decision-making (1972, 43). Allison and Halperin’s bureaucratic politics model (BPM) assumes foreign policy decisions result from bargaining among several government officials with “competitive, not homogenous interests,” including national security, organizational, domestic, and personal (1972, 44-48). The scholars concluded that each government official’s success in influencing the foreign policy decision is based on his or her “bargaining advantages, skill and will in using bargaining advantages, and other players’ perceptions of the first two ingredients” (1972, 50).

In addition to bureaucratic politics, several scholars have suggested there is a significant causal relationship between public opinion and government decision-making, including foreign policy decision-making (e.g. Page and Shapiro, 1983; Risse-Kappem, 1991; Hartley and Russett, 1992; Monroe, 1998). After examining previous research on the effect of public opinion on foreign policy decisions, Ole Holsti suggested there was “impressive correlational evidence” that changes in U.S. foreign policy over time were largely made in the direction favored by the public (1992, 459). In addition, Benjamin Page and Robert Shapiro concluded public opinion “is a factor that genuinely affects government policies in the United States” (1983, 1989).

Similarly, Alan Monroe found that on a majority of public policy issues, including foreign policy issues, there was “consistency between majority opinion and actual policy” in the U.S. during the period from 1980 to 1993 (1998, 12). However, Monroe indicated that the consistency between public opinion and public policy, with the exception of defense policy, had declined compared to the period from 1960 to 1979 (1998, 12-13). Some decades earlier, Gabriel Almond argued the influence of public opinion on national security policy varied among the three different types of public opinion: mass public, attention groups, and attentive public (1956, 376). He suggested the influence of the generally-uninformed mass public on
foreign policy decision making was relatively minimal, the influence of attention groups depended on the issue (e.g. American Jews and Israeli-Arab policy), and the influence of the attentive public was relatively significant (1956, 376-377).

Despite a wide range of research findings linking public opinion and public policy, other scholars have concluded mass public opinion does not have a significant direct effect on foreign policy decision making (e.g. Brooks, 1990, 522-523; Jacobs and Page, 2005, 15). In their comparative analysis of several actors—including organized interest groups (e.g. business groups and labor unions), epistemic communities (i.e. knowledge-based experts), and ordinary citizens (i.e. public opinion)—which appear to influence foreign policy decisions in the U.S., Lawrence Jacobs and Benjamin Page found that the “public does not appear to exert substantial, consistent influence on the makers of foreign policy” and “controlling for the past views of governmental and nongovernmental elites—officials tend perversely to move away from public opinion” (2005, 11).

Acknowledging that “the public may not formulate specific stable opinions about foreign policy,” Juliet Kaarbo et al. suggested that the political culture (“core values” or “underlying beliefs”) of a society may influence foreign policy decision making (2002, 14). Specifically, the authors argued that a society’s political culture represents the “values, norms, and traditions that are widely shared by its people and are relatively enduring over time” and these “enduring cultural features may also set parameters for foreign policy” (2002, 14-15). Furthermore, John Duffield argued that political culture was likely to have its greatest impact on foreign policy under two conditions: (1) when the international setting is characterized by relatively high levels of complexity, uncertainty, and ambiguity; and (2) when national policy is not the exclusive province of only one person or a very small number of decision makers (1999, 777). As an example of the impact of political culture on foreign policy decision making, Duffield examined post-Second World War Germany where “antimilitarism and even pacifism have acquired strong roots” (1999, 780).

Like political culture, some scholars have suggested that political parties and party systems influence foreign policy. Specifically, Kaarbo et al. argued that in single-party systems the dominant party’s “ideology can be important in setting the boundaries for debate over foreign policy decisions,” although “factions [of the dominant political party] may disagree over the direction of the country’s foreign policy” (2002, 16). The authors also suggested the competition among political parties in multiparty systems influences foreign policy since political parties “may attempt to distinguish themselves ideologically from each other, thus polarizing the debate over foreign policy” (2002, 16).

Finally, certain provisions of a country’s constitution may constrain the foreign policy decisions of chief executives in democracies. In particular, constitutional provisions related to the use of military force abroad have the potential to impact the outcome of the foreign policy decision making process. As an example, the U.S.
Constitution gives the president the enumerated power as commander-in-chief of the armed forces (Article II, Section 2). However, the U.S. Constitution also gives the U.S. Congress the enumerated power to declare war and to appropriate funds for the military (Article I, Section 8), and it gives the U.S. Senate the power to provide “advice and consent” on treaties signed by the president (Article II, Section 2). Regarding the latter congressional power, Auerswald and Maltzman argued the “advice and consent process is one of the central processes enumerated in the Constitution by which Congress can influence U.S. foreign policy” (2003, 1098). Furthermore, Reiter and Tillman argued “[c]onstitutions that require legislative ratification of any international treaty signed by the executive accord relatively more foreign policy power to the legislature” and “[s]uch legislative involvement in treaty ratification is likely to extend to other areas of foreign policy” (2002, 816).

Here again, there are several implications of the broad argument that a variety of domestic-level pressures and constraints directly influence foreign policy decisions:

**Hypothesis 5**: An aspiring permanent member of the UNSC is likely to pursue a less (more) aggressive strategy if a particular government agency within the country that is generally supportive of an aggressive strategy is relatively less (more) powerful than a government agency that is generally opposed to an aggressive strategy.

**Hypothesis 6**: An aspiring permanent member of the UNSC is likely to pursue a less (more) aggressive strategy if public opinion is generally opposed to (supportive of) an aggressive strategy.

**Hypothesis 7**: An aspiring permanent member of the UNSC is likely to pursue a less (more) aggressive strategy if an important aspect of the political culture is pacifism (militarism).

**Hypothesis 8**: An aspiring permanent member of the UNSC is likely to pursue a less (more) aggressive strategy if the dominant political party is generally opposed to (supportive of) an aggressive strategy.

**Hypothesis 9**: An aspiring permanent member of the UNSC is likely to pursue a less (more) aggressive strategy if there are (are not) significant constitutional constraints on the external use of military force.

**Case Study Analysis**

In order to test the preceding hypotheses, we analyze the case of Japan, which has been an aspiring permanent member of the UNSC since the 1960s. The case of Japan was selected for three reasons. First, Japan is one of several countries that have formally announced candidacies for permanent seats. Other countries that have also formally launched bids for permanent seats include Germany, India, Brazil,
Indonesia, Nigeria, South Africa, and Egypt. Second, many scholars and policymakers consider Japan to be among the “most obvious” candidates for a new permanent seat (Soussan, 2005, 56). In other words, Japan is seen as a “legitimate candidate” for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council (GSC). As one of the largest global economic powers, Japan contributes more financially to the UN than four of the current permanent members – Britain, China, France, and Russia – combined (Thakur, 2004, 73). In fact, Japan contributed nearly 20 percent of the regular UN budget in 2004, compared to the 22 percent contributed by the U.S. (Blum, 2005, 638). Finally, Japan has adopted over the past several decades each of the three basic strategies for pursuing a permanent seat on the UNSC. Because of its unique position in any discussion of UNSC restructuring, the case of Japan presents an excellent opportunity to analyze the effects that international, regional, and domestic constraints and pressures have on the strategy choices of an aspiring permanent member.

Japan’s Pursuit of a Permanent Security Council Seat. Japan was not formally admitted into the UN until December 1956, some eleven years after the establishment of the UN and four years after the end of the post-Second World War occupation by the U.S. military. Nevertheless, the Japanese government expressed support for revisions to the UN Charter – particularly the elimination of the “enemy state” clauses of the UN Charter – just a few months after it was admitted into the UN (Drifte, 2000, 20-21). While it is unclear when the Japanese government first established the goal of seeking a permanent seat on the UNSC, there is compelling evidence that government officials were at least discussing the matter in the early 1960s. Responding to a question from a member of the Japanese parliament in March 1964, Foreign Minister Masayoshi Ohira suggested with “reference to the question of our country seeking permanent membership in the Security Council, we are prepared to do our utmost to realize this when it becomes apparent that the majority of the nations favors this step and when the time is regarded as opportune” (Drifte, 2000, 20). This marked the beginning of the “trial balloon” strategy in Japan’s pursuit of a permanent seat on the UNSC.

Subsequently, other Japanese government officials alluded to the goal of obtaining a permanent seat on the UNSC. For example, Senjin Tsuruoka, Japan’s ambassador to the UN, was said to have told a reporter in August 1967 that it was not unrealistic for Japan to become a permanent member (Drifte, 2000, 25-26). A year later, the ambassador suggested Japan would become a permanent member because of its economic capabilities (Drifte, 2000, 26). Foreign Minister Kiichi Aichi, speaking before the UNGA in September 1969, suggested the composition of

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6 The Soviet Union vetoed Japan’s application for admission into the UN three times between 1952 and 1956.
7 Articles 53 and 107 of the UN Charter refer to “enemy states” which are those countries that were enemies of the original signatories of the UN Charter, including Germany and Japan.
the UNSC ought to be restructured to include countries that were “truly representative of the various regions of the world” (Drifte, 2000, 26).

During the 1970s, U.S. government officials expressed support on several occasions for a permanent seat on the UNSC for Japan. For example, U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers expressed support for a permanent seat for Japan in a speech before the UNGA in September 1972, and President Richard Nixon reaffirmed U.S. support in a joint declaration with Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka in August 1973 (Drifte, 2000, 43-44). In addition, President Jimmy Carter expressed support following a summit meeting with Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda in 1977 (Watanabe, 2005).

Although U.S. government officials encouraged Japan to seek a permanent seat on the UNSC throughout the 1970s, Japan did not take any substantial steps toward this goal until the early 1990s. In October 1991, a special committee of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) released a report proposing Japan seek a permanent seat. One month later, Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa called for changes in permanent membership, but stopped short of suggesting Japan should seek a permanent seat. In September 1992, Cabinet Secretary Koichi Kato expressed support for the NAM’s call for UNSC reform, but declined to comment on the organization’s proposal to abolish the veto power. It was also reported at that time Japan was “quietly urging” other countries to support its bid for a permanent seat.

In September 1993, Prime Minister Morohiro Hosokawa addressed the UNGA but did not request a permanent seat for Japan on the UNSC. Later, he commented “if other countries recommend [that Japan obtain a permanent seat], Japan is ready to take up the challenge. But we will not press our way through. We will not conduct a campaign.” Japan’s ambassador to the UN, Hisashi Owada, stated in a speech before the UNGA in March 1994 that his country “reemphasizes its firm determination” to apply for a permanent seat, but his speech was apparently not approved by Prime Minister Hosokawa (Ahn, 1997, 370-371). Ambassador Owada made the first semi-official statement regarding Japan’s candidacy for a permanent seat in June 1994 when he told the UN Working Group that Japan had “renewed its bid to become a permanent member.” During his speech before the UNGA in September 1994, Foreign Minister Yohei Kono stated “Japan is prepared, with the endorsement of many countries, to assume its responsibilities as a permanent member of the Security Council” (Hiroshi, 1995, 437). This speech signaled a shift from the “trial balloon” strategy to the lobby strategy. In October 1994, Finance Minister Takemura Masayoshi told the parliament that the country “did not blindly seek the [UNSC seat] without further discussions within the nation” and the foreign

10 Foreign Broadcast Information Service-East Asia (FBIS-EAS), September 9, 1992, 11.
12 Foreign Broadcast Information Service-East Asia (FBIS-EAS), June 9, 1994, 7.
The minister’s address to the UNGA “should be regarded as the starting point for promoting foreign and domestic discussions and reaching a national consensus” (Ahn, 1997, 374).

For more than a decade, Japan cautiously but persistently lobbied other countries for support of its bid for a permanent seat on the UNSC. In fact, Japanese government officials frequently lobbied visiting government officials from other countries. For example, Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto was reported to have lobbied visiting government officials from South Africa, Italy, Burkina Faso, Botswana, Mozambique, and Swaziland in 1998. Furthermore, Japan also successfully lobbied for support from the U.S. and other existing permanent members. U.S. government officials, including President Bill Clinton, expressed support for a permanent seat for Japan on several occasions beginning in January 1993 (Drifte, 2000, 139-140). Although initially cautious about supporting Japan’s bid for a permanent seat in the early 1990s, Britain and France expressed support for Japan’s bid in 1994 (Drifte, 2000, 141-142). The foreign ministers of both countries reaffirmed support for Japan’s bid for a permanent seat during speeches before the UNGA in September 2004.

In addition to lobbying efforts to secure support from other UN member-states, Japan formed a coalition – known as the “Group of Four” or “G-4” – in September 2004 with three other aspiring permanent members of the UNSC, namely Brazil, Germany, and India. Subsequently, the G-4 countries reaffirmed their support for each other’s bids for permanent seats. For example, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi visited India in April 2005 and signed a joint statement with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh committing both countries to a “high level strategic dialogue” and to support each other’s bid for a permanent seat.

In May 2005, Japan’s strategy for obtaining a permanent seat noticeably shifted from a lobby strategy to a negotiation strategy when Japan and the other members of the G-4 circulated a draft resolution in the UNGA calling for the expansion of the UNSC from 15 to 25 members and permanent seats for themselves and two African countries. As a part of the negotiation strategy, the G-4 countries immediately proposed a 15-year freeze on the veto power for new permanent members as an effort to influence the votes of UN member-states who were opposed to the extension of the veto power to additional permanent members.

Both China and the U.S. were strongly opposed to the G-4 draft resolution regarding UNSC reform, and in fact, the countries were reported to have agreed to

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16 Agence France Presse (AFP), April 29, 2005.
work together to derail the G-4 proposal. China’s foreign ministry spokesman Liu Jianchao responded to the G-4 proposal by suggesting that for “a few countries to force through an immature proposal, it has derailed Security Council reform and gravely undermined any potential progress of UN reform” (Bezlova, 2005b). Meanwhile, the U.S. proposed an expansion of the permanent membership of the UNSC from five to only seven seats. In response, Prime Minister Koizumi stated, “Japan can’t buy this [U.S.] proposal. We must stick to cooperation among the G-4, and the four countries must stick together” (Curtin, 2005). In addition, a Japanese diplomat suggested that “[f]or the moment, the U.S. has derailed our [UNSC] strategy” (Curtin, 2005).

Despite Chinese and U.S. opposition, foreign ministers representing the G-4 countries held negotiations regarding UNSC reform in July 2005 with their counterparts from Ghana and Nigeria, who were representing the African Union (AU). The G-4 countries aggressively sought African support for their UNSC reform proposal, which included the 15-year freeze on veto power for new permanent members. However, the African countries had previously demanded two permanent seats with veto power. According to Foreign Minister Olu Adeniji of Nigeria, “[e]verything in the draft resolution, everything in any draft resolution, until it is adopted, is still up for negotiations because it is a game of numbers.” Despite the negotiations, representatives of the AU meeting in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia rejected the G-4 proposal in August 2005.

During this same time period, Japan made it known there could be negative consequences if it failed to secure a permanent seat on the UNSC. At the same time G-4 negotiations were taking place with representatives of African countries, Japanese Foreign Minister Nobutaka Machimura was reported to have stated the Japanese public might demand a reduction to contributions to the UN if the country did not obtain a permanent seat. Nevertheless, the UNGA failed to approve any of the proposals for UNSC reform during a summit of world leaders in September 2005. Lacking two-thirds support for the G-4 resolution in the UNGA, Japan reportedly chose to refocus its strategy towards negotiations with the U.S. and China in late 2005. The Japanese foreign ministry held “consultations” regarding UN reform with Chinese government officials in Beijing in December 2005. Japanese leaders were also reported to have decided that instead of joining the G-4 coalition in

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Since the mid 1960s, Japanese leaders have adopted each of the three broad strategies for pursuing a permanent seat on the UNSC. From March 1964 to September 1994, Japan pursued a “trial balloon” strategy culminating with the announcement of an official bid for a permanent seat. From September 1994 to May 2005, Japan pursued a “lobby” strategy resulting in expressions of support for its bid by dozens of UN member-states, including most of the existing permanent members of the UNSC. In addition, Japan participated in a coalition (“G-4”) with other aspiring permanent members. Since May 2005, Japan has focused on a strategy emphasizing negotiations with UN member-states, including current permanent members of the UNSC, other aspiring permanent members, and African countries. In the sections below, we examine the influence of international, regional, and domestic pressures and constraints on Japanese foreign policy, including the pursuit of a permanent seat on the UNSC.

**International Influences on Japanese Foreign Policy.** There is evidence that factors originating at the level of the international political system have broadly influenced Japanese foreign policy since the end of the Second World War, including Japan’s strategy for obtaining a permanent seat on the UNSC. First and foremost, Japanese foreign policy was constrained by the bipolar structure of the international political system, and more specifically, the global rivalry between the U.S. and Soviet Union during the Cold War period (Miyashita, 2002, 145). Many scholars have argued that bilateral security agreements with the U.S. during this period constrained Japan from aggressively pursuing an independent foreign policy based on its own national interests. For example, Susan Shirk suggested “Japan, dependent on the United States for its security, lacked the autonomy to be a regional player” (1997, 254). In addition, Kent Calder characterized Japan during the Cold War period as a “reactive state,” meaning that the “impetus to policy change is typically supplied by outside pressure, and that reaction prevails over strategy in the relatively narrow range of cases where the two come into conflict” (1988, 518).

Other scholars have suggested Japanese foreign policy decision-makers adhered to a common doctrine during the entire Cold War period, largely because of the fact that Japanese foreign policy was “implemented in a world in which developments were linked to, or decided by, the Cold War bifurcation of the world” (Edstrom, 2004, 63). Indeed, Japan’s foreign policy during the Cold War period, known as the Yoshida doctrine, was primarily a reaction to international constraints resulting

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27 The Yoshida Doctrine was named after the Japanese prime minister, Shigeru Yoshia, who served from 1946 to 1947 and from 1948 to 1954.
from the Second World War (Edstrom, 2004, 63-64). Under the Yoshida doctrine, Japan was able to “concentrate on economic growth while depending on the United States to maintain Japanese security” (Pyle, 1989, 51). However, Japan was called upon to provide economic assistance to non-communist regimes in Asia during the Vietnam War period. Chaiwat Khamchoo suggested “Japan was under international pressure, particularly from the United States, to increase aid to countries adjacent to areas of international conflict and deemed strategically important to the west” (1991, 11).

Global events in the early 1990s - including the collapse of the bipolar international system, the end of the Cold War, and the Persian Gulf War - had significant consequences for Japanese foreign policy. In particular, Japanese leaders faced considerable international pressures to enhance the country’s role in maintaining global peace and security. Following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, the U.S. government made several official requests of the Japanese government, including financial, economic, and military contributions to the multinational effort to oust Iraqi troops from Kuwait (Shinoda, 2004, 46). Although Japan was dependent on oil from the Middle East, the government rejected a request by the U.S. in late-August 1990 to send minesweepers and tankers to the Persian Gulf (Zisk, 2001, 25; Miyashita, 2002, 159). In early September 1990, U.S. government officials urged Japan to increase its financial contributions to the military effort in the Persian Gulf region; Japan responded by pledging $3 billion (Miyashita, 2002, 160). Despite its eventual contribution of some $13 billion to the war effort, Japan faced strong international criticism for not shouldering more of the burden of the Persian Gulf War (Ryu, 2005). Some of the strongest criticism came from government officials and politicians in the U.S. (Rowley and Awanohara, 1991, 46-47).

Facing international pressure, Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu of the LDP introduced the United Nations Peace Cooperation Bill in the Japanese parliament in October 1990. The legislation would have permitted Japanese military personnel to serve overseas in UN peacekeeping missions (Miyashita, 2002, 160). According to Chaiwat Khamchoo, the legislation “was apparently proposed under heavy pressure from the United States who wanted Japan not only to provide funds but also to send Japanese personnel to join multinational forces arrayed against Iraq in the Persian Gulf” (1991, 16). However, the legislation was withdrawn from consideration a month later due to the lack of support from opposition political parties, the Japanese public, and even some members of the LDP (Purrington, 1992, 165; Katzenstein and Okawara, 1993, 109; Zisk, 2001, 26; Miyashita, 2002, 160-161). Ultimately, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 and Japan’s difficulty in dealing with international pressure to militarily participate in the multinational response to the invasion arguably triggered the beginning of a significant shift in Japanese foreign policy, including the shift in Japan’s strategy for pursuing a permanent seat on the UNSC from trial balloon strategy to lobbying strategy in 1994. According to Courtney Purrington, the “Iraq Shock” led to the “realization that Japan was ill
prepared to respond to the demands of a new international system” and that a “consensus was reached that Japan must play a more active role in international affairs” (1992, 169).

In January 1991, Prime Minister Kaifu decided following debate within the ruling LDP and government agencies to deploy Self-Defense Forces (SDF) transport planes and personnel to the Persian Gulf region to assist with the evacuation of refugees. However, due to a lack of public support and other reasons the deployment ultimately did not occur (Rowley and Awanohara, 1991, 10; Purrington, 1992, 165). In response to informal requests by Saudi Arabia and the U.S., the Japanese government decided to send six Japanese minesweepers and 500 SDF personnel to the Persian Gulf region in April 1991, which was the first deployment of Japanese military personnel and ships in an overseas mission since 1945 (Purrington, 1992, 171; Zisk, 2001, 26; Miyashita, 2002, 161). In May 1991, Prime Minister Kaifu, sensitive to regional concerns about the deployment of SDF personnel overseas, traveled to several Asian countries to discuss a regional, multilateral security alliance and Japan’s involvement in international peacekeeping operations. 28 During his trip, Prime Minister Kaifu commented, “I feel acutely that Japan is expected to make even greater contributions in the Asia-Pacific region, not only in the economic sphere, but in the political sphere as well.” 29

In 1992, the Japanese government introduced the *International Peace Cooperation Bill* in the parliament. Unlike the previous legislation, this bill restricted itself to authorizing SDF participation in non-combat missions and humanitarian efforts. Under the revised legislation, Japanese participation in UN peacekeeping operations was only allowed if the parties to a conflict agreed to a cease-fire, if the parties accepted the peacekeeping force, and if the peacekeeping force was understood to be neutral. In addition, SDF personnel were not allowed to serve under UN operational command during peacekeeping operations in order to ensure Japanese personnel could not become involved in combat-related missions (Simon, 1994, 1056; Miyashita, 2002, 162). In June 1992, the parliament approved the *International Peace Cooperation Bill* largely with the support of LDP members (Miyashita, 2002, 162). Soon after passage of the 1992 law, Japan deployed some 600 SDF personnel to participate in a UN peacekeeping mission in Cambodia (Brown, 1994, 440; Szechenyi, 2006, 140). SDF personnel were subsequently deployed in peacekeeping missions throughout the world, including Mozambique (1993-1995), Zaire (1994), and the Golan Heights (1996) (Miyashita, 2002, 163).

Japan experienced further international pressure to expand its role in maintaining global peace and security following the terrorist attacks in the U.S. in September 2001. Much like the early 1990s, Japan reacted to the increasing international pressure following the terrorist attacks of 9-11 with a noticeable shift in

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its overall foreign policy, including a change in strategy for pursuing a permanent seat on the UNSC from lobbying to negotiation. Nicholas Szechenyi recently noted that “as the United States transforms its global military posture to face the challenges of the post-September 11 era, Japan is exploring ways to assume a greater defense burden and to accept new roles and missions as a U.S. alliance partner” (2006, 139). Szechenyi added that such changes in Japanese security policy would also “respond to international pressure for Japan to become a ‘normal nation’” (2006, 139-140). Professor Yoko Iwana of the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies suggested Japan’s more active foreign policy was at least partly a consequence of “increased U.S. expectations” following the terrorist attacks (Kakuchi, 2004). In fact, Prime Minister Koizumi responded to the events of 9/11 by expressing support for the U.S.-led global war on terrorism and indicated Japan “would be prepared to make a pre-emptive strike against a foreign threat” (Green, 2003). It was suggested that Koizumi’s comments “reflect the change occurring in Japan’s defense policy from pacifism to a more robust, deterrent-oriented posture” (Shuja, 2004, 207).

In response to 9/11, the Japanese parliament approved the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law in October 2001, permitting SDF naval forces to assist in the refueling of U.S. and British naval forces in the Indian Ocean involved in anti-terrorism efforts (Ryu, 2005; Szechenyi, 2006, 140). At the same, however, it was reported that Prime Minister Koizumi “resisted U.S. pressure” to deploy destroyers to the Indian Ocean (Berkofsky, 2002). In December 2001, the 1992 International Peace Cooperation Law was amended to permit SDF personnel to be involved in broader array of UN peacekeeping missions, including “monitoring ceasefires, disarming local forces, patrolling demilitarized zones, inspecting the transport of weapons, and collecting and disposing of abandoned weapons” (Ishizuka, 2002, 24-25). The amendment was submitted to the parliament by the Japanese coalition government headed by Prime Minister Koizumi in anticipation of Japanese participation in a peacekeeping mission in Afghanistan following the fall of the Taliban government (Berkofsky, 2001).

At the time of the U.S. invasion of Iraq in March 2003, Prime Minister Koizumi stated he had “come to the conclusion that as a responsible member of the international community, it is in accordance with our national interests to support the actions taken by the United States and its coalition partners.”30 After the collapse of the government of Saddam Hussein a few weeks later, the Japanese government approved the deployment of more than 1,000 SDF personnel to Iraq in a strictly humanitarian capacity.31 After three Japanese nationals were taken hostage in Iraq in

April 2004, Prime Minister Koizumi defied domestic political pressure and refused to order the withdrawal of Japanese personnel from Iraq.\[^{32}\]

**Regional Influences on Japanese Foreign Policy.** Throughout much of the Cold War period, the U.S.-Soviet Union “confrontation was a fundamental factor in shaping the political processes in Asia and in the Pacific region” (Simai, 1995, 324). Indeed, Japan and South Korea were strongly allied with the U.S. against the Soviet Union and other communist regimes in China and North Korea. The U.S. decision to pursue an “active Cold War strategy” in Asia after the Second World War constrained Japan’s foreign policy options in the region (Khamchoo, 1991, 8). Even as late as the mid-1980s, Japan was “experiencing an increasing military threat and continual political pressure from the Soviet Union as a result of the latter’s rapidly expanding military power in East Asia” (Langdon, 1996, 397).

After the end of the Cold War, some scholars suggested a multipolar system had emerged in the region with the Russia, China, and Japan as important regional powers (Betts, 1993/1994, 41-48). For example, Sheldon Simon suggested in the mid-1990s that security concerns in the Asia-Pacific region “reflect the growing multipolarity” of the region and “multipolarity implies a balance of power arrangement rather than hegemony” (1996, 390). Unlike recent trends in Europe and other regions of the world, there is no emerging regional security arrangement based on cooperative or collective security in the Asia-Pacific region. Instead, the region has retained its traditional balance of power or competitive security system. According to Simon, this region has “resisted collective security schemes” because “it has always been a multidimensional security environment with no single source of threat but rather the presence of many large actors” such as the U.S., Russia, China, and Japan (1994, 1061). Simon concluded the “absence of a consensual source of threat” was “clearly not conducive to collective security under which all states would agree to coalesce against any of their own number who would upset the status quo through the use of force” (1996, 395).

Consequently, the competitive security system in the Asia-Pacific region remains an important constraint on foreign policy decision-making in Japan. Rather than viewing Japan’s bid for a permanent seat on the UNSC as a harmless attempt to enhance its role in maintaining international peace and security, regional powers view Japan’s bid for a permanent seat with considerable suspicion. Indeed, some regional powers consider the effort as a threatening attempt to enhance Japanese power in the region. As a result, most of the major powers in the Asia-Pacific region have opposed the Japanese bid for a permanent seat.

As two of the five permanent members of the UNSC, Russia and China are crucial in the ultimate success or failure of Japan’s bid for a permanent seat. For a

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variety of reasons, including the unresolved dispute over the southern Kurile Islands, the relationship between Japan and Russia continues to be strained since the end of the Cold War. Eugene Brown suggested the “lingering animosity, combined with Russia’s still formidable military capabilities in the Far East region, presents Japan with a continuing threat to its national security” (1994, 434). Nevertheless, Japan provided financial assistance to Russia to support the country’s “transition to democracy and a market economy” in the 1990s (Miyashita, 2002, 157). As a result, Russia was publicly supportive of Japan’s bid for a permanent seat in the 1990s. Indeed, President Boris Yeltsin and other high ranking government officials expressed support for Japan’s bid for a permanent seat on at least three occasions in 1997 and 1998 (Drifte, 2000, 143).

Japan has also viewed China’s military buildup since the end of the Cold War as another potential threat to its national security. Brown noted that for Japanese foreign policy decision makers there is “a heightened sensitivity that Beijing’s enhanced military capability coupled with its renewed assertiveness over territorial issues could translate into a destabilizing Chinese bid for regional hegemony in the post-Cold War Asia” (1994, 435). In addition, Yong Deng suggested the “unprecedented economic integration of China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong in the 1990s has triggered concern among some Japanese about the possible Chinese domination in the region” (1997, 389). At the same time, China has also been suspicious of Japan’s foreign and security policies in the post-Cold War period, including Japan’s relationship with Taiwan. Deng indicated “[m]utual distrust dictates that both China and Japan will keep a wary eye on each other’s regional ambitions” and the “result is the lack of a stable consensus on the kind of role either party would like to assign to the other, thereby precluding any significant political collaboration in organizing regional affairs” (1997, 388).

Unlike Russia, China has been deliberately ambiguous regarding Japan’s bid for a permanent seat (Malik, 2005, 20). In December 1993, a Chinese foreign ministry official stated “when the time is ripe, China will in principle agree to expanding the membership” of the UNSC.33 Shen Guofong, a Chinese foreign ministry spokesman, stated in September 1994 that while China “understands Japan’s desire to play a greater role in the UN,” it believed extended debate and consultations were necessary before Japan could acquire a permanent seat.34 Since 1994, China’s policy regarding Japan’s goal of a permanent seat has essentially remained unchanged. Indeed, Ambassador Wang Guangya of China stated on June 26, 2005 that “Japan will have to obtain a consensus in its region before it can think of sitting on the Security Council” (Bulard, 2005). Furthermore, Chen Xiangyang of the China Institute for International Relations noted that in “its pursuit of a UN Security Council seat, Tokyo has shown little respect for the sensibilities of its neighbors and former wartime enemies” (Bezlova, 2005a).

33 Foreign Broadcast Information Service-China (FBIS-CHI), December 27, 1993, 4.
34 Foreign Broadcast Information Service-China (FBIS-CHI), September 16, 1994, 1.
In addition to the regional influences of Russia and China, Japan’s foreign policy is also influenced by regional rivalries with North and South Korea. As a result of their bitter experiences with Japan during the Second World War, both Koreas oppose an expanded regional or international role for Japan (Soni, 1999). In addition, the governments of North and South Korea have suggested Japan has not sufficiently apologized for its aggression and atrocities during the war. Nevertheless, South Korea was initially restrained in its opposition to Japan’s bid for a permanent seat on the UNSC. In February 1993, a South Korean foreign ministry official stated “it is far too early to comment on specific countries who are seeking membership.” In addition, the official hinted Japan needed to apologize for its aggression in East Asia in the 1930s and 1940s before it seeks a permanent seat.35

Following a September 1994 visit to South Korea, LDP Vice-President Keizo Obuchi suggested he had the impression South Korea would not block Japan’s bid for a permanent seat, although South Korea’s Foreign Minister Han Sung-chu announced in October 1994 his country would not support granting the veto power to any new permanent members.36 Since the mid-1990s, South Korea has been more explicit about its opposition to Japan’s bid for a permanent seat (Drifte, 2000, 131). This opposition was particularly visible after Japan formed a coalition with other aspiring permanent members of the UNSC in September 2004. In fact, South Korean Ambassador to the UN, Kim Sam-hoon, stated in March 2005 that regarding Japan’s bid for a permanent seat, a “country that does not have the trust of its neighbors cannot play a leadership role in the international society” (Deen, 2005). Furthermore, the South Korean ambassador stated in an interview in April 2005 “[w]e do not think Japan has the qualifications to become a UN Security Council member, and we will try to make sure that it does not.”37

While Japan’s overall relations with South Korea have been “fundamentally sound” since the early 1990s, Japan has viewed North Korea as a “mounting security threat” during this period, partly as a result of North Korea’s threat to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NNPT) in March 1993 and North Korea’s test firing of a missile capable of striking Japan in June 1993 (Brown, 1994, 437). Tensions between the countries escalated to hostilities in December 2001 when Japanese coastguard ships sank a North Korea spy ship in the East China Sea.38 Compared to China and South Korea, North Korea has been much more strident in its opposition to Japan’s bid for a permanent seat. In February 1992, a foreign ministry spokesman stated Japan was not qualified to become a permanent member since it had “not dealt properly” with the issues related to Japan’s aggression during

35 Foreign Broadcast Information Service-East Asia (FBIS-EAS), February 9, 1993, 45.
36 Foreign Broadcast Information Service-East Asia (FBIS-EAS), September 19, 1994, 51; FBIS-EAS, October 4, 1994, 8.
the Second World War. Similarly, a North Korea government official suggested in November 1994 that “the Asian countries which suffered from aggression of Japan and feel the danger of the revival of Japanese militarism in every fiber of their being will never be taken in by any trick of Japan.” North Korean opposition to Japan’s bid for a permanent seat did not abate during the subsequent decade. In January 2005, Rodong Sinmun, spokesman for the North Korean government, expressed opposition to Japan’s bid for a permanent seat due to Japan’s refusal to confess to atrocities committed during its colonial rule of the Korean peninsula from 1910 to 1945.

Clearly, the existence of several regional rivals in Asia poses both constraints and pressures on Japanese foreign policy. On the one hand, political opposition by regional rivals has hindered Japan’s ability to aggressively pursue its foreign policy goals, including a permanent seat on the UNSC. On the other hand, the perceived threat of regional rivals, particularly China and North Korea, to the national security of Japan has simultaneously pushed the government to aggressively pursue its foreign policy goals.

**Domestic Influences on Japanese Foreign Policy.** In addition to international and regional influences, there have also been several domestic constraints and pressures on Japanese foreign policy since the end of the Second World War, including political culture, constitutional provisions, bureaucratic politics, political parties, and public opinion. In the past several decades, Japan’s “pacifist” (or “anti-militarist”) political culture has constrained foreign policy decision-makers who believe Japan’s bid for a permanent seat on the UNSC would be enhanced if it could contribute militarily to international peacekeeping and peace-enforcement missions. As in the case of Germany, this aspect of Japan’s political culture emerged following its devastating defeat in the Second World War. According to Kimberley Zisk, the “Japanese people were terribly scarred by the immense material sacrifices they were expected to make during the war, by bombing campaigns inflicted on Japanese territory, and by the humiliation of defeat, and they were encouraged by the American occupation forces to blame the uniformed military for starting an unwinnable war and ultimately leaving them in ruin and poverty” (2001, 23). Likewise, Thomas Berger argued “anti-militarism is one of the most striking features of contemporary Japanese politics and has its roots in the collective Japanese memories of the militarist takeover in the 1930s and the subsequent disastrous decision to go to war with America” (1993, 120).

Japan’s pacifist political culture has remained very strong throughout the post-Second World War period, but some scholars have suggested nationalism may be an increasing aspect of Japanese political culture in the 21st century. For example,

39 *Foreign Broadcast Information Service- China* (FBIS-CHI), February 19, 1992, 8.
40 *Foreign Broadcast Information Service- East Asia* (FBIS-EAS), November 8, 1994, 52.
Robert Scalapino, argued “[n]ationalism is rising in Japan as elsewhere, especially among younger generations who are essentially liberated from guilt for the past” (2003, 79). Other scholars have suggested the Japanese have become less pacifist as a result of global terrorism and the threat posed by neighboring North Korea (Shuja, 2004, 207). As with other changes since the end of the Cold War, a shift in the political culture away from pacifism and anti-militarism has arguably contributed to pressure on Japanese leaders to pursue an increasingly aggressive foreign policy.

There is also evidence that Japanese foreign policy has similarly been constrained by Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution (“peace constitution”) in which the Japanese “forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes.” According to Edward Lincoln, “sending soldiers abroad to engage in combat even as part of UN- or U.S.-led coalitions remains political unacceptable” as a result of Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution (2003, 115). Until the passage of the International Peace Cooperation Bill in 1992, the “peace constitution” was a significant obstacle to Japanese participation in UN peacekeeping and other military missions. For example, Japan rejected a request by UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold in June 1958 to contribute to a peacekeeping mission in Lebanon, citing constitutional prohibitions on the overseas deployment of Self-Defense Forces (SDF) (Ishizuka, 2002, 3). Also, Japan turned down U.S. President Ronald Reagan’s request to send SDF minesweepers to the Persian Gulf region in 1987 (Ishizuka, 2002, 9). Since 1992, Japan has participated in some UN missions, but only in a limited manner.

Although some scholars and politicians in Japan have proposed amending Article 9, Japanese public opinion has consistently opposed such amendments. According to a survey conducted by Asahi Shimbun in April 2005, some 56 percent of respondents supported amending the constitution in order to clarify the military role of the SDF. However, only 36 percent of the respondents supported changing the war-renouncing Article 9, while 51 percent of the respondents opposed amending Article 9.

The constraint placed by the “peace constitution” upon Japan’s ability to participate in UN peacekeeping and other military missions have arguably hindered its quest for a permanent seat on the UNSC. Indeed, Jamie Miyazaki suggested that despite “its larger international role and its non-combat work in Afghanistan and Iraq…Japan’s war renouncing constitution may stand in the way of a permanent council seat” (2004). He further argued that permanent members of the UNSC “are not supposed to flinch from overseas combat, but fight if necessary to maintain international peace and security” (Miyazaki, 2004).

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In addition to the influence of political culture and constitutional provisions, there is some evidence that governmental structure and bureaucratic politics have influenced Japanese foreign policy since the end of the Second World War.\footnote{There is also evidence that bureaucratic politics influenced Japanese foreign policy prior to the Second World War. Indeed, Chihiro Hosoya argued the “bureaucrats politics model seems to be even more workable as a conceptual scheme in the case of Japan’s decision for Pearl Harbor than it is in the case of the Cuban missile crisis” (1974, 356).} Perhaps most importantly, the “fragmented character of state authority” in Japan has been a constraint on foreign policy decision making, in the sense that “decisive action” is much more difficult compared to countries with strong chief executives (Calder, 1988, 528). For example, Chihiro Hosoya argued the “Japanese Prime Minister continues to hold less power in the formation of foreign policy than the President of the United States” (1974, 367). As a consequence, foreign policy decisions in Japan have been greatly influenced by a variety of governmental ministries and agencies, including the Japanese Defense Agency (JDA),\footnote{The Japanese Defense Agency (JDA) was upgraded to a cabinet-level ministry, known as the Ministry of Defense (MOD), on January 7, 2007.} the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), and the Ministry of Finance (MOF) (Ahn, 1998, 42).

Compared to the JDA and other government bureaucracies, however, the Japanese MOFA occupies a dominant position in the national security and foreign policy decision-making process (Zisk, 2001, 32). Peter Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara suggested the reason MOFA is relatively more powerful than the JDA is because the “structure of the Japanese state has made it virtually impossible…for an autonomous and powerful military establishment to emerge in Japan” (1993, 86). The scholars indicated that the lack of institutional autonomy has meant at least four of the top eleven positions within the JDA are always occupied by officials on “temporary assignment” from the MOF and MOFA (1993, 95). In addition, Katzenstein and Okawara argued military professionals in Japan are institutionally limited in their ability to access the policy-making process in the government as a result of civilian control over the SDF, the lack of minister-level representation in the cabinet, and the isolation of the military from Japanese society (1993, 86).

The MOFA’s institutional dominance over the JDA has had important consequences for Japanese foreign policy, although the MOFA has not always been able to get its way in bureaucratic “turf battles” with the JDA. For example, the MOFA and the JDA had “sharp differences of opinion” over whether or not Japan should contribute military personnel to a UN peacekeeping mission in the Horn of Africa in 2000 (Masaki, 2000). In the end, Japan chose not to participate in the peacekeeping mission, even though the MOFA believed “active participation in UN peacekeeping efforts is essential for Japan’s bid to win a permanent seat on the powerful UN Security Council” (Masaki, 2000). Nevertheless, the MOFA’s dominance in the foreign policy decision-making process has meant influential MOFA bureaucrats, who have traditionally supported increased military involvement...
in UN and other peacekeeping missions,\textsuperscript{46} have been able to push Japan’s bid for a permanent seat. According to Akistoshi Miyashita, officials in the MOFA have “felt that Japan’s participation in the UN peacekeeping operations would strengthen its bid for permanent membership in the Security Council, as it could demonstrate to the world that Japan was both willing and able to assume its responsibility for global peace and security” (2002, 162).

Another important domestic influence on Japanese foreign policy is that such policies are developed, not within the various committees of the Japanese parliament, but rather within the majority political party or coalition of political parties in that body. The majority political party in the Japanese parliament for most of the post-Second World War period has been the LDP, which has generally supported a more prominent role for Japan in international affairs and a permanent seat on the UNSC. Several scholars have pointed to the prominent role of the LDP in foreign policy making since the end of the Second World War (e.g. Hosoya, 1974; Hellman, 1976; Pempel, 1977; Ahn, 1998). According to Donald Hellman, the foreign policy-making process in Japan is centered in the “intraparty decision-making process of the LDP” through which all other domestic groups such as opposition political parties, bureaucracy, and interest groups gain access (1976, 24). Similarly, C. S. Ahn argued the LDP “played an important role in interministry policy coordination when the party dominated every aspect of Japanese politics and policy making” from 1955 to 1993 (1998, 55). In addition, T. J. Pempel argued since “the LDP has monopolized control of government for more than twenty years, it is difficult to treat it as merely a ‘link’ between populace and government” (1977, 730). Pempel concluded that the LDP, for all practical purposes, was the government (1977, 730).

How specifically has the influence of the LDP impacted foreign policy decisions? Hellman argued the Japanese have a tradition of foreign policy decision-making by consensus and compromise, which means the LDP has had a responsibility to “respect and seek accommodation with the views of those out of power” (1976, 23). This tradition has, according to Hellman, generally not permitted Japanese leaders to implement an aggressive and proactive foreign policy, but rather has resulted in Japan being a “passive and reactive actor” on the international scene (1976, 26). Similarly, Kent Calder argued that within a LDP “increasingly important in foreign policy formation, there are few incentives to propose clear, independent foreign policy initiatives” (1988, 530). To support his argument, Calder pointed to the belief that LDP legislators tend to be “highly sensitive” to well-organized, grassroots interest groups within their local districts, such as agriculture and small business groups, which largely have “no clear ideology or maxims for conducting

\textsuperscript{46} Kimberley M. Zisk suggested that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) was divided on how to contribute to UN and other peacekeeping missions. Some MOFA bureaucrats favor using SDF personnel, while other MOFA bureaucrats favor creating “a separate, non-SDF organization that would send militarily trained Japanese personnel on peacekeeping missions as civilians not under military command” (2001, 25).
international relations other than a pragmatic response to foreign pressure” (1988, 531).

Japan’s pursuit of a more active role in maintaining international peace and security, including obtaining a permanent seat on the UNSC, might have been adversely affected by significant developments in domestic politics occurring between 1993 and 1996. The LDP lost its governing majority in the parliament for the first time in 38 years as a result of the July 1993 elections, and Morohiro Hosokawa of the Japanese New Party (JNP) formed a left-of-center coalition government in August 1993. The JNP, as well as the Japanese Socialist Party (JSP), expressed their opposition to Japan’s bid for a permanent seat on the UNSC (Ahn, 1997, 377). The LDP’s fall from power also resulted in a lack of foreign policy coordination between the new governing coalition in the parliament and the MOFA. For example, Japan’s bid for a permanent seat was “derailed” by a significant discrepancy in Prime Minister Hosokawa’s speech before the UNGA in September 1993 and a position paper regarding Japan’s bid for a permanent seat submitted by the MOFA to the UN Secretariat in July 1993 (Ahn, 1997, 369). Specifically, Prime Minister Hosokawa suggested the reform of the UN was a “condition for Japan’s entry to the UNSC as a permanent member” while the MOFA position paper did not specify such a condition (Ahn, 1997, 369).

The coalition governments during the period from 1993 to 1996 were largely preoccupied with domestic policies, including political and economic reforms, than they were with foreign policies. Indeed, Eugene Brown argued “the fragility of the coalitions has caused emphasis to be placed on maintaining sufficient unity to press forward on the divisive issue of political reform rather than undertaking bold foreign policy initiatives” (1994, 432). It was reported the Japanese government had been reluctant to push for a permanent seat on the UNSC because of “wide differences in political positions of coalition parties.” The LDP did regain some power when it formed a coalition government with the left-of-center Japanese Socialist Party (JSP) in June 1994, although Tomiichi Murayama of the JSP was named as prime minister. After the resignation of Prime Minister Murayama, Ryutaro Hashimoto of the LDP formed a coalition government as prime minister in January 1996.

Finally, there is evidence Japanese foreign policy has been influenced by public opinion (Miyashita, 2002, 155). In the mid-1980s, Frank Langdon argued the basic constraint on Japanese security policy was “neither constitutional nor legal, but simply the continuation of the postwar popular rejection of anything that smacks of strong military forces or suggests the possibility of any return to wartime or prewar military domination” (1985, 404). However, the evidence suggests that during the past several decades Japanese public opinion has been both a constraint and a pressure on Japanese foreign policy in general and its strategy for pursuing a permanent seat on the UNSC in particular.

47 The Japan Times, October 11, 1993, 3.
According to Risse-Kappen, Japanese public opinion was relatively stable and consistent on foreign policy and national security issues from 1945 to 1990 (1991, 489). During this period, public opinion was consistently opposed to Japan’s involvement in multilateral security arrangements and overseas military involvements, although a plurality of the public supported Japan’s bid for a permanent seat on the UNSC. In June 1988, a *Yomiuri Shimbun* survey found 23 percent of respondents supported the involvement of the SDF in overseas peacekeeping missions (Ishizuka, 2001, 11). Furthermore, a survey conducted by the government found some 41 percent of respondents supported a bid for a permanent seat, 17 percent were opposed, and 42 percent were “not sure” (Watanabe, 2005).

Japanese public opinion was also consistently opposed to amending the “peace constitution” to allow for the overseas deployment of SDF personnel. Even as late as September 1990, a *Yomiuri Shimbun* survey found only eight percent of the respondents supported revising the constitution to permit SDF personnel to be sent overseas. The same survey found only 23 percent of respondents agreed SDF personnel should be sent overseas if requested by the UN, while 40 percent were opposed. Another poll of Japanese public opinion regarding the *United Nations Peace Cooperation Bill* – which would have permitted SDF personnel to serve overseas in UN peacekeeping missions – found 58 percent of respondents opposed to the bill, while only 21 percent of respondents supported the bill (Miyashita, 2002, 160). According to Chaiwat Khamchoo, the “pacifist” public attitude of the Japanese people prior to the early 1990s “imposed practical limitations on policy makers, inhibiting attempts to broaden the Japanese security role” (1991, 20).

However, there was a noticeable shift in Japanese public opinion after the Persian Gulf War (Ishizuka, 2002, 11). Just after the end of the war in February 1991, a *Yomiuri Shimbun* survey found 56 percent of respondents supported involvement in maintaining international peace and security, while 34 percent were opposed to such involvement. After Japan sent minesweepers to the Persian Gulf in April 1991, a survey of Japanese public opinion found 65 percent of respondents supported the decision, and the same poll found 74 percent of respondents supported SDF participation in UN peacekeeping missions (Miyashita, 2002, 161). Similarly, an *Asahi Shimbun* poll found 56 percent of the respondents supported the decision, and only 30 percent of the respondents opposed the decision (Purrington, 1992, 171). Public support for Japan’s bid for a permanent seat on the UNSC also increased after the Persian Gulf War. The Japanese MOFA conducted a poll in early 1994, which found that nearly 53 percent of the respondents favored a permanent seat on the UNSC for Japan while only about 15 percent opposed a permanent seat for Japan (Hiroshi, 1995, 438). Similarly, a majority of respondents (56 percent) in a January

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The 1995 survey supported Japan’s bid for a permanent seat on the UNSC while only 18 percent were opposed.  

The terrorist attacks in September 2001 and the U.S. invasion of Iraq in March 2003 were further shocks to Japanese public opinion. While recent surveys indicate a growing percentage of the Japanese public favoring SDF military involvement in peacekeeping and other non-military missions, most Japanese remain opposed to a significant expansion in overseas military involvement by the SDF. According to a NHK survey in July 2003, some 43 percent of respondents supported a draft law to approve deployment of SDF military personnel in Iraq, while 48 percent opposed the draft law. After the Japanese government decided to deploy some 1,000 SDF personnel to Iraq in December 2003, a survey by Asahi Shimbun found 55 percent of respondents opposed the deployment, while 34 percent supported the deployment. Although the Japanese public has generally been more willing to support a greater role for the SDF in contributing to global peace and security in the post-Cold War period, public opinion arguably remains an important constraint on Japanese foreign policy.

Conclusion

While the examination of a single case can not provide conclusive evidence regarding the hypotheses posed earlier in this article, there is some evidence in support of the overall argument that Japan’s choice of strategies for pursuing a permanent seat on the UNSC has been influenced by a combination of interacting factors from the international, regional, and domestic levels (see Table 1). At the international level, there is strong evidence that Japan chose a relatively less aggressive strategy for pursuing a permanent seat during the Cold War period when it was not perceived to be a major global power (Hypothesis 1). In addition, there is evidence Japan shifted from a relatively less aggressive strategy to a relatively more aggressive strategy in response to changes in the distribution of power in the international political system (Hypothesis 2).

The first shift in strategy occurred shortly after the end of the Cold War period and Japan’s emergence as a global power in the international political system in the early 1990s. As a result of the shift from bipolarity to multipolarity after the end of the Cold War, Japan experienced considerable international pressure to increase its contributions to global peace and security, especially during the Persian Gulf War. The second shift in strategy occurred shortly after the events of 9/11 and the U.S. invasion of Iraq in March 2003 when Japan again experienced international pressure to enhance its role as a global power. In both situations, the strategy changes took

51 Foreign Broadcast Information Service-East Asia (FBIS-EAS), January 9, 1995, 16.  
52 Social Trends #49, July 24, 2003.  
place within about three years of global “shocks” that directly (and indirectly) influenced foreign policy decision making in Japan.

Table 1. Summary of Influences on Japanese Foreign Policy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Constraints</th>
<th>International Political System</th>
<th>Regional Political System</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bipolar International System—global rivalry between the U.S. and Soviet Union constrains the</td>
<td>Bipolar/Competitive Security System in the Asia-Pacific Region during the Cold War period</td>
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<td>development of an independent Japanese foreign policy; Japanese foreign policy tied to U.S.</td>
<td>Japan threatened by Soviet Union’s expanding military power and political pressure in</td>
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<td>national security priorities during the Cold War; Japan not encouraged to contribute to global</td>
<td>East Asia.</td>
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<td>peace and security.</td>
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<td>Multipolar/Competitive Security System in the Asia-Pacific region during the post-Cold War</td>
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<td>period—Japan competes with Russia and China for power and influence in the region; regional</td>
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<td>powers view Japan’s bid for a permanent seat as an effort to enhance Japanese power in the</td>
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<td>region.</td>
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<td>Pacificist Political Culture—Japanese political culture characterized by pacifism and anti-</td>
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<td>militarism after the Second World War.</td>
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<td>“Peace Constitution”—Article 9 restricts Japanese involvement in overseas military operations</td>
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<td>and peacekeeping missions.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Tradition of Consensus and Compromise—LDP support for aggressively pursuing foreign policy</td>
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<td>goals, including a permanent seat on the UNSC, is constrained by opposition political parties</td>
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<td></td>
<td>in the Japanese parliament.</td>
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<td>Public Opinion—a plurality of Japanese public supportive of a permanent seat for Japan during</td>
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<td></td>
<td>the Cold War; a majority of Japanese oppose overseas deployment of SDF personnel during the</td>
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<td>Cold War.</td>
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Table 1 (cont.). Summary of Influences on Japanese Foreign Policy

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<tr>
<th>International Political System</th>
<th>Regional Political System</th>
<th>Domestic Political System</th>
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<td>Pressures</td>
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<td>Multipolar</td>
<td>Regional Rivalries</td>
<td>Nationalist Political</td>
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<tr>
<td>International System—</td>
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<td>Culture—Japanese</td>
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<td>Japan pressured by</td>
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<td>political culture</td>
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<td>the inter-national</td>
<td>Asian neighbors,</td>
<td>increasingly</td>
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<td>community,</td>
<td>including Russia,</td>
<td>nationalist and</td>
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<td>particularly the U.S.,</td>
<td>China, South Korea,</td>
<td>militaristic beginning in</td>
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<td>to increase its</td>
<td>and North Korea,</td>
<td>the mid-1990s.</td>
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<td>contributions to global</td>
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<td>peace and security</td>
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<td>1990s.</td>
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<td>Global Powers—</td>
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<td>Bureaucratic Politics—</td>
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<td>Japan encouraged by</td>
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<td>France, and Russia</td>
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<td>position in the foreign</td>
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<td>policy making process.</td>
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<td>seat beginning in the 1990s.</td>
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<td>Global Terrorism—</td>
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<td>Public Opinion—a</td>
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<td>Japan encouraged to</td>
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<td>contribute militarily to</td>
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<td>public supportive of a</td>
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<td>the global “war on terrorism”</td>
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<td>permanent seat for Japan</td>
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<td>after the terrorist attacks of</td>
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<td>and overseas deployment</td>
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There is also evidence that Japan was constrained from choosing a relatively more aggressive strategy for pursuing a permanent seat on the UNSC due to the existence of a competitive security (“balance of power”) system in the Asia-Pacific region during both the Cold War period and post-Cold War period (Hypothesis 3). At the same time, Japan was also pressured to pursue a relatively more aggressive strategy due to the existence of regional rivals that posed real or perceived threats to Japanese national security during both the Cold War period and post-Cold War period (Hypothesis 4). Therefore, the overall impact of regional factors was probably negligible due to the existence of both regional constraints and pressures on Japanese foreign policy. This is perhaps evident by the fact that, for the most part, while there were only insignificant changes in these regional factors between the Cold War
period and the post-Cold War period, there were in fact significant changes in Japan’s overall foreign policy, including its strategy for pursuing a permanent seat on the UNSC.

There is some evidence that Japanese foreign policy has been influenced by bureaucratic politics (Hypothesis 5), although this factor does little to explain the changes in Japan’s strategy for pursuing a permanent seat on the UNSC during the past couple decades. During both the Cold War and post-Cold War periods, the MOFA supported a relatively more aggressive foreign policy in general (and a relatively more aggressive strategy for pursuing a permanent seat). In addition, the MOFA was the dominant foreign policy-making agency in Japan during both of these periods. Therefore, the continual dominance of the MOFA in the foreign policy decision-making process during the Cold War period and post-Cold War period does little to explain recent changes in Japanese foreign policy. On the other hand, there is evidence that Japanese foreign policy, and its strategy for pursuing a permanent seat on the UNSC, was influenced by Japanese public opinion (Hypothesis 6). The evidence suggests that shifts in Japan’s strategy in 1994 and 2005 occurred shortly after measurable shifts in Japanese public opinion favoring a more active role in maintaining global peace and security. However, it is likely that Japanese public opinion was influenced by changes in the international political system.

Similarly, there is evidence that Japan’s strategy for pursuing a permanent seat on the UNSC has also been influenced by Japanese political culture (Hypothesis 7). Clearly, the shift to a more nationalistic (and militaristic) political culture during the post-Cold War period influenced changes in Japanese foreign policy in the last decade of the 20th century and the first decade of the 21st century. Here again, it is likely that Japanese political culture was affected by global “shocks” occurring with the end of the Cold War, the Persian Gulf War, and the events of 9/11.

There is some evidence that Japanese foreign policy has been influenced by political parties (Hypothesis 8), although there is little evidence that this factor significantly influenced changes in Japan’s strategy for pursuing a permanent seat on the UNSC. In fact, the dominance of the Japanese political party that most favored an aggressive and independent foreign policy, namely the LDP, had been diminished at about the same time there was an initial shift to a relatively more aggressive strategy in 1994. Clearly, the tradition of consensus and compromise in making Japanese foreign policy, as well as the influence of grassroots interest groups in Japan’s electoral districts, largely negated the impact that the LDP might have otherwise had on the pursuit of a permanent seat on the UNSC.

Finally, there is some evidence that Japanese foreign policy has been influenced by particular provisions of the Japanese constitution (Hypothesis 9). However, it is once again unclear how much effect that the Japanese constitution has had on changes in Japan’s strategy for pursuing a permanent seat on the UNSC since the 1990s. Although the Japanese parliament has approved legislation in the past several
years to permit military personnel to serve abroad in non-combat missions, the constitutional provisions that prohibit the use of military force abroad have not been changed. Nevertheless, there have been significant changes in Japanese foreign policy and its strategy for a permanent seat.

Overall, this study has shown that future research on Japan’s strategy for obtaining a permanent seat on the UNSC since the mid-1960s should focus on international, regional, and domestic politics. In addition, future research on the politics of seeking permanent representation on the UNSC should expand the focus to other aspiring permanent members such as Germany, India, Brazil, Indonesia, Egypt, Nigeria, and South Africa. In particular, scholars should examine the extent to which the strategies of these other aspiring permanent members have been influenced by international, regional, and domestic constraints and pressures. Are there any major differences regarding the strategy choices of aspiring permanent members or major differences in the relative influence of international, regional, or domestic factors on the strategies of aspiring permanent members? If there are major differences in the strategy choices of these aspiring permanent members, what accounts for these differences? Did changes in the international system in the early 1990s have similar or different effects on these countries? Answers to these and other questions will undoubtedly further contribute to our understanding of the politics of seeking a permanent seat on the UNSC.
References


